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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS  
Decentralization has been a popular theme in development thinking and practice for at 
least two decades. The interest here lies in the impact of decentralisation of government 
expenditures and revenues upon human development. This survey explores the extensive 
literature on decentralisation, revealing the lack of quantitative and rigorous studies. It 
emerges that this is an area where few, if any, general propositions will hold. Nonetheless 
detailed analysis of the various dimensions of decentralisation - participation, financing 
and comparative priorities - and of the relevant effects upon efficiency, resource 
availability and equity, enables us to draw some interesting lessons from its theory and 
practice. These can be summarised as follows.  
Regarding efficiency, the main problems associated with centralisation include the 
irrelevance of projects and policies to local needs and conditions, lack of adaptability, 
delays, under-utilisation of local resources and inadequate maintenance. It is observed 
that decentralisation has demonstrated potential to lead to more appropriate and better 
utilised facilities, lower costs per unit of service and improved operations and 
maintenance. However, greater efficiency need not necessarily accompany 
decentralisation, given the risk of loss of economies of scale, duplication and overlap. In 
any case, there must be a fairly thoroughgoing devolution of authority in order that the 
presumed advantages might follow.  
We distinguish two lines of thought with respect to political participation in public 
decision making, which focus upon the developmental and instrumental aspects, i.e. as an 
end in itself, and as a means to better outcomes, respectively. Whilst acknowledging the 
value of the former, our ultimate interest here lies in the impact of decentralisation and 
participation upon the nature of expenditure and revenue decisions affecting human 
development. Even where national officials and local elites dominate local decision 
making structures, the outcomes may be more positive in terms of human development 
than that which would have resulted under a centralised system. More extensive evidence 
bearing upon these issues is discussed under the headings of comparative priorities and 
equity.  
The discussion and quantitative analysis of the comparative priorities of different levels 
of government suggests that local governments, where some thoroughgoing devolution of 
decision making power takes place, are likely to make expenditure decisions which 
accord to the basic priorities of human development. Not only do local governments tend 
to focus on more basic (and cheaper) levels of provision, the evidence suggests that their 
expenditure patterns as a whole are more oriented towards education, community amenities and health care. This is contrasted to a picture of central priorities, wherein the 
social allocation ratio averages 28%, and the social priority ratio 38% (HDR 1991, p.41).  
With respect to effects on equity, a distinction is drawn between its inter- and intra-
district aspects. It is found that intra-district equity is likely to improve, following 
increased expenditure on basic social services which increases access and utilisation on 
the part of poorer members of the community. At the same time however, the pivotal role 
of central grants in affecting inter-district equity is identified and explored, in both 
theoretical and practical terms. It is found that the prevailing fiscal arrangements under 
decentralisation - by design or otherwise - typically fail to enhance inter-district equity. 
The incidence of taxation is also investigated. Due to data limitations, no conclusive 
determination can be made as to the relative progressiveness of decentralised, versus 
centralised taxation systems; the most which could be said that neither appears to be very 
regressive.  
Beyond the expansion of basic social services, increasing income earning opportunities is 
a crucial aspect of human development. In principle, decentralisation may promote 
economic activity via several routes including an increased infusion of capital and other 
resources, the more extensive provision of infrastructure, and a more effective enabling 
environment than would have been the case under a centralised system. A number of 
examples are found to illustrate these possibilities.  
Resource availability under a decentralised system is an important aspect of the present 
survey. It is shown that the nature of the assignment problem means that vertical fiscal 
imbalances are almost inherently likely to occur, and that in practice local taxation is 
limited by the fragmented nature of the system, centrally imposed restrictions and 
administrative constraints. At the same time it is clear that taxation at all levels is subject 
to evasion and practical administrative problems. It is argued that cost recovery raises 
significant efficiency and equity considerations, which lead to the conclusion - contrary 
to World Bank opinion - that the nature of local government responsibilities (e.g. primary 
education and primary health care) renders user charges inappropriate at the local level. 
Given the likelihood of fiscal gaps emerging, inter governmental financial arrangements 
will play an important role. These are explored, with particular interest being accorded to 
the principle of financial autonomy. Whilst considerations of equity point to the need for 
central grants, the risk of national government dominance and corresponding local 
vulnerability is very real, as illustrated by a number of case studies.  
The need for increased public expenditure on human development leads us to explore the 
possibility that decentralisation may increase total public resource mobilisation. It is 
found that voluntarism is fairly widespread at the local level (as predicted by the visible 
benefits principle) although it rarely accounts for substantial amounts of revenue. 
Borrowing is another route by which additional resources can be mobilised for local 
government, although this can be problematic given, for example, the potentially adverse 
implications for the efficacy of national macroeconomic policy. It is likely to remain a 
relatively marginal form of finance in developing countries, limited to the largest and 
most financially viable municipalities. It is shown that inter governmental transfers often tend to provide disincentives to, and/or substitute for, local revenue raising especially in 
the absence of such mechanisms as matching requirements. However the empirical 
evidence available suggests that, in general, the degree of decentralisation and total 
public resource mobilisation have little to do with each other.  
Finally the significant underlying theme relating to the obstacles confronted in 
decentralisation efforts is explored. There is ample evidence of political resistance to 
decentralisation by those who perceive their vested interests to be threatened, and of the 
bureaucratic problems, especially relating to staffing.  
Overall the picture of decentralisation in developing countries which emerges reflects - 
both in theory and practice - significant potential for human development. Provided that 
the devolution of decision making power is thoroughgoing, the provision and utilisation 
of basic social services and levels of economic activity can be expected to expand. This 
does not deny a significant role for national authorities - whose actions have a crucial 
bearing in ensuring a minimum degree of provision (in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms), acting to take advantage of economies of scale, and avoiding unnecessary overlap 
and duplication, and in mobilising public revenue, as well as promoting inter district 
equity.  
It may therefore be appropriate that the focus of central governments shift, from direct 
decision making about the details of provision of basic social and economic infrastructure 
to providing a supportive role where local institutions can more effectively provide such 
services, especially in previously neglected regions, and to poorer sections of the 
community. This is not to suggest that the contemporary experiences of decentralisation 
in developing countries typically present such a rosy picture. It is seen that under existing 
arrangements the functions and finances of local government institutions are often quite 
limited, and so more appropriately described as deconcentration; that local administrative 
and revenue raising capacity is inadequate; and that inter-district equity may well worsen. 
Thus the message portrayed here is that decentralisation, under certain significant 
conditions, can have substantial positive implications for human development in 
developing countries.  
1. Introduction  
Human development, defined in terms of the expansion of peoples' capabilities, has 
several aspects. Foremost among these are to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire 
knowledge and to enjoy a decent standard of living. These, in turn, raise such dimensions 
as access to basic social services, expansion of income-earning opportunities; and 
participation - both political and economic.  
The task here is to evaluate the literature on decentralisation in the above terms. 
Decentralisation can be seen in the light of various objectives which, in turn, contribute to 
human development. The comparative priorities of different levels of government, 
together with issues of equity, efficiency and financing are all crucial. There are also 
important questions, very relevant to human development, about participation in decision making. In Part II this survey reviews the evidence on these dimensions, in order to 
appraise the extent to which decentralisation can contribute to human development, in 
terms of the above-mentioned dimensions. Part III investigates the characteristics of, and 
the issues raised by decentralisation in specific sectors. Finally Part IV tackles the issue 
of comparative priorities at different levels of government.  
It becomes clear that few definitive propositions hold in this area - in the sense that the 
question is not simply whether decentralisation per se is 'good' or 'bad' for human 
development. Rather there should be an appreciation of the various possibilities which 
can emerge under the rubric of decentralisation - the questions are therefore how to 
decentralise and what to decentralise and to whom, in order to maximise the benefits for 
human development. It is also important to bear the comparative aspect in mind - it is of 
fundamental interest to learn how local governments perform, relative to central 
government.  
Defining decentralisation  
There are many kinds of reforms which fall under the banner of decentralisation. It is 
therefore useful to follow Hicks (1961) and Rondinelli (1984) and distinguish between 
different modes of decentralisation along the following lines:  
   
•  deconcentration - spatial relocation of decision making - i.e. the transfer of some 
administrative responsibility or authority to lower levels within central 
government ministries or agencies; 
•  delegation - assignment of specific decision making authority - i.e. the transfer of 
managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to public organisations 
(e.g. local governments or parastatals) outside the normal bureaucratic structure of 
central government; and 
•  devolution - transfer of responsibility for governing, understood more broadly - 
i.e. the creation or strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national units of 
governments, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of 
central government. 
As far as possible, this survey will focus upon the second and third modes of 
decentralisation -although as will be seen, the first more limited form appears to be the 
most common approach reflected by developing country experience. There is frequently a 
large gap between the rhetoric, and the reality of the extent to which national 
governments are prepared to decentralise decision making authority. (Conyers 
(1981,1986) emphasises this point, as does Slater (1989).) Moreover, it can be argued 
that many decentralisation programs have involved devolution to "hybrid" bodies, 
composed of both locally elected and centrally appointed representatives (Conyers, 
1981). It is possible to find so-called devolved "local governments" that have similar, or 
even less discretionary authority than do deconcentrated units" (Olowu 1989). And it is 
difficult to draw a sharp line between devolution and deconcentration when, for example, executive officials are popularly elected (as are town and district officers in Tonga) 
(Larmour 1983). It is therefore important to examine attempts at decentralisation 
carefully.  
The Extent of Decentralisation  
The impact of decentralisation upon human development will obviously depend upon the 
relative importance of local government. In the present context, this is best indicated by 
the share of local government in total government expenditure, which varies widely 
among developing countries. This measure is only a rough guide, however, in the sense 
that local spending decisions may not be autonomous, as discussed below. One survey, 
for a sample of sixteen developing countries for which comparable data was available, 
found that the share ranged from 55% in India, down to 2.5% in The Gambia (WDR 
1988). For seven of those countries, less that 10% of total government spending was 
conducted through local government.  
The size of the sub-national units is a related dimension. The main focus of the present 
survey is upon what is typically the lowest level of government - often known as the 
district or area. This can vary quite widely in size, even within countries. In Botswana, 
the range in population is from 22 000 to 364 000. In Africa generally, the size (both in 
terms of area and population) of the basic units of government is relatively larger than 
that of industrial countries (Olowu 1989) (see Table 1). Obviously the demographic and 
geographic circumstances of the particular country are, amongst other factors, relevant - 
as extreme alternatives compare Indonesia or India to, say, Costa Rica or The Gambia. 
There may also be some relationship between, for example, the relative efficiency of 
local government performance and its size, due to such factors as economies of scale.  
Throughout this survey there are also references to what is often the second tier of 
government - state or provincial. This is due to (i) the need for evidence on particular 
aspects of decentralisation (e.g. the assignment problem); and (ii) the implications of such 
arrangements often appear to be relevant to decentralisation to lower levels of 
government.  
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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS  
Decentralization has been a popular theme in development thinking and practice for at 
least two decades. The interest here lies in the impact of decentralisation of government 
expenditures and revenues upon human development. This survey explores the extensive 
literature on decentralisation, revealing the lack of quantitative and rigorous studies. It 
emerges that this is an area where few, if any, general propositions will hold. Nonetheless detailed analysis of the various dimensions of decentralisation - participation, financing 
and comparative priorities - and of the relevant effects upon efficiency, resource 
availability and equity, enables us to draw some interesting lessons from its theory and 
practice. These can be summarised as follows.  
Regarding efficiency, the main problems associated with centralisation include the 
irrelevance of projects and policies to local needs and conditions, lack of adaptability, 
delays, under-utilisation of local resources and inadequate maintenance. It is observed 
that decentralisation has demonstrated potential to lead to more appropriate and better 
utilised facilities, lower costs per unit of service and improved operations and 
maintenance. However, greater efficiency need not necessarily accompany 
decentralisation, given the risk of loss of economies of scale, duplication and overlap. In 
any case, there must be a fairly thoroughgoing devolution of authority in order that the 
presumed advantages might follow.  
We distinguish two lines of thought with respect to political participation in public 
decision making, which focus upon the developmental and instrumental aspects, i.e. as an 
end in itself, and as a means to better outcomes, respectively. Whilst acknowledging the 
value of the former, our ultimate interest here lies in the impact of decentralisation and 
participation upon the nature of expenditure and revenue decisions affecting human 
development. Even where national officials and local elites dominate local decision 
making structures, the outcomes may be more positive in terms of human development 
than that which would have resulted under a centralised system. More extensive evidence 
bearing upon these issues is discussed under the headings of comparative priorities and 
equity.  
The discussion and quantitative analysis of the comparative priorities of different levels 
of government suggests that local governments, where some thoroughgoing devolution of 
decision making power takes place, are likely to make expenditure decisions which 
accord to the basic priorities of human development. Not only do local governments tend 
to focus on more basic (and cheaper) levels of provision, the evidence suggests that their 
expenditure patterns as a whole are more oriented towards education, community 
amenities and health care. This is contrasted to a picture of central priorities, wherein the 
social allocation ratio averages 28%, and the social priority ratio 38% (HDR 1991, p.41).  
With respect to effects on equity, a distinction is drawn between its inter- and intra-
district aspects. It is found that intra-district equity is likely to improve, following 
increased expenditure on basic social services which increases access and utilisation on 
the part of poorer members of the community. At the same time however, the pivotal role 
of central grants in affecting inter-district equity is identified and explored, in both 
theoretical and practical terms. It is found that the prevailing fiscal arrangements under 
decentralisation - by design or otherwise - typically fail to enhance inter-district equity. 
The incidence of taxation is also investigated. Due to data limitations, no conclusive 
determination can be made as to the relative progressiveness of decentralised, versus 
centralised taxation systems; the most which could be said that neither appears to be very 
regressive.  Beyond the expansion of basic social services, increasing income earning opportunities is 
a crucial aspect of human development. In principle, decentralisation may promote 
economic activity via several routes including an increased infusion of capital and other 
resources, the more extensive provision of infrastructure, and a more effective enabling 
environment than would have been the case under a centralised system. A number of 
examples are found to illustrate these possibilities.  
Resource availability under a decentralised system is an important aspect of the present 
survey. It is shown that the nature of the assignment problem means that vertical fiscal 
imbalances are almost inherently likely to occur, and that in practice local taxation is 
limited by the fragmented nature of the system, centrally imposed restrictions and 
administrative constraints. At the same time it is clear that taxation at all levels is subject 
to evasion and practical administrative problems. It is argued that cost recovery raises 
significant efficiency and equity considerations, which lead to the conclusion - contrary 
to World Bank opinion - that the nature of local government responsibilities (e.g. primary 
education and primary health care) renders user charges inappropriate at the local level. 
Given the likelihood of fiscal gaps emerging, inter governmental financial arrangements 
will play an important role. These are explored, with particular interest being accorded to 
the principle of financial autonomy. Whilst considerations of equity point to the need for 
central grants, the risk of national government dominance and corresponding local 
vulnerability is very real, as illustrated by a number of case studies.  
The need for increased public expenditure on human development leads us to explore the 
possibility that decentralisation may increase total public resource mobilisation. It is 
found that voluntarism is fairly widespread at the local level (as predicted by the visible 
benefits principle) although it rarely accounts for substantial amounts of revenue. 
Borrowing is another route by which additional resources can be mobilised for local 
government, although this can be problematic given, for example, the potentially adverse 
implications for the efficacy of national macroeconomic policy. It is likely to remain a 
relatively marginal form of finance in developing countries, limited to the largest and 
most financially viable municipalities. It is shown that inter governmental transfers often 
tend to provide disincentives to, and/or substitute for, local revenue raising especially in 
the absence of such mechanisms as matching requirements. However the empirical 
evidence available suggests that, in general, the degree of decentralisation and total 
public resource mobilisation have little to do with each other.  
Finally the significant underlying theme relating to the obstacles confronted in 
decentralisation efforts is explored. There is ample evidence of political resistance to 
decentralisation by those who perceive their vested interests to be threatened, and of the 
bureaucratic problems, especially relating to staffing.  
Overall the picture of decentralisation in developing countries which emerges reflects - 
both in theory and practice - significant potential for human development. Provided that 
the devolution of decision making power is thoroughgoing, the provision and utilisation 
of basic social services and levels of economic activity can be expected to expand. This 
does not deny a significant role for national authorities - whose actions have a crucial bearing in ensuring a minimum degree of provision (in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms), acting to take advantage of economies of scale, and avoiding unnecessary overlap 
and duplication, and in mobilising public revenue, as well as promoting inter district 
equity.  
It may therefore be appropriate that the focus of central governments shift, from direct 
decision making about the details of provision of basic social and economic infrastructure 
to providing a supportive role where local institutions can more effectively provide such 
services, especially in previously neglected regions, and to poorer sections of the 
community. This is not to suggest that the contemporary experiences of decentralisation 
in developing countries typically present such a rosy picture. It is seen that under existing 
arrangements the functions and finances of local government institutions are often quite 
limited, and so more appropriately described as deconcentration; that local administrative 
and revenue raising capacity is inadequate; and that inter-district equity may well worsen. 
Thus the message portrayed here is that decentralisation, under certain significant 
conditions, can have substantial positive implications for human development in 
developing countries.  
1. Introduction  
Human development, defined in terms of the expansion of peoples' capabilities, has 
several aspects. Foremost among these are to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire 
knowledge and to enjoy a decent standard of living. These, in turn, raise such dimensions 
as access to basic social services, expansion of income-earning opportunities; and 
participation - both political and economic.  
The task here is to evaluate the literature on decentralisation in the above terms. 
Decentralisation can be seen in the light of various objectives which, in turn, contribute to 
human development. The comparative priorities of different levels of government, 
together with issues of equity, efficiency and financing are all crucial. There are also 
important questions, very relevant to human development, about participation in decision 
making. In Part II this survey reviews the evidence on these dimensions, in order to 
appraise the extent to which decentralisation can contribute to human development, in 
terms of the above-mentioned dimensions. Part III investigates the characteristics of, and 
the issues raised by decentralisation in specific sectors. Finally Part IV tackles the issue 
of comparative priorities at different levels of government.  
It becomes clear that few definitive propositions hold in this area - in the sense that the 
question is not simply whether decentralisation per se is 'good' or 'bad' for human 
development. Rather there should be an appreciation of the various possibilities which 
can emerge under the rubric of decentralisation - the questions are therefore how to 
decentralise and what to decentralise and to whom, in order to maximise the benefits for 
human development. It is also important to bear the comparative aspect in mind - it is of 
fundamental interest to learn how local governments perform, relative to central 
government.  Defining decentralisation  
There are many kinds of reforms which fall under the banner of decentralisation. It is 
therefore useful to follow Hicks (1961) and Rondinelli (1984) and distinguish between 
different modes of decentralisation along the following lines:  
   
•  deconcentration - spatial relocation of decision making - i.e. the transfer of some 
administrative responsibility or authority to lower levels within central 
government ministries or agencies; 
•  delegation - assignment of specific decision making authority - i.e. the transfer of 
managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to public organisations 
(e.g. local governments or parastatals) outside the normal bureaucratic structure of 
central government; and 
•  devolution - transfer of responsibility for governing, understood more broadly - 
i.e. the creation or strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national units of 
governments, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of 
central government. 
As far as possible, this survey will focus upon the second and third modes of 
decentralisation -although as will be seen, the first more limited form appears to be the 
most common approach reflected by developing country experience. There is frequently a 
large gap between the rhetoric, and the reality of the extent to which national 
governments are prepared to decentralise decision making authority. (Conyers 
(1981,1986) emphasises this point, as does Slater (1989).) Moreover, it can be argued 
that many decentralisation programs have involved devolution to "hybrid" bodies, 
composed of both locally elected and centrally appointed representatives (Conyers, 
1981). It is possible to find so-called devolved "local governments" that have similar, or 
even less discretionary authority than do deconcentrated units" (Olowu 1989). And it is 
difficult to draw a sharp line between devolution and deconcentration when, for example, 
executive officials are popularly elected (as are town and district officers in Tonga) 
(Larmour 1983). It is therefore important to examine attempts at decentralisation 
carefully.  
The Extent of Decentralisation  
The impact of decentralisation upon human development will obviously depend upon the 
relative importance of local government. In the present context, this is best indicated by 
the share of local government in total government expenditure, which varies widely 
among developing countries. This measure is only a rough guide, however, in the sense 
that local spending decisions may not be autonomous, as discussed below. One survey, 
for a sample of sixteen developing countries for which comparable data was available, 
found that the share ranged from 55% in India, down to 2.5% in The Gambia (WDR 
1988). For seven of those countries, less that 10% of total government spending was 
conducted through local government.  The size of the sub-national units is a related dimension. The main focus of the present 
survey is upon what is typically the lowest level of government - often known as the 
district or area. This can vary quite widely in size, even within countries. In Botswana, 
the range in population is from 22 000 to 364 000. In Africa generally, the size (both in 
terms of area and population) of the basic units of government is relatively larger than 
that of industrial countries (Olowu 1989) (see Table 1). Obviously the demographic and 
geographic circumstances of the particular country are, amongst other factors, relevant - 
as extreme alternatives compare Indonesia or India to, say, Costa Rica or The Gambia. 
There may also be some relationship between, for example, the relative efficiency of 
local government performance and its size, due to such factors as economies of scale.  
Throughout this survey there are also references to what is often the second tier of 
government - state or provincial. This is due to (i) the need for evidence on particular 
aspects of decentralisation (e.g. the assignment problem); and (ii) the implications of such 
arrangements often appear to be relevant to decentralisation to lower levels of 
government.  
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2. Efficiency  This section attempts to set out and appraise the impact of decentralisation upon 
efficiency. Efficiency is a multi-faceted concept which can be used in at least three 
senses. Allocative efficiency involves the consideration of what is produced, preferences 
and how it is allocated between agents. From a neo-classical economic point of view, the 
basic proposition is that local governments are better able, given differing local 
circumstances and preferences, to satisfy varying local demands for public goods and 
services. X- or technical efficiency refers to cost-minimisation. In practice attention tends 
to focus upon the relationships between decentralisation and unit costs, the use of local 
resources, technical adequacy or quality, and the comparative extent of malfeasance. It is 
also important to view efficiency over time, or the intertemporal allocation of resources, 
which brings the issues of implementation and maintenance to the fore.  
We proceed to examine the various dimensions of efficiency in turn, adducing specific 
evidence wherever possible. It is demonstrated that, as in many other aspects of 
decentralisation, efficiency raises countervailing factors. The design of public goods and 
services may be more in accordance with local preferences under a decentralised system 
(allocative efficiency), but weighing against this are central standards which can ensure a 
minimum degree of quality and quantity of provision. The utilisation of local resources, 
information and technology may lower costs (technical efficiency); but the existence of 
economies of scale points in favour of more centralised provision (provided that dis-
economies do not thereby appear). The presence of externalities - i.e. absence of a market 
- also tends to justify provision and control by higher levels of government. Finally 
regarding implementation and maintenance (especially in the long term), the literature 
and evidence favour decentralisation, provided that this approach obtains a higher degree 
of user-participation than would have been the case in a centralised system.  
It follows that simple generalisations are not likely to emerge as to whether and how the 
structure of government affects efficiency. Nonetheless on balance it appears that 
theoretical and empirical considerations tend to favour local, rather than central 
responsibility. This is especially the case for public goods and services that have 
primarily local effects and where local adaptation is important.  
Overview of the Theoretical Arguments  
"The State should offer those services that correspond to its citizens' preferences... decentralisation is 
better apt to take into account the different preferences of the community's members than are extremely 
unitary states with their systematically uniform approach."  
(Frey 1977)  
Preferences  
The underlying economic theory falls into the realm of welfare economics and public 
choice (see Helm and Smith, 1987). It builds upon the propositions that individual 
preferences may vary by locality, and that information constraints inhibit the effective 
operation of central authorities. Thus the basic economic rationale for decentralisation 
rests largely on a negative observation, the inability of central government to deliver 
many public services efficiently. It has been suggested that the most efficient allocation of public resources is attained if such services are provided (and paid for) by 
governments responsible to those most directly affected (Tiebout, 1956).  
This is based on following assumptions. First, that the demand for local public services 
varies from place to place, because tastes and willingness to pay differ, for geographic, 
cultural and historical reasons (and that preferences within each locality are reasonably 
homogeneous). If this is the case, the central provision of local public goods, (if it tends 
to be uniform across the country), is unlikely to please anybody. The second assumption 
is that decentralisation would result in every local government providing a different 
bundle of local public services, which reflects local preferences.  
Tiebout (1956) suggested that rather than attempt to provide a voting mechanism to allow 
individuals to express their preferences, such preferences might be reflected in where 
people choose to live - i.e. where the bundle of local public goods provided coincided 
with their preferred choices. This thesis obviously requires several strong assumptions 
about freedom of mobility and the nature of the migration decision, and its applicability 
is limited. "Voting with one's feet" is impeded considerably both by costs of migration 
which are higher than the advantages expected elsewhere, and by the "very fuzzy ideas" 
that individuals tend to have about the cost/benefit effects of their choice of residence 
(Buchanan 1974, cited in Frenkel 1986). Unfortunately, there is very little empirical 
research on the relationship between consumer satisfaction with public services and 
organisational arrangements. (The only evidence uncovered related to the U.S. context, 
where it was found that urban areas with small scale police organisations tended to satisfy 
residents more than did larger forces: Frenkel 1986).  
The argument about preferences is nonetheless useful in highlighting the possibility that 
local governments act more in accordance with the needs and priorities of local 
communities than would higher authorities. It gains empirical support from such areas as 
implementation and maintenance, where local involvement has been found to result in 
more appropriate and better utilised local public services. Levels of utilisation have a 
significant impact upon the cost per unit of service, particularly in the long term. In the 
water sector it has been found that in the absence of some thoroughgoing devolution of 
decision making power to users, the gap between local preferences and product design 
generally results in poor long term prospects for the services (see below). In the health 
sector, levels of utilisation are often low, partly due to difficulties associated with access 
(distance, time, expense etc.), and partly due to the lack of local receptivity to 
government provided services. Local conceptions of actions appropriate to promote good 
health and combat illness may well differ from those offered by public health officials. It 
is important that the design of health services takes this into account, so that the 
organisational form evokes "active and appropriate use and co-operation based upon 
comprehending acceptance by the patient and community" (Wilson-Pepper 1982). 
Decentralisation of decisions about the provision of health care may result in approaches 
more consistent with local preferences, and in turn higher levels of utilisation and lower 
unit costs.  
 Box 1: Education and Preferences  
It has been predicted that greater efficiency will flow from a better match between individual 
preferences and educational services in a decentralised system (Winkler 1989). This, in turn, requires 
that people are able to exercise a degree of choice in the type of local school that their children attend 
by, for example, selecting local school administrators, or by relocating to districts which offer the 
educational services they prefer. Although there are no studies which determine the extent to which 
decentralisation alters the nature of educational services offered and the degree to which that meets 
local preferences (Winkler 1989), the following examples highlight several possibilities.  
(i) Schools may be organised in a way which is most appropriate for local needs - more intensive in 
the non-harvest, and breaks over the busy harvest season in rural areas. In the BRAC system, 
decisions about school hours and breaks are made in village meetings, which is said to contribute to 
the unusually high attendance rates in BRAC schools.  
(ii) Given regional variations in labour demand, it may be more efficient to provide different 
curricula, to better prepare people for the skills needed in the locality. Training in seeds 
improvement will obviously be more relevant to those in rural areas, than those in the capital city.  
(iii) The debate on the language of instruction is also relevant here. Decentralisation may lead to 
teaching in the first local language, to meet local demand. This is controversial however, because it 
may put those children at a disadvantage for future education and employment opportunities 
(Lockheed 1990). (So could curricula which focus solely on agricultural skills - this raises the same 
kind of issues.)    
 
Information  
"...one of the critical properties of all large-scale systems (is that) the authorities must 
act in an atmosphere of partial ignorance, considerable misinformation, and 
consequently of great uncertainty."  
(Easton 1979)  
Information is an important factor bearing upon the question of efficiency. When there is 
insufficient or asymmetrical information, it is difficult for government decision makers to 
predict the consequences of their decisions, and serious efficiency losses can follow. The 
probability of disparities between a decision maker's ideas about the effects of some 
policy and the actual local impact of the decision may be much greater in a centralised 
context. For example, political scientists have found that when information is transmitted 
through a hierachially-oriented structure, a selective distortion of information is likely 
given the desire of subordinates to advance their careers through forwarding favourable, 
and repressing adverse, reports.  
Such information constraints may be alleviated to some extent by virtue of having 
decision makers closer to "where the action is", through the creation of (at least partially) 
autonomous centres of decision making which function independently of the central 
authority. Schaffer (1982) saw local participation in planning and decision making in 
terms of the information needed for development programs, posing the question: " how can decentralisation be organised so that information, local women and men, and 
program planners can be effectively brought together?".  
Principals and Agents  
More generally, it is noted that decentralisation has been interpreted by some economists 
as an example of the general principal-agent problem: how to provide necessarily 
decentralised (to maximise information) agents (local government) with incentives to 
pursue the principal's (central government's) objectives. Substantive principal agent 
problems arise when there exist, as between different levels of government, conflicting 
goals and asymmetric information about local costs and needs.  
Whilst this perspective provides some useful insights into the economic rationale, 
advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation, it is not a complete basis for the 
present analysis. Principal-agent theory addresses the question: Given a hierarchial power 
structure (i.e. a relationship in which one party has the right to write contracts - which the 
other party can accept or not), what is the best contract that can be written, in terms of the 
principal's objectives? In the present case, it is recognised that the agents (local 
governments) have legitimate goals and objectives which may well diverge from those of 
the principal (centre).  
Decentralization is addressed here in the light of the task of this survey: what is the 
appropriate power structure - 'appropriateness' being defined in terms of the objectives of 
human development. There are two extreme alternatives - on the one hand the complete 
centralisation of all decision making authority, and on the other the general devolution of 
such powers - plus all the possibilities in between. It is difficult to evaluate each of these 
situations in standard principal-agent terms. It might be useful to extend the theoretical 
analysis to a more complex multi-principal model - i.e. to account for the principal-type 
roles of both local constituencies and higher authorities. Alternatively, the complexity of 
the issue of decentralising tasks and policy decisions suggests that a model of inter-
governmental bargaining might be more useful.  
Cost Per Unit of Service  
"...government costs increase in direct and geometric connection with centralisation."  
(Proudhon 1959)  
Whilst the foregoing section outlined the issues raised by economists who explore issues 
of efficiency and decentralisation in neo-classical theoretical terms, a survey of the 
literature and country experience reveals that such concerns are not always regarded as 
relevant. In practice attention tends to be focused upon the more tangible cost dimension 
of decentralisation - i.e. does decentralisation reduce the unit cost of providing public 
goods and services? This often involves countervailing factors, specifically the lower 
costs of local resources versus economies of scale and the risk of wasteful duplication 
and overlap.  Low Costs of Local Resources  
Decentralization may lead to lower unit costs, through simpler procedures and building 
upon existing local resources, knowledge, technology and institutional capacities. Time 
could be saved, delays due to conflicts between project staff and beneficiaries reduced or 
avoided, and local responsibility and oversight exercised, so that costs could be lower 
relative to those when the same services are provided by the central government. 
Statements which support this proposition can be found throughout the literature (see, for 
example, Lisk (1985) p.20; Allen (1987); Uphoff (1988) p. 50). Cost reductions are an 
important motivation for World Bank projects which seek to enhance community 
participation (Paul 1988).  
The processing of information involves costs which depend to some extent upon the 
distance between the origin of the data and their final use. In the process of transmission, 
each step entails costs, both the direct costs of the intermediary agencies (salaries, 
administrative infrastructure etc.), as well as those arising from the distortion of 
information which may lead to expensive misjudgment (Frenkel 1986).  
In rural localities which are characterised by low population density and relative 
isolation, it has been observed that public service delivery is "generally more difficult and 
expensive" (OECD 1986). However local governments may still be relatively more 
effective in these circumstances than their central counterparts, depending on the 
significance of such factors as economies of scale (discussed below).  
 
Box 2: Cheaper Local Resources in Water and Education  
Water programs have traditionally employed the relatively expensive services of professional 
engineers and other specialised technicians. A greater degree of reliance upon local personnel and 
resources under a decentralised system may be more cost effective. In Agua del Pueblo, multi-skilled 
field personnel, similar in concept to primary health workers, have been employed. High school 
graduates from rural backgrounds receive six months instruction in surveying, basic hydraulic 
engineering, system design and construction, health education, community organisation and project 
administration. Working under the minimal supervision of a civil engineer, they provide technical 
advice and support as the communities work through the steps of installing their water systems 
themselves (Cox and Annis 1982).  
Many national governments provide centralised "hugely expensive in-service training" for teachers 
(Garret 1989 p.309). Yet there is little, if any, evidence available that such formal training is an 
effective way of producing better teachers (id.). The BRAC teachers, for example, are not fully 
trained professionals but better educated, younger villagers who take part in an intensive 12-day 
training course and receive regular guidance and supervision (UNICEF 1990).    
 
There are some considerations which point the other way however - and indicate that 
decentralisation, through increased duplication and overlap, can increase costs. In Papua 
New Guinea, the provincial governments "created new public services that have very 
high per capita costs" (Rondinelli 1983 p.46). In Indonesia, overlap and duplication of responsibilities between the agencies of the various levels of government has been held to 
have resulted in considerable inefficiencies. This was also reported to be a concern in 
Nigeria.  
Costs of Scale  
Economies of scale point in favour of centralisation. A certain minimal area and, 
therefore, a certain degree of centralisation are necessary prerequisites for the provision 
of some public services, or at least for their cost-efficient provision. This tends to flow 
from the better utilisation of fixed facilities. It should also be noted that local decisions 
which rely solely upon local information may ignore the potential for externalities and 
economies of scale, which in turn creates wider costs for the society.  
Yet dis-economies of scale may also exist, where costs rise disproportionately with size. 
This is attributed to the increasing costs of information processing, professionalisation of 
the public service, and raised expectations in a centralised system. (Diseconomies have 
been found to be empirically significant in industrial countries: Hawkins 1976, cited in 
Frenkel 1986).  
Studies have found that economies of scale exist primarily in connection with those 
goods and services that are capital, rather than labour, intensive (Frenkel 1986). However 
it is not possible to determine whether scale produces economies or diseconomies in an 
abstract way and without relation to the actual public services provided in a given polity.  
 
Box 3: Economies of Scale in Education  
The proliferation of education agencies under decentralisation can increase overhead and 
administrative costs. In Latin American countries where the exercise of educational authority is said 
to bear a "marked political dimension", the pressure to reward supporters has resulted in the 
creation of multiple structures. The Ministry of Education in Venezuela had 34 central directorates, 
and the Mexican SEP 7 under-secretariats, 44 general directorates, 304 directorates and 6 councils 
(Cassusus, 1990, p.12). Decentralised administration may inhibit the realisation of economies of scale 
in such functions as curriculum development, examinations, textbook production, staff monitoring 
and teacher training (Lockheed 1990).  
On the other hand, school-based curriculum development could have a number of advantages. 
Teachers' skills and professionalism may be enhanced. Changes can be tailored to fit available 
resources. And teachers have a particular ability to judge the classroom value of ideas; teacher 
produced materials tend to have, for example, less start-up problems (Garret 1990). However 
research findings that local curriculum development results in greater job satisfaction and higher 
productivity are largely reported from countries where the teaching profession is comparatively well-
paid and highly motivated (Garret 1990). One cannot assume that such conditions exist in developing 
countries, nor that the attitudes of teachers toward additional workload would not be adverse.    
 
Externalities  "Decisions made by constituent units are invariably minority decisions that impose 
high external costs on the national majority"  
(Riker 1964)  
An important aspect of the efficiency question lies in the presence of externalities. Basic 
education and health care, for example, exhibit significant positive externalities in the 
form of benefits to the society and economy from having a healthy, literate and skilled 
population. The benefits will spillover beyond the local community, both directly (if 
people are mobile) and indirectly, through a more productive workforce. Education has 
been found to have negative effects on fertility and child mortality, and a positive impact 
on political awareness and participation (Armitage and Sabot 1988). In a decentralised 
system, there will be an undersupply of public services when localities only produce a 
public good until its marginal costs coincide with the marginal benefits for the locality's 
own inhabitants. The same issue arises in labour economics, from the reluctance of firms 
to invest in training of employees who may subsequently leave the firm. The possibility 
that such spillovers might tend to reduce the amount of services provided by the local 
community (firm) is a concern in the context of many basic social services - although it 
appears to be less relevant to water supplies. Externalities may be important for economic 
infrastructure - spending on road construction and maintenance, for example, will tend to 
benefit road users living outside the local jurisdiction as well as local residents.  
In order to counteract the tendency to underinvest in a decentralised system it might 
therefore be necessary to introduce measures to increase local spending on basic social 
services and economic infrastructure. These might include fiscal equalisation grants, 
incentives such as matching grants for revenues collected, and regulations which specify 
minimum expenditure levels, user fees or tax rates. The purpose of central grants which 
reflect externalities is to ensure economic efficiency in local spending decisions (Helm 
and Smith 1987 p.xii).  
National "product" standards, defining minimum requirements in such areas as education 
and health, also have an important role to play here. This represents a measure of 
centralisation which undermines local autonomy in decision making about the quality and 
quantity of provision. It is nonetheless necessary in order to promote levels of investment 
in services where excludability is not possible, but the positive externalities are 
significant. This is also related to the discussion of quality in the following section.  
Quality of Provision  
One of the many difficulties faced in investigating the comparative efficiency of 
centralised versus decentralised provision of public goods and services lies in the 
possibility that quality may vary under the different alternatives. This has direct 
repercussions for efficiency. If in education, for example, local provision leads to rising 
rates of failure, repetition or drop-out, any apparent cost savings might be illusory. 
Centralised control will at least guarantee certain national minimum standards in such 
areas as literacy and immunisation. This appears to be especially important where 
decentralisation exacerbates disparities in resource availability between different localities, so that the poorer areas are forced to resort to services which are lower in 
quality, whilst the better-off enjoy improved provision. Thus the issue of quality may 
have significant implications for inter-district equity (discussed below).  
Under a decentralised system, professional staff may be relatively more isolated and lack 
the frequency of contact with colleagues, than would have occurred under centralisation. 
This has been said to lead to a lower quality of service and provision than would 
otherwise have been the case (OECD 1986).   
 
Box 4: Quality and Decentralised Education  
It has been said that decentralisation is "the key that unlocks the potential of schools to improve the 
quality of education" (Lockheed et al. 1989, p.81). This claim is based on the improved performance 
of teachers, greater relevance of curricula, and so on. Yet there is evidence that decentralised 
education can be of lower quality, perhaps because local efforts are more likely to be necessary in 
poor, rural areas where the central government has failed to provide adequate educational 
opportunities (Winkler 1989). In a locality in which many parents of school children are themselves 
uneducated and thus unable to reach informed judgements about the relative costs and benefits of 
relatively high quality schooling, there is a concern that the quality will be less than socially optimal 
(Armitage and Sabot 1988).  
Overall, the evidence about the impact of locally provided schooling on the quality of education is 
mixed. The Harambee schools of Kenya are of low quality, in terms of inputs (teachers) and outputs; 
very few (13%) of harambee schools exceed minimum standards (grade 4 attainment levels) 
compared to almost 80% of central government schools. Mwira (1990) argues that a major effect of 
the harambee movement in education has been the "polarisation of the secondary school system, 
differentiating school type by quality"(p.360) (See table 2). But this is not the case in Bangladesh, 
where 95% of pupils from BRAC primary schools have passed examinations for entry into the fourth 
class of the official school system, and most of these children make the transition to government 
schools.    
 
Implementation and Maintenance  
An important advantage of decentralisation, relative to centralised provision, may lie in 
the better ability to facilitate the implementation of projects and programs in a wide 
variety of local circumstances. And in the long term, such investments may be more 
likely to be maintained and effectively utilised where the responsibility lies with local 
authorities. This is especially held to be the case where decentralisation enhances local 
community participation.  
This stands in contrast (and may be partly a reaction) to the evidence that institutional 
centralisation creates serious inefficiencies in the maintenance of development projects 
and programs (Wunsch 1991). This appears to be particularly relevant for rural 
infrastructure projects. A centrally directed and hierarchial bureaucracy has been found 
ineffective in undertaking various tasks of rural development, particularly under conditions of uncertainty and severely limited resources. It has failed to secure 
beneficiary participation, responsiveness to local needs, adequate maintenance and 
utilisation of infrastructure, and administrative flexibility. It is argued that this leads to 
serious inefficiencies in public expenditure. Thus decentralisation may be advantageous 
in its better and more timely decision making by those who have a more direct interest in 
sensible decisions, given that they are both their authors and the bearers of the 
consequences (see section 1.5.1).  
Information problem associated with multi-level hierarchies was noted above. There may 
also be a loss of selectivity through increased distance. The farther away a centre of 
decision and the more encompassing its responsibilities, the more difficult it may be for 
the decision maker to deal with small problems or issues of a predominantly local 
character which arise in the course of implementation and maintenance.  
Similar conclusions emerged from donor project evaluation studies at the beginning of 
the 1980s (USAID 1982; 1983). Maintenance problems were attributed to the 
competition for funds at the centre - the relatively less glamorous task of maintenance 
together with the tendency of officials to be distracted by more nationally visible 
concerns. Further, it was found that highly centralised project selection, design and 
management led to the construction of economic infrastructure that did not fit local 
conditions - use patterns, social realities and economic needs. This in turn resulted in 
underutilisation and local unwillingness to finance maintenance. And where maintenance 
was the responsibility of centrally based teams which serve many dispersed communities, 
there were often be long delays in responding to system failures. It is therefore, at least 
partly, a technical problem - as to how technical information is obtained, and how 
technical services are provided in an efficient manner.  
•  In Ghana, "local powerlessness has meant that roads, bridges and buildings await 
repair, and local improvement projects stand idle for months, awaiting national 
authorisations and funds which come too late or not at all" (Wunsch 1990 p.64). 
To summarise, the main issues which recur in the numerous writings which emphasise 
the inefficiencies associated with centralisation include: weakness in attaining and 
maintaining beneficiary participation (Uphoff 1986; Korten 1986); underutilisation and 
inadequate maintenance (Wunsch 1986); irrelevance to local needs and conditions; and 
lack of flexibility, adaptability and speed (Rondinelli 1983). These observations all 
impact upon the relative efficiency of the decentralisation/centralisation alternatives, and 
suggest that thoroughgoing devolution of decision making and authority will aid the 
effective implementation of programs and projects for human development.  
Local Participation in Decision Making  
"The colonists...at least have a greater interest in coming to a right judgement and will 
take greater pains to do so, than those whose welfare is very remotely and slightly 
affected ... If the colonists make bad laws, and select improper persons to conduct their 
affairs they will generally be the only, always the greatest sufferers....and must bear the ills which they bring on themselves, until they choose to apply the remedy". (Earl of 
Durham in his 1839 report on Canada, quoted in Frenkel 1986).  
Decentralization may alleviate technical problems in design and implementation given 
the greater relevance to local needs, conditions and available resources. If local 
authorities are willing and able to engage community support and participation their 
decisions and activities are likely to be based, to some extent, on the knowledge and 
desires of the local population. This, in turn, is likely to enhance the appropriateness and 
continued maintenance of local services and therefore the cost-effectiveness of the initial 
investment.  
If decentralisation promotes community participation, the management of operations can 
improve. Irrigation, for example, requires decisions about on-farm use of water and 
allocations from the distribution point to the farms. Interaction and consensus among 
water users at the distribution level is crucial for efficient day-to-day operations (Paul 
1989).  
Thus the degree to which decentralisation alleviates problems in the design and 
maintenance of development projects appears to be largely linked to the issue of 
community participation. Whilst there exists an extensive literature on the latter, its 
relationship with the practical and technical aspects of the decentralisation of government 
does not tend to be an important express concern. In order to bring the two together, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the discussion of participation in decision-making in Section 3 
below. Where decentralisation does facilitate and encourage local participation, then the 
benefits of community involvement - improved project design and implementation due to 
better match with beneficiary needs and better appreciation of local constraints etc. - can 
follow, and result in greater efficiency in government activities, especially in the long 
term.  
For example, the use of participatory methods to build reliable water systems and to 
motivate the complex behavioural changes needed for health improvements requires 
effective communication with the village clientele. This involves both technical decisions 
(what size of pipe) and also the resolution of social conflict (where to put the pipe) (Cox 
and Annis 1982).  
•  The Malawi self-help Water Project recorded impressive results in terms of 
numbers of village pipes constructed and local institution building. It reflected 
community consultation and involvement from the outset, and co-operation 
between the Department of Community Development and local leaders, the 
government providing materials and training, and the latter mobilising local 
contributions of labour. District Development Committees - comprised of local 
parliamentarians, Party members, and the district medical and technical personnel 
- are the channel of requests for piped water, and are involved in the design 
process. A villager is locally selected to become the para-technical trainee, to 
supervise the construction and maintain the pipes afterwards - s/he remains 
accountable to the community. Although final responsibility remains vested in the central department, the significant degree of decentralisation has resulted in a 
scheme which is effective in meeting local needs and resource availabilities. 
•  A 1979 study of 34 Guatemalan village water projects built over the previous 15 
years found that village involvement in operating and maintaining systems was 
essential to keep them working. Where villagers received practical training in 
operation and maintenance, there were fewer system failures and fewer days 
without clean water due to breakdowns (Cox and Annis 1982). This is an example 
where transferring the skills and responsibility for repair to the community proved 
to be an effective alternative to centrally based teams. 
•  A World Bank study found that of 25 completed agricultural projects it had 
financed, only 12 appeared to be achieving long-term benefits (cited in Uphoff 
1988). The projects most likely to demonstrate sustained improvements in 
productivity were those that strengthened institutional capabilities for beneficiary 
participation in management. 
Nonetheless, here, as elsewhere there is an array of country experience. There are a 
number of factors, ranging from the purely technical to the highly political, which impact 
upon the long term issue of maintenance. (See also Obstacles below). According to Paul 
(1989), the impact of community participation on the maintenance of facilities is mixed - 
successful in some functions of operations management but not in others. He concludes 
that the main reason for failure was the absence of complementary inputs such as 
effective training and extension services.  
Wunsch (1990) argued that centralisation and decentralisation (as conventionally 
practised) are both flawed, and that the vast majority of decentralisation efforts have 
failed to resolve the inefficiencies which have hitherto plagued development projects. He 
noted the following deficiencies:  
(i) The agendas and priorities of central ministries, which continue to control most 
program and project resources, have seldom been seriously affected (see Obstacles 
below);  
(ii) There has rarely been a notable improvement in local broad-based participation - 
local representatives have been field personnel of central ministries, local members of the 
dominant party, or from the most powerful caste or class factions (see Participation 
below); and  
(iii) Local plans are largely illusory, since localities were never allowed to raise and 
spend significant amounts of their own money (see Financial Autonomy below).  
The main point which emerges from this critique is that if "decentralisation" follows the 
mode of deconcentration, improvements in efficiency through better implementation and 
maintenance are unlikely to follow. It reiterates the point made elsewhere that only where 
there is a thoroughgoing devolution of decision making power are the presumed 
efficiency gains likely to be realised.    
Box 5: Water and Sanitation  
The issues of maintenance and community participation are particularly relevant to water and 
sanitation infrastructure projects. Recent writings from the World Bank (1987; 1988; 1990) have 
emphasised the finding that centrally-provided improved water supply systems often do not function. 
It has been estimated that "one in four water systems is not working at any one time, and that the 
number of systems being abandoned is approximately equal to the number being commissioned. 
Where breakdowns force people to use contaminated water for even 2% of the time, this risks 
undoing the health benefits of drinking clean water through the rest of the year (Cox and Annis 
1982). Even if they do function they are apparently often not being used. In Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, 
for instance, surveys have shown that only one third of the population reported to have access to 
improved facilities actually used them" (Briscoe et al 1990 p.116).  
In North-eastern Thailand, evaluations of a USAID project to provide handpumps found that, after 
five years, most of the handpumps were not working. The problem was that the villagers "did not 
want handpumps, which were not considered to be any significant improvement over the commonly 
used rope and bucket. Standpipes were no closer than their traditional sources and so offered no 
obvious benefits" (Briscoe 1988 p.10). (The IBRD studies tend to emphasise that sustaining and 
extending services depends upon mobilising "willingness to pay" - which has been the subject of 
contingent valuation studies. The main recommendation is for increased user charges).    
 
Local Institutional Capacity  
A growing body of literature underlines the vital importance of local institutional 
capacity in the operation and maintenance of development projects and programs. Fifty 
impact studies commissioned by USAID since 1979 have testified, almost invariably, to 
the proposition that local organisations must be able to shape development projects to 
their specific circumstances if such endeavours are to be both successful and sustainable 
(Harbeson 1990).  
The institutional capacity of local government depends largely upon such factors as the 
quality and quantity of staff engaged by local government (this is discussed further in 
Section 6.2.1 below). There must be a sufficient degree of skills, training and 
management at the local level to carry out the relevant tasks, and enough funds to finance 
local priorities. There must be a significant degree of autonomy in decision making 
processes. And so on.  
The Comparative Extent of Malfeasance  
If, under decentralisation and the closer scrutiny of the people local government does 
become more accountable for its actions, the relative incidence of malfeasance may be 
reduced. The justification for favouring local government, rather than either 
deconcentrated or centralised administration, lies partly in "the greater capacity of local 
voters, compared to central decision makers, to evaluate performance" (Helm and Smith 1987). "Goldfish bowl" effects can set limits on nonfeasance and malfeasance by local 
authorities, as observed in the education context, regarding teachers (see below).  
Malfeasance would be less likely under a decentralised system where at least some of the 
following conditions are met:  
(i) active participation in, and discussion of, local government decision making by the 
local population;  
(ii) open, clear and simple routine accounting procedures and reports;  
(iii) at least a basic degree of numeracy and literacy in the community; and  
(iv) some means by which malfeasance can be sanctioned - through, for example, the 
electoral process and the access of local people to cheap and effective adjudicatory 
systems to ensure due process and public accountability.  
Yet problems of accountability do arise at the local level - corruption has been described 
as "rampant" (Manglesdorf, 1988). This ranges from doctors pilfering medical supplies at 
the local level and selling them in their private practices (as reported in Ecquador) to 
reports that local councillors and officials have behaved "irresponsibly" with public 
resources, being concerned primarily with personal emoluments, jobs and status (Stren 
1989). In Africa, local government institutions had a "poor reputation...as the hot-bed of 
corruption, ineffectiveness and inefficiencies" (Olowu 1990). Hughes (1985) states that 
"all too frequently abysmal standards of morality and responsibility prevail, and local 
authorities have at various times been suspended on the ground of maladministration 
(including Banjul, Freetown, Calcutta and Delhi)".  
Malfeasance (at any level of government) is a waste of resources. The question to be 
addressed here is its relative significance at local, as opposed to central, levels of 
government. Corruption has been found to be a serious problem pervading national 
administration in a number of developing countries (see HDR 1991). In principle, 
decentralisation which brings decision making closer to the people, accompanied by 
established mechanisms of local accountability, can improve the operations of 
government in this sense. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence on this point, nor 
any reliable estimates of the comparative quantitative significance of malfeasance at 
different levels of government. Box 6 presents the only available evidence, which relates 
to the education sector. Overall it tends to support the proposition that accountability is 
improved, and malfeasance correspondingly less likely, when decisions are made at the 
local level.   
 
Box 6: The Comparative Extent of Malfeasance in Education  
The limited evidence available suggests that accountability in education can be enhanced under a 
decentralised system. In developing countries where inspection and supervision are the responsibility of higher authorities, these functions are often poorly executed due to inadequate resources 
(Lockheed 1990). In Senegal, school visits were limited by lack of transportation: only 28 vehicles to 
be used by over 600 staff in 41 regional directorates. The scope for malfeasance appears to be higher 
in such situations, than where the local community (particularly parents and principals) are able to 
supervise, and have the authority necessary to manage and improve instruction.  
In the Indian state of Karnataka, the Panchayata Act (1985) has involved people in planning and 
implementing local activities, through the gram sabha (meeting of all voters in the village). There has 
been a notable improvement in the attendance of teachers who are now accountable to the local 
community (Sanwal 1987). In Bangladesh, by way of contrast, where government teachers are 
centrally recruited, supervised and promoted, there is reported to be a high degree of absenteeism 
and malfeasance (by teachers). Their union strongly opposed attempts to delegate responsibility for 
teaching to the local level, allegedly because it feared the greater accountability that would result 
from such a shift (personal communication from a former secretary of the Ministry of Education, 
1991).  
The evidence on this point is not all one way, however. It is reported from Kenya that the Harambee 
schools, which are not subject to regular auditing, suffer from continued misappropriations of school 
funds to corrupt head teachers and their school committees (Mwira 1990 p.354). It is also noted that 
teacher opposition to local autonomy may be justified. One comparative study of the professional 
freedoms of teachers in 12 countries concluded that "the fact that the school cannot decide on 
promotions, appointments, dismissal and the recruitment of staff is a guarantee of professional 
freedoms" (cited in Davies 1988).    
 
Efficiency - Sectoral Considerations  
Ultimately the question of relative efficiency is largely empirical - unfortunately there 
exists little quantitative evidence which directly supports, or refutes, the various 
competing claims. An extensive search of the literature found only a handful of sectoral 
studies which rigorously evaluated the comparative cost of centralised versus 
decentralised provision. The distinguishing characteristics and concerns of each of the 
relevant sectors are summarised in the following subsections.  
Education  
Reduced costs are often put forward as an important rationale for decentralisation of 
education (Winkler 1989). Highly centralised systems of purchase and distribution of 
school inputs may be manifestly inefficient (as in Brazil, where pilfering and spoilage of 
central stores is reportedly rife). The structure of centralised bureaucracies may also be 
relatively costly. Yet the support for greater decentralisation on the ground of cost 
savings appears to be more theoretical than empirical. McGinn and Street (1986, cited in 
Cassusus, 1990) concluded that in the field of education there is only slight evidence that 
these policies work, and on the contrary, that there are many experiences which 
demonstrate that decentralising policies do not increase administrative efficiency.  
Case Studies  The construction costs of locally-built schools tend to be lower, due to cheaper materials 
and lower costs associated with contract administration (Winkler 1989, p19). BRAC 
schools hold classes in buildings made of bamboo or mud-brick, and children sit on mats 
on an dirt floor. However, there is evidence that children in schools with electricity and 
water learn more than pupils in schools without these facilities, although other 
improvements in construction have shown little impact on educational achievement 
(Lockheed 1990).  
There is only scattered direct empirical evidence on the issues of local financing and cost 
effectiveness. Jimenez et al (1988) claimed to be the first empirical work exploring the 
impact of local financing. The study, conducted in the Philippines, found that for given 
levels of enrolment and quality, schools which rely more heavily on local funding are 
more efficient (i.e lower cost). Regarding quality, it was found that students at schools 
which relied more heavily upon local funding attained better 'achievement scores' (see 
table 3) - although it should be noted that these schools also tended to be located in more 
affluent and urbanised communities. Local funding, collected via a surcharge on taxes on 
real property and certain cigarettes, is administered by the local school board. The school 
administration, local government and parents are represented on these boards. Locally 
generated funds, while small compared to total expenditures, made an important 
contribution to non-salary recurrent costs. It was suggested that increased efficiency 
flowed through the following channels:  
(i) A more appropriate input mix - Whilst teachers were assigned and paid centrally, local 
funding allowed schools to achieve a more appropriate balance between personnel and 
non-personnel costs (when central government spending on the latter had been falling).  
(ii) Lower personnel costs - through lower salaries and/or fewer non-teaching personnel.  
(iii) An improved incentive structure for local school administrators, accountable to local 
parents who are better able to monitor performance than central authorities.  
On the question of cost reductions in education it is noted that teacher salaries and 
benefits account for as much as 95% of recurrent government expenditures on primary 
schools in developing countries (Lockheed 1990). Given that teachers' salaries have been 
eroded significantly in many of these countries over the past two decades, it is doubtful 
whether further cost-cutting is appropriate.  
It is important to note that where cost reductions are achieved locally, this may well be 
due to a shift in the burden of resource provision - from governments to households 
through extensive in-kind contributions of the local community. Whilst cutting the overt 
costs of social services is an attractive proposition for central governments facing serious 
fiscal constraints, this may also impose severe additional burdens on poor families in 
times of economic distress.  
•  This can be seen in the Zambian context, where the shares of public expenditure 
allocated to education, particularly to the primary level, have fallen markedly over the past decade. Over the same period, local contributions to the direct costs of 
equipment, materials and maintenance have risen - so that it now exceeds the 
governmental outlay. It is reported that, in vital areas (such as teacher training and 
basic instruction materials), parental and teacher self help have virtually replaced 
the state's contribution (Hopper, 1989). Table 4 illustrates the various kinds of 
contributions that local communities in Zambia make to primary schools. Thus 
cases which represent "cost-cutting" through decentralisation may also raise 
important issues about the ultimate division of responsibilities for the provision of 
basic social services between the state and the private sector, and the 
redistributitive role of the central government. 
It has been suggested that decentralisation of education in debtor countries is directly 
linked to debt renegotiations with the IMF who recommend, inter alia, cuts in public (and 
ultimately education) spending (Hevia and Nuez, 1989).  
Health  
It is generally held that locally-provided primary health care (PHC) is a more cost 
effective approach than the provision of large central hospitals (see e.g. HDR 1990; 
1991). This follows from cost savings on personnel, more appropriate technology, 
cheaper and effective treatments, and lower overheads. On the other hand, 
decentralisation may enlarge the scope for delays, supply problems and malfeasance. The 
literature reflects that there are factors working both ways - enhancing and diminishing 
efficiency. On balance, the available evidence appears to favour decentralisation - which 
is largely due to the association between decentralisation and the pursuit of PHC 
alternatives.  
Case Studies  
•  In the slums of Bombay, local community involvement in door-to-door 
immunisation substantially improved the follow-up of triple and polio vaccination 
(Kowli et al 1990) (table 6). Costs were reduced when the help of schoolchildren 
and voluntary agencies was obtained. 200 children were invited to take 
responsibility for 1200 families (6000 individuals), and proved to be effective 
agents of change in the community. This is cited as 'a prime example of using 
local resources effectively without incurring extra cost' (p.171). 
•  Under a decentralised system, it may be possible to rely upon less qualified staff 
and achieve good results. It was found in Tamil Nadu, India, that paraprofessional 
staff (CHWs) paid as little as a quarter of a junior health professional's salary can 
be effective if tasks are limited and close supervision is available (Heaver 1984). 
However, since volunteers require close supervision, it may be more cost-
effective to implement a tightly managed training-and-visit type system. The 
latter approach has proved successful in producing behavioural change on a mass 
scale in situations where field staff and clients are poorly educated and 
geographically scattered. It concentrates on a few key tasks and on selected clients for maximum impact (e.g. pregnant women and children) and frequent 
home visits (Heaver 1984). 
•  A study of efficiency in primary health care in Indonesia which compared health 
centres, sub-centres and community health workers, found that community-based 
health care was the most cost effective approach (Berman, 1989). Both centres 
and sub-centres provided a similar type of services, through paramedical staff. 
Cost curves were constructed for specific health functions (curative care, maternal 
and child health, and family planning). It was found that community health 
workers were significantly cheaper than clinic-based care - the average costs of 
community-based nutrition programs, maternal and child health and family 
planning services were markedly lower than clinic-based services. This provides 
empirical support for the argument that there is significant potential for cost 
savings through the delegation of routine services to community health workers. 
On the other hand, there was no clear relationship between type of facility and 
average cost. It is noted that the capital, operating, maintenance and supervision 
components of costs are quite small - generally less than 10%. The variations in 
costs were related to both utilisation levels at the different facilities and the use of 
drugs and supplies. Although there did not appear to be any verifiable difference 
in efficiency between health centres and sub-centres, the latter were found to be 
clearly favoured by low-income users. This suggests an equity benefit from the 
decentralisation of health services to more peripheral units. In comparing 
MCH/FP in clinics with community based care, community health workers were 
both more efficient and more equitable (ibid p.321). 
•  One quantitative study of a public health program in Ecquador sought to test 
whether decentralised management was more efficient (Manglesdorf 1988). The 
rural health program recruited indigenous health workers from isolated rural 
villages into a two month training course, followed by placement back in their 
villages. The workers were supposed to be provided with the supervision and 
medical supplies needed to perform their duties. The study measured the 
productivity of health workers, in terms of numbers of home and pre-natal visits, 
village meetings and patients seen. Using multiple regression analysis it was 
found that decentralisation was not a significant determinant of the number of 
community meetings or patients seen. There was no effective supervision and 
logistical support. Supply shortages and delays were more severe under 
decentralisation. Yet overall productivity and decentralisation appeared to be 
unrelated. Also, there appeared to be an increase in the amount of maternal-child 
care under decentralised supervision. Within an eight year period the drop-out rate 
of the community health workers was 17%. 
•  Several factors may have contributed to these mixed results. Interviews identified 
shortages of supplies as the primary obstacle to performance of duties. This, in 
turn, could be attributed to the difficulties encountered by the government in 
financing the project on a large scale. Decentralisation worsened problems in the 
distribution of medical supplies, in terms of delays and shortages. The CHWs had 
difficulty in managing the revolving drug funds, partly because the price of 
pharmaceuticals rose sharply (after the 1982 devaluation). The second most cited 
problem was the lack of effective supervision. Most of the field supervisors had no training in the supervision of village health workers, were responsible for a 
range of duties - from supervision to administration, to direct patient care - and 
were not themselves accountable for their own performance. The observation that 
productivity was unrelated to the foregoing problems may reflect the ability of the 
rural poor to organise successfully to provide essential public goods. Accustomed 
to delay, most health workers either purchased supplies in the private sector or 
used medicinal plants. The study concluded that the most efficient degree of 
decentralisation is not only program specific, but also function specific - and that 
to the extent that functions are separable, decisions to decentralise should be made 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Water and sanitation  
Decentralization in the water and sanitation sector can lead to cost savings in a variety of 
ways. It may encourage voluntary contributions of materials and labour services. 
Community involvement in operation and maintenance can save money by reducing the 
number of expensive post-construction visits by outside maintenance personnel. Yet 
extensive local consultations and involvement may be more time-consuming and lead to 
delays. It is noted that much of the available evidence relates to the transfer of 
responsibilities to local communities and public utilities, and the use of private 
contractors, rather than to local governments per se.  
Case studies  
•  In Karachi, the Orangi Pilot Project had a successful low-cost sanitation program. 
It involved community participation which was facilitated by the modification of 
standard engineering technology and implementation procedures. Whereas the 
prices charged by the Karachi Municipal Corporation for laying sewerage pipes 
were beyond the means of the residents, if the residents formed a 'lane' (the basic 
unit of the system, comprising of 30-40 houses), then the Project would assist. 
The Project's social organisers held meetings to explain the program and its 
benefits to the lanes. A lane manager (selected by the residents) formally asked 
for assistance. The Project's technical staff surveyed the lane, and prepared plans 
and estimates for the lane manager. Initial problems with sub-standard work were 
overcome through a large extension effort. The project became increasingly 
involved in technical assistance, rather than motivating and organising the people, 
since the lanes began to organise themselves. Within five years over 1500 lanes 
had built sewerage systems. The total cost was considerably less than had the task 
been left to local authorities. The cost to the community was $1.7 million, and to 
the project $94 000, inclusive of capital expenditures; it is estimated that the 
Karachi Municipal Corporation would have spent about $8.5 million on this effort 
(Hasan 1988). 
•  The World Bank regards locally and privately supplied water supply systems as 
less costly than centrally provided. It compares Kenya, where 70% of the costs of 
the government-run scheme is spent on salaries, to Cote d'Ivoire where a private 
company operates most water systems and only 35% of expenditures goes to salaries. Private sector maintenance - by local mechanics - is recommended 
(IBRD 1987). 
On the other hand, there is evidence that decentralised provision of water can be 
inefficient, in terms of high installation costs, inadequate maintenance and so on. 
It is also noted that water systems built with extensive community participation 
can take longer to complete - the organisation and training of village water 
committees, health education and the instruction of local maintenance personnel 
all require the time and effort of program personnel.  
•  According to Rondinelli (1990) the inability of the local water authority in 
Guatemala City to manage the system efficiently increases substantially the costs 
of water services and reduces its capacity to recover revenue. The authority 
cannot account for 70% of the water in its distribution system - half of which is 
said to disappear though leaks, whilst illegal connections siphon off the rest. 
•  A primary objective of decentralisation and villagisation in Tanzania was the 
extension of access of clean water to all (Maro 1990). The government had to 
ensure that people would not abandon the newly established village communities 
for lack of water. But although there was a general increase in capital expenditure 
on rural water supply, it was small compared to the existing needs - by 1987, only 
42% of the rural population had access to water services (HDR 1992). Field 
surveys conducted by Maro (1990) stressed the inadequate maintenance of 
existing facilities - frequent breakdown of pumps and shortages of spare parts, 
repair technicians and fuel. 
 
Box 7: The Impact of "Demunicipalisation" Upon Efficiency - A Controversial Example.  
Colombia provides an interesting example of decentralised responsibility for water and sanitation, 
through semi-autonomous "decentralised agencies", rather than local government. The underlying 
rationale was that the municipios were inefficient, providing services on the basis of political/ 
personal criteria which were too charitable to consumers. The agencies, by way of contrast, were 
seen as technocratic with the virtues of flexibility and expertise. From the 1960s the agencies 
expanded in both size and number, and local governments became increasingly marginalised and 
functionally insignificant.  
There exist quite different assessments of the Colombian approach. The World Bank regards the 
program, which attained rural coverage of 80%, as the "best in Latin America", and states that local 
beneficiaries played a major role in all stages, from initiation to operation and maintenance. An 
administrative committee includes members of local authorities and village development committees, 
as well as locally elected leaders. In contrast, Collins (1989) is far more critical. He argues that the 
"demunicipalisation" of service provision in Colombia was selective. Local government continued to 
provide services in many of the larger urban centres (see Table 5), so that the pattern which emerged 
was of "a confusing mass of interwoven institutions and lines of authority with shared finances and 
responsibilities".  
In practice, according to Collins (1989) the record of the agencies was disappointing. Decision 
making was highly centralised, delays frequent, corruption rife, and the agencies remained highly 
dependent upon central funding. Field research in 1983-4 found that the growing social protest movements in the country held the decentralised agencies responsible for deficient public service 
provision - and that some 63% of the movement was directed against the agencies (Collins 1989). 
Since that time there have been significant changes in the structure of state organisation in Colombia 
- local government has been entrusted with the task of improving basic services, and the 
decentralised agencies reformed or abolished.    
 
Housing  
Decentralization can promote efficiency in meeting priority housing needs. It is widely 
held that greater efficiency requires a shift in the focus of public policies, away from 
direct central provision, towards the creation of an 'enabling environment' together with a 
larger role for local government, self-help and community groups. It has been observed 
that tapping local entrepreneurship, building materials and other underutilised local 
resources, will lower costs (UN 1989). Rather than replacing national with local direct 
provision, decentralisation may facilitate the satisfaction of basic housing needs via the 
creation of an environment which better facilitates private activity in the housing sector. 
Zoning and land use regulations, as well as basic infrastructure, may be more 
appropriately decided upon at the local level.  
When the public sector does undertake upgrading projects, the role of local authorities 
can be important in promoting community participation. Unclear expectations of what the 
authorities would do can cause apprehension among beneficiaries leading to local 
opposition to housing projects (Paul 1989). Community consultation and participation 
can help to overcome expensive delays and hurdles to implementation, and result in 
significant efficiency gains. According to Paul (1989) the potential contribution of 
community participation, in terms of the savings in time and money arising from the 
smooth implementation of tasks which are normally prone to delays, is especially 
relevant to housing projects.  
On the other hand, the evidence does indicate that local government involvement is not a 
panacea for the housing sector. It has been argued that even with "genuine innovation in 
technology, materials, financing and institutional support... self help, mutual help, sites 
and services, progressive slum upgrading, institution building and wholesaling rather than 
upgrading ... honesty, bureaucratic efficiency and community participation", government 
provided housing is still "too expensive" (Annis 1987). Indeed, it appears to be generally 
accepted that public institutions, at any level, cannot directly meet the need and demand 
for decent housing in a fiscally sustainable manner.  
Case Studies  
•  In Lusaka, Zambia, during the four years of a World Bank project "8000 houses 
were resettled ... yet active collaboration with community leadership kept a 
potentially volatile situation free from conflict" (Paul 1989 p.23). 
•  In Mexico, the urban popular movement has been active and successful in 
organising the poor. Partly in response to this, FONHAPO, a low-income housing authority created by the Portillo government in 1981, created a window of 
housing credit to barrio associations, co-operatives and community groups. This 
transferred considerable power to local groups by allowing them to solicit their 
own credit, participate in design, select their own technical assistance and contract 
directly for construction services, which improved housing quality and reduced 
malfeasance (Annis 1987). 
•  In the Colombian context, it has been argued that inexperienced local builders 
almost invariably use heavier, more expensive construction materials in greater 
quantity than required. Most projects are small and cannot take advantage of 
economies of scale. self-help projects also take twice as long to complete as 
projects constructed by formal housing institutions - four years instead of two 
(Solock 1984). 
Economic infrastructure  
Decentralisation can lead to more efficient provision of economic infrastructure in terms 
of both product design and unit costs, and maintenance. The latter point was explored 
above (sections 1.3, 1.6). As to construction, the relevant possibilities lie in the use of 
local construction materials and labour, and the more appropriate selection of the type 
and location of facilities.  
Where infrastructure policies are applied generally across-the-board, rather than directed 
specifically toward particular localities, the resulting provision may be more costly and 
inefficient than what would have been the case where local conditions were taken directly 
into account. Infrastructure programs which fail to develop or apply technologies for 
small scale applications typical of rural areas, and require rural areas to use facility 
designs that were developed for large-scale urban operations, have imposed higher 
operating costs onto local residents than they can afford to pay (OECD 1986).  
Sanwal (1987) stated that "it is only now being recognised that (government) programs 
for human development require spatial decentralisation and co-ordination... The 
electricity board can lay transmission lines very efficiently but rural electrification 
requires the planning of these lines according to village concentrations, and an economic 
return on the investment is dependent upon power connections taken for village 
industries."  
Case studies  
•  One example of cost reductions comes from the Baglung district of Nepal. Local 
committees working under village council auspices, with little outside help, 
constructed sixty-two bridges covering the whole district, in five years. Local 
materials and artisans were utilised, and management and labour were unpaid. It 
is estimated that each bridge cost only one-quarter of what the government would 
have spent, and was built three or four times faster (Uphoff in Lewis, 1988). 
•  In Kenya, high levels of local participation in the ILO/IBRD Rural Access Roads 
Program contributed to savings in construction and maintenance costs, as well as higher implementation rates. Active local involvement encouraged people to 
donate land for project roads - the amount thereby saved was estimated to equal 
the cost of constructing about 150 km of additional roads (Lisk 1985). 
•  In Liberia in the early 1970s, decentralisation was put forward as the new 
administrative strategy for promoting rural development. Newly created structures 
included 'development councils' and the restoration of municipal charters. The 
local administration was said to have been an effective instrument of development 
in implementing such development projects as the construction of roads and 
highways. Between 1967 and 1977, more than 3000 miles of secondary and 
feeder roads were constructed, more than twice as much as had previously 
existed. 
•  A counter-example, of inefficiencies associated with decentralisation, is found in 
China's electricity sector (Wirtshafter and Shih, 1990). The post-Mao reform 
promoting greater decentralisation to local government and enterprises coincided 
with the drive to increase economic growth. This required corresponding 
increases in electricity production - but in the mid-1980s there were acute power 
shortages. When the national government (Economic Planning Commission) 
froze the funding of centrally-planned power plants at the 1986 level, greater 
responsibility was placed on individual provinces to fund power facilities. The 
national EPC and the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power have 
encouraged local officials to build small facilities, by granting greater authority 
and economic incentives. 
Whilst China's hydroelectricity is often cited as an example of appropriate technology, 
many localities are unable to exploit hydro, given low winter stream flow and rapidly 
increasing demand for electricity. Local authorities therefore exploited the only 
remaining option, through the construction of small coal-fired thermal plants. 
Decentralised development has been successful in providing rural areas with much 
needed energy. The incentives to expand local capacity via small plants lie in local 
control, the ability to set own prices (and make and keep profits), and significantly 
shorter lead times. At the same time however, the above mentioned study found that, in 
terms of thermal efficiency, capital and operating costs, dispatching capacity and 
environmental impact, the small plants are inferior to the large plants (see table 6). (In 
1989, the State Council appeared to reverse its policy on decentralised power plants, by 
banning their construction. The directive did not, however, discuss the status of small 
plants currently in existence or under construction; nor did it offer local governments an 
alternative source of electricity.)  
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3. Resource Availability  
There are basically three, interrelated, themes falling under this heading which are 
relevant to the present survey. The first concerns the distribution of taxation and 
expenditure under the centralisation/ decentralisation alternatives. Or, in other words, the 
assignment problem of 'who collects and gets what'. Another relates to the degree of 
financial autonomy of local governments versus dependence on central transfers. The 
final theme raises an efficiency issue, of whether decentralisation increases the total 
amount of resources mobilised for public expenditures - 'how much is there?'. There 
exists a substantial body of literature which relates generally to each theme; although the 
empirical aspects of the third are less often addressed.  
To summarise the findings of the present section, it is seen that the distribution of 
revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities between different levels of government 
is such that local public expenditures tend to exceed own-source revenues. The heavy 
reliance of local government upon central transfers means that their degree of financial 
autonomy tends to be quite limited; and hence such authorities may in reality be less 
independent than first appears. However fiscal imbalances do not necessarily indicate an 
inappropriate allocation of governmental responsibilities and powers. The goals of fiscal 
equalisation, principles of 'good' taxation and administrative considerations may all point 
to a substantial role for central transfers. The task is to structure these transfers such that 
any adverse incentive and efficiency implications are minimised. Finally, it is found that 
while the impact of decentralisation on revenue raising is controversial, the most relevant 
evidence suggests that governmental structure and public resource mobilisation have little 
to do with each other.  
The Distribution of Revenue Sources and Expenditure  
The assignment problem is an important theme in the literature about revenue 
mobilisation in a decentralised system (see, for example McLure (ed.) 1983). It explores 
which fiscal instruments are most appropriately allocated to the different levels of 
government. There are obviously important inter-relationships at work here: the 
appropriate delegation of revenue authority to local governments will depend, to some 
extent, on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities.  A highly generalised picture of expenditure responsibilities in developing countries might 
be painted along the following lines. Local government spending tends to be directed 
towards the direct provision of certain public goods and services, such as primary 
education and basic health care. Higher authorities have significant expenditures in such 
areas as defence and security, transport and communications infrastructure, and 'other', 
which includes public administration. Overall, developing countries tend to have (relative 
to industrial countries) small, centralised public sectors (Oates 1985).  
If it is accepted that the national government has primary responsibility for horizontal 
fiscal equalisation, economic stabilisation and management, as well as significant 
expenditure responsibilities in such areas as major economic infrastructure, it follows that 
the centre should exercise control over the most important (lucrative) and flexible, as well 
as the main redistributive tax sources. The general principles of 'good' (i.e. efficient) 
taxation, which are discussed below, also point in this direction.  
Bahl and Linn (1983) argued that for a given set of expenditures, local governments 
should, on the grounds of efficiency, distinguish between services having the 
characteristics of (i) pure public goods - which should be financed by taxes; (ii) 
excludability - financed by user charges; and (iii) externalities - by intergovernmental 
transfers. The 1988 World Development Report put forward a similar proposition. 
However it is very difficult to apply and justify such a simplistic classification in practice 
(Gandhi 1983); an obvious example being a clean water supply, a public utility which has 
significant externalities.  
It should be borne in mind that decisions about the assignment of functions and finances 
to different levels of government can be appraised from a more politically oriented 
perspective, and the process regarded as one of allocating authority between different 
(and possibly conflicting) power centres (Bird 1990). It has been said that state and local 
governments exist in the form they do and with the functions and finances they have, 
neither to maximise democratic access to government nor to provide public services as 
efficiently as possible, but rather as a result of many complex historical and institutional 
factors. Moreover, it is a "common characteristic of most intergovernmental fiscal 
systems that there is considerable confusion and obscurity as to who exactly is 
responsible for what and how precisely various public services are delivered and paid 
for" (ibid).  
Below we examine two potential sources of revenue for local government, taxation and 
user charges, outlining the underlying principles and current practice. Attention is paid to 
the structure of local systems of taxation and the bases which tend to be relied upon; the 
use and appropriateness of local cost recovery; and the practical constraints faced in 
revenue collection. It is noted that there are few effective and broad based tax handles 
available to governments in developing countries, and that "irrespective of the level (of 
government) to which these taxes are assigned, often their bases are limited and their 
collection inefficient". However overall it is found that for various reasons, theoretical 
and political, local tax bases tend to be more limited and fragmented than those exploited 
by the centre. Moreover, administrative weaknesses appear to undermine the local tax effort to an extent greater than that suffered by the centre. The discussion about user 
charges focuses upon the revenue raising ability and equity implications, and concludes 
that on efficiency and equity grounds there is a strong case for charging consumers of 
certain public services at higher levels of provision (e.g. for university education). 
However it is emphasised that those same considerations mean that the nature of the 
services provided by local governments, especially in the areas of basic education and 
primary health care, are inappropriate candidates for cost recovery. It is seen that in 
practice user charges, levied on a consumption basis, have not been widely utilised at the 
local level.  
Taxation  
Theory  
The basic underlying theory of taxation is fairly well established, and leads to several 
general principles of 'good' taxation. The first proposition is that a tax base should be 
inelastic - in the sense that imposition of the tax on a particular good or activity will not 
lead to a decrease in consumption of the good or engagement in the activity within the 
jurisdiction. This leads to the Tiebout-type prediction that mobility places limits on 
variations between the taxation policies of different local governments - and that tax 
bases which are highly mobile are more appropriately taxed by a higher level of 
government, unless localities have uniform rates or if variations reflect local preferences 
and benefits. There are therefore economic constraints on local taxes, given the reactions 
or distortions which may result. The local tax jurisdiction can be likened to a very open 
economy, in which the dis/incentive effects of local taxation together with the assumed 
mobility of local residents and capital place severe limits upon variations in local rates 
between localities (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Another general principle is that tax 
bases which are unevenly distributed between localities - such as those on natural 
resources and trade - are inappropriate candidates for decentralisation, because of their 
repercussions for equity. It has been argued that income redistribution and stabilisation 
are within the proper province of the national government, and that localities should not 
seek to further these objectives through such means as corporate and personal income 
taxes (Musgrave 1983).  
On the other hand, insofar as the feasible set of tax instruments is crucially determined by 
the information actually available to tax authorities (Newbery 1988), local governments 
may enjoy a comparative advantage. Information must be collected, tax liabilities 
calculated and payment enforced. Decentralisation may permit more detailed local 
knowledge, aiding more efficient tax administration, especially where accounting 
systems differ significantly between areas (Helm and Smith 1987 p.xii; refer to the 
discussion of information in Efficiency above). Moreover the so-called visible benefits 
principle can be interpreted as a justification for the transfer of revenue powers to those 
levels of government 'closer' to the people (taxpayers), given the increased willingness of 
beneficiaries to 'share the burden' where they can actively participate in the design and 
management of projects, and better hold decision makers to account for their actions.  Thus certain kinds of taxation appear to be more suitable for decentralisation - on such 
items as real property, vehicles and perhaps retail sales. Taxes on external trade and 
resource rents, personal and corporate income, all of which are important revenue sources 
in developing countries, are more appropriately levied by the central government.  
Practice  
The following paragraphs describe the nature of local tax systems, in particular their 
fragmented nature, centrally imposed restrictions and the administrative constraints 
actually faced. It is found that poor local tax performance can be largely attributed to 
inadequate effort and capabilities, as well as to the disincentives and restrictions imposed 
by higher authorities. At the same time, inadequate yield is a marked shortcoming of 
national taxation systems in most developing countries. Tax evasion and avoidance, as 
well as political obstacles to increased tax yields, exist at all levels of government. The 
task here is to assess the comparative shortfall at local, vis-a-vis, national levels. More 
generally it appears that urban municipalities will often be better able than their rural 
counterparts to mobilise local resources, given their access to more lucrative taxation 
bases, the nature of local tax instruments (motor vehicles, sales and business), and greater 
perceived creditworthiness.  
Tax bases  
While local governments exploit a range of revenue sources, the general pattern does tend 
to conform, to some extent, to the theoretical principles outlined above. The major 
source, which is almost universally applied, is the property tax. In Asia and Latin 
America, property taxes on buildings and land tend to be the most frequently used 
instruments for raising local revenues. It accounts for more than two thirds of local tax 
revenues in the Philippines, and is important in China, India, Korea and Pakistan. The 
next most popular taxes are those on motor vehicles and entertainment (Bahl and Linn 
1983). The former is said to represent an "excellent (for efficiency and equity reasons) 
but neglected tax base for urban governments" (Bahl, Holland and Linn 1983). The 
category of 'all other taxes'- "a motley collection of nuisance taxes which are often costly 
to collect and comply with" (Bahl and Linn 1983) - contribute a sizeable share to local 
revenue in some jurisdictions.  
Yet local governments typically face practical difficulties in revenue raising, particularly 
in the limitations set nationally and administrative problems. Local governments are often 
actively discouraged from fully exploiting potential revenue sources by a wide variety of 
central checks, controls and hindrances (Bird 1990). This may be motivated by economic 
considerations, as well as by popular sentiments. Generally central governments tend to 
reserve for themselves the most buoyant and lucrative revenue instruments (although, as 
noted above, there may be sound efficiency reasons why this should be the case).  
•  In Nigeria, the elasticity of local revenues has been severely limited by the 
removal of wealthier members of the community from the local tax system; all 
employed persons, institutions and companies were placed under the tax jurisdiction of the central government's PAYE or direct assessment, thus leaving 
local government with the poorest sections of the community as its taxpayers. In 
1976-7, the taxpaying population of Oyo State fell by 25%, and most of the 
remaining taxpayers were poor farmers (Smith 1982). 
There are many examples of centrally imposed legal restrictions upon local revenue 
raising. National governments often require explicit prior approval for local tax rates, 
property revaluations and "almost everything else that affects local budgets" (Bird 1990 
p.284). If the power to set the rate is part of the "generally accepted definition of a local 
tax" (Prud'homme, 1989), then many locally collected taxes would fall outside this 
definition.  
•  The Brazilian constitution limits the municipalities to two sources of revenue - 
certain urban properties (as defined) and specified services (at certain rates). 
•  In Nigeria, central approval is required before any levy can be included in the 
revenue estimates of a local council (Rondinelli, 1990). 
•  In Bangladesh, the list of tax sources used by the zilla parishad (district) is "very 
short" (Schroeder, 1989). The property transfer tax has its rate set in Dhaka and is 
administered by the central government. Local autonomy is limited by the 
requirement that tax rate changes must be approved by the divisional 
commissioner (a central government official) -and the zilla parishad have no 
effective autonomy regarding taxation, and no independent ability to increase tax 
yields. 
Administrative Capacity  
Administrative feasibility places severe limits on the revenue raising capability of all 
levels of government in developing countries (see Newbery 1988). The practical 
obstacles which inhibit efficient revenue collection and cause substantial revenue 
shortfalls are by no means peculiar to local government. The prerequisites of staff 
competence, well-defined tax legislation, and effective means of enforcement present 
acute problems at the national level (Goode 1990). The tax system is typically in a state 
of flux, compliance low and enforcement lax (Newbery 1988). Institutional, political, 
administrative, structural and cultural constraints characterise the tax systems of 
developing countries at both national and local levels. The interest here therefore lies in 
assessing the relative revenue competence of local versus central government.  
Ideally, we would want some quantitative assessments - of net revenue yields (in terms of 
potential), staff and skill shortages, and the extent of tax evasion - on a comparative basis 
for the various levels of government. In practice however, one is forced to rely upon 
more anecdotal-type evidence. In some respects - due to, for example, the lack of 
qualified staff outside the national capital, the fragmented nature of local tax bases and 
limited enforcement jurisdiction - it appears that administrative problems may be 
relatively worse at the local level, especially in rural and remote localities. In some other 
respects, local governments may be better vehicles of revenue collection, such as in 
maintaining current registers of taxpayers and property, and cost recovery.  There is substantial evidence which reflects administrative weakness at the local level. 
Rondinelli (1990) regards this as the most "immediate and crucial problem". A World 
Bank (1988) survey of 25 countries concluded that administrative weaknesses meant that 
only 5-25% of local revenues were raised by property taxes, except in Africa, where 
reliance on property taxes is generally higher and has grown in real terms. In more than 
half of the Asian and Latin American countries, the real value of property tax revenues 
has declined. The greatest erosion was experienced in countries with high rates of 
inflation (WDR 1988). Even when a simpler head (poll) tax is imposed, the task of 
maintaining a current census of population may exceed local administrative capacity.  
•  In the Sudan, the local sources of revenue - taxes on 'rain-fed' and irrigated land, 
animals, date trees, urban property, and 'development' taxes in the South - are not 
calculated in an informed or graduated manner, and rates are kept very low 
(Norris, 1983). 
•  In Monrovia, Liberia, land adjudication teams did not receive the logistical 
support necessary for their work, so that the local government (MCC) was never 
able to collect property taxes (Merlin 1990). 
•  In the South Pacific, there is reportedly a reluctance to tax rural, particularly 
customary land (Larmour, 1983). Where, as in PNG, customary rights are 
unregistered, the costs of registration may be high relative to tax yield. 
•  In Barranquilla, Colombia the municipality collects revenues from less than half 
of the taxable properties because only three of the ten districts in the city have 
updated cadastre (Rondinelli, 1986). 
Are administrative problems any more severe at the local, as opposed to the central level? 
In some respects, the practical tasks are more difficult in a decentralised system. The 
shortage of qualified staff (assessors, collectors and accountants) is often more serious at 
the local level, which is partly attributed to their comparatively low pay, partly to the 
relatively unattractive location, and partly to poorer career prospects in local government 
service. In the Philippines, low property tax yields are due to poor records and lack of 
qualified local staff (Panganiban, 1982). Alternatively, where local revenue officials are 
directly tied to higher levels of government, programmes initiated and implemented at the 
local level may be unsuccessful because it is not in the official's long-term interest to 
pursue the local reform (Bahl 1984).  
Tax evasion and avoidance are serious problems in many countries around the world 
(Mathews 1983). Incentives and opportunities determine the degree to which it occurs. 
Public attitudes with respect to tax morality and the ability of authorities to take deterrent, 
and if necessary, punitive action, are also important. Compliance may be enhanced by 
taxation systems which are disaggregated among a number of localities, each of which is 
less remote from the individual taxpayer than the centre. In West African countries the 
names of 'delinquent' village taxpayers often remain on display at the local administrative 
center - which generally leads shamed relatives to pay the amounts owing in a short time 
(Local Revenue Administration Project, 1983). It should be noted that the penalties for 
tax offences which exist at the national level are rarely assessed and enforced, particularly criminal sanctions (Gordon 1990). The perception that tax avoidance will 
pass undetected may increase rates of non-compliance.  
Evasion may be particularly acute at the local level, given the more limited jurisdiction 
and enforcement powers. Expropriation procedures for failure to pay taxes, for example, 
are generally governed by higher level legislation, rendering enforcement cumbersome 
and ultimately less likely. Furthermore, opportunities for non-compliance will be 
increased if tax units are mobile among local taxation systems. Although there are many 
examples of cases where ineffective enforcement undermines local revenue raising, no 
quantitative evidence could be found as to its significance relative to that at the national 
level.  
•  It is reported that Nigerian local authorities have consistently failed to obtain all 
their estimated revenues for a given year - some collecting as little as a third of 
the anticipated amount. In 1973, an estimated 40% of taxpayers in the Mid-West 
State evaded tax, and 70% in the Western State (Smith 1982). 
•  In Kenya, where local authorities tax agricultural produce ('the cess'), there have 
been serious problems because influential individuals and the parastatal Coffee 
Board are the prime defaulters in payment. This makes collection and 
enforcement especially difficult (Wallis 1990). 
•  In Zimbabwe, on average, only about 10-15% of the potential yield of the 
development levy (poll tax) is actually collected by the District Councils. 
•  Harriss (1988) concludes from a detailed study of local government revenue in the 
North Arcot district of South India that the relatively slow growth of real revenue 
in the context of substantial economic growth reflected substantial evasion of 
commercial and property taxes. 
•  In Colombia only about 30% of Banranquilla's business taxes are actually paid 
each year, because the municipal government lacks effective enforcement 
procedures (Rondinelli, 1986). 
•  In Senegal only about 20% of taxpayers regularly meet their local tax obligations, 
and summons generally have to be resorted to (You and Mazurelle, 1987). 
•  In some cases the central government collects certain revenues more efficiently, 
given its larger jurisdiction and enforcement powers. In many West African 
countries, the patente - a licence fee levied on professions and businesses - is a 
major source of municipal revenue that is assessed, collected and allocated among 
municipalities by the central government (Rondinelli 1990). 
Tax reform and enforcement at all levels may be susceptible to political obstacles. 
Influential interest groups may include large landowners, representatives of multinational 
companies and the military. It is arguable that local administrations are more vulnerable 
to such pressures. It is reported from Nigeria that local taxation is used as a political 
weapon - supporters of the governing party are completely exempt, whilst members of 
opposition parties are over assessed (Smith, 1982). Penalities - e.g. the confiscation and 
sale of property - may be so drastic that these are opposed (and feared) by local 
politicians and administrators (Bahl et al 1984).  •  It is reported from Iloilo City in the Philippines that gross underassessment of 
property values and numerous tax exemptions have undermined the city's revenue 
base. This situation is attributed to the strong representation of the propertied 
classes on the city's decision making bodies. In the collection of business and 
amusement taxes "the city government is at the mercy of the businessmen's 
willingness to pay", (who often did not) (Ruland and Sajo 1988). 
There are some examples of successful efforts in increasing local government 
revenues. Improving the administration of property taxes is evidently an 
important means of achieving better local revenue performance. Among other 
possibilities, taxing the ownership of motor vehicles also appears to be a 
relatively efficient and equitable local source of revenue.  
•  In Ghana, the revenue yield of the Accra City Council increased substantially 
over the second half of the 1980s (see table 8). One of the aims of the Accra 
District Rehabilitation Project (ADRP), undertaken in 1984, was to mobilise 
municipal revenue. This was done through the revaluation of properties by a 
restructured Land Valuation Board, and the improvement and computerisation of 
budgeting and accounting procedures (both with technical assistance from the 
equivalent U.K. office). There is said to be further potential, for doubling the 
1988 income in real terms once the revised property tax system is fully 
operational and collection performance is further improved (EDI 1989). 
•  In Colombia, important changes were made to local revenue sources in the early 
1980s. Regarding the property tax, cadastral values were updated by applying an 
annual 15% increase for each year since the last official revaluation, and then 
automatically updating each year on the basis of the price index. The latter 
measure has not been fully implemented however; political factors have kept the 
rate of indexation below the rate of inflation. The property tax rates were also 
modified, to provide an element of local discretion in rate-setting. Reforms to the 
industry and commerce tax established a uniform tax base (based on gross sales) 
and reduced the variation in rates (WDR 1988). 
•  In Delhi, property tax collection was improved through a number of reforms - 
including rebates for timely, and penalties for late, payments, better facilities for 
making payments, and an improved management information system. In addition, 
taxpayers had to pay their assessments before being allowed to appeal in court. 
This resulted in increasing revenue by 16% in 1985-6, and by 96% in 1986-7 
(WDR 1988). 
•  In Seoul, automobile tax revenue more than doubled between 1982 and 1986, 
while total local tax revenue increased by 64% (WDR 1988). Traditional 
structures may facilitate, or limit revenue raising. In practice it is more often 
observed that the diminution, or abolition of 'native authorities' has caused 
difficulties in local tax collection. 
•  In Zimbabwe, prior to independence, rural local authorities had a reasonably firm 
local revenue base because of the participation of traditional chiefs and their 
subordinates in the system. Since traditional leaders have lost their land allocation 
and judicial powers there has been a sharp decline in the yield of the development levy (formerly the poll tax), whose collection was transferred to the district 
councils (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). Some District Councils have reassigned tax 
collection powers back to the traditional leaders (see case study). 
•  Similarly, in the Sudan, collection of rural sources of revenue depended on the 
knowledge and influence of traditional heads, the odmas and chiefs in the north 
and chiefs in the south - and both odmas and chiefs were abolished or 
compromised after 1969 (Norris, 1983). In 1985, a comprehensive strategy of 
revival of the old system of native leaders was initiated. The intention was to 
allow local chiefs to participate in and contribute to the administration of the 
country, for the sake of achieving political stability and efficiency in revenue 
collection (Elhussein 1989). 
Cost recovery  
Local and central authorities may seek to recover the marginal or average costs of 
publicly provided services, including depreciation and interest charges. This possibility 
gained increased attention over the last decade as the international monetary agencies 
explored means of increasing revenue mobilisation in developing countries (see Jimenez 
1988). There are, however, very significant concerns surrounding the appropriateness of 
such charges, particularly for basic social services.  
User fees for basic social services raise important efficiency issues, particularly where 
significant positive externalities exist. A health clinic, for example, provides benefits to 
those not inoculated against contagious diseases. Efficiency requires charging users less 
than the marginal costs of the vaccination service, and financing the remainder of the 
costs from general revenues. If the price is set too high, the service will be underused and 
the society as a whole will suffer from not having a healthy and (at least potentially) 
productive population. Similarly, the social rates of return are high on investments in all 
forms of education, particularly primary education. The benefits are also indirect (higher 
productivity) and non-monetary (lower fertility rates). Further, distortions in related 
markets (credit and insurance), which can be viewed as a divergence between private and 
social benefits, have important implications for efficiency.  
There are also significant equity concerns. Take the example of clean water, and the facts 
that the income elasticity of demand is relatively low, and that household size and income 
may be negatively correlated. Recent evidence drawn from Ghana, Lesotho, and 
elsewhere has shown that the introduction of user charges led to decreased utilisation of 
the relevant social services, particularly in rural and remote areas. Although negative 
repercussions might be avoided through different charges for different income groups, 
means testing is administratively difficult.  
On the other hand, it has been argued that blanket policies in favour of 'free' provision 
across the board have resulted in inefficiency and inequity (Jimenez 1988). It is said that 
the absence of fees has led to underinvestment in the social sectors and the inability to 
ration scarce services according to need. Access to free public services is limited in 
practice, and those who are forced to resort to private provision are often the poorest. The better off, who have been found to enjoy greater access to the most costly services (e.g. 
university education and health care in urban hospitals), have been subsidised the most 
heavily. It follows that cost recovery must be sufficiently high to provide adequate 
revenues for maintenance of an effective service, deter over-use, and avoid rationing by 
less efficient and less equitable means. This argument is more convincing with respect to 
higher level, rather than basic, services.  
According to its advocates, user charges are particularly relevant to local government - as 
a means of financing recurrent costs and avoiding reliance upon central transfers (e.g. 
Bahl and Linn 1983). Indeed, the first of the four criteria for efficiency in raising local 
revenue listed by the World Development Report 1988 is that "the cost of providing local 
services should be recovered, to the extent possible, from charges on the beneficiaries" 
(p.159). This is said to be "especially important at the local level because, being closer to 
beneficiaries, local public services are more amendable to such charges than services 
provided by higher levels of government" (p.160).  
The World Bank (1988) reported that in 25 developing countries surveyed, user charges 
accounted for nearly one-third of all locally raised revenue. Within its definition, 
however, the Bank includes both consumption-related and benefit-related charges. The 
latter are one-off payments for a particular project having the characteristics of both 
taxation and user charges; although given that one cannot choose whether or not to use 
the service (pay the levy), it is more akin to a tax. Betterment levies have been used 
extensively in Colombia, India and Indonesia as an indirect means of recovering costs 
from landowners pro rata who enjoy the benefit of public improvements nearby or on 
their property (Bird, 1984). In New Delhi, for example, such charges are used to recover 
50% of the cost of public works (Rondinelli, 1990). Alternatively, municipal 
governments have recovered the cost of services through land readjustment - whereby 
landowners pool their property for service improvements and contribute sufficient land to 
compensate the government. This has been done successfully in Taiwan, Thailand, South 
Korea (Rondinelli, 1990).  
Clearly, municipal governments must have the requisite technical capability to levy and 
collect such charges. It has been argued, for example, that metered water is a "pipe 
dream" in most developing countries (Gandhi 1983).  
Betterment levies have met difficulties in assessing the surplus value attributable to 
public improvements, and determining the "zone of influence" in identifying the 
properties benefited. It may also be hard to estimate total costs prior to project 
completion. This was a problem in Colombia, so that collections tended to be unstable 
and erratic (Bird, 1984).  
•  In the early 1980s, it was reported from Nigeria that the significance of local user 
charges, which were largely confined to urban townships, had tended to decline. 
In the Northern Region in the mid 1960s they contributed 15% of native authority 
revenues, but by 1971 local authorities in the North Western State only raised 
1.5% of revenues from this source (Smith 1982). •  In Jakarta, delayed notification of the Tax Department that an area would be 
improved and hence the late notification of landowners, together with difficulties 
in tracing landowners because of unregistered transactions and a lack of data on 
land values, all created problems for the administration of the city's betterment tax 
(WDR 1988). 
It may be possible to tap non-cash sources of revenue - in the Malaita Province in the 
Solomon Islands, hospital outpatients are required to bring potatoes for the canteen 
(Larmour, 1983).  
Levying charges may be politically difficult. In Pakistan, for example, local authorities 
were reportedly unable to recover costs from squatter communities, even though (or 
perhaps because) some of the residents were not poor (Rondinelli, 1990). National 
governments may limit the utilisation of user charges on the grounds of inflationary 
pressures, or feared political repercussions.  
Thus the issue of cost recovery is, as the discussion in HDR 1991 indicates, a complex 
one. It is submitted that there may be damaging repercussions for the principle of equity 
and universal access, and the net revenue gained may not, in any case, be significant. 
Whilst this basic argument applies to a range of public goods and services, it is 
particularly relevant to priority social expenditures. The Report concludes that primary 
schooling should be free, and that there is a strong case for secondary education to be free 
also; that primary health care should be free, although some charges for drugs and 
hospitals may be justified; and that users might contribute to the recurrent costs of water 
and sanitation, whilst the government should bear the capital costs (p.67). At the same 
time user charges could be introduced which discriminate on the basis of type of service, 
exempting, for example, residential water, basic education and primary health care; and 
recovering a substantial part of the costs of such higher level services as sophisticated 
health care in urban hospitals and university education.  
This implies that central governments are more likely to be able to levy fees with fewer 
adverse repercussions, given that the level of provision is generally higher; and that local 
governments, which typically provide basic social services, ought to rely on central 
grants and local taxation rather than user charges. The review of country experience 
showed that, apart from the special case of betterment levies, local authorities in 
developing countries have rarely been willing and able to fully exploit user charges as a 
revenue instrument. Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Kenya, Indonesia and Botswana have abolished 
primary-level education fees during the past decade (Jimenez 1988).  
Financial Autonomy and Central Transfers  
It follows from the foregoing discussion of local revenue raising possibilities that vertical 
fiscal gaps are likely to emerge, and that intergovernmental transfers will play a critical 
role. Here we examine intergovernmental financing arrangements, with particular interest 
being accorded to the impact of the structure of transfers upon the degree of local 
autonomy. (The significant redistributive aspects of such arrangements are discussed below, in the context of Equity, and are not detailed here; the impact of grants on total 
resource mobilisation are discussed in section 2.3 below.)  
First this section explores the basis for the widespread belief in the need for financial 
autonomy at the local level, at both theoretical and practical levels. It goes on to describe 
the nature of the systems of central grants generally found in developing countries. While 
cognisant of the difficulties of measurement, it proceeds to present a picture of the 
limited degree of local government financial autonomy which exists today.  
Rationale for Financial Autonomy  
Financial autonomy can be defined as the ability of government units to finance own 
expenditures from own revenues. Thus in the model presented above, it was presented as 
a special case of the general allocation of taxes and expenditures.  
One recurring theme in the literature on decentralisation is the importance of financial 
autonomy. This is invariably seen as a crucial ingredient in explaining the success (or, 
more often failure) of programmes for decentralisation. As one well known observer 
noted, lack of financial autonomy "reduces the burden, but increases the dependence of, 
local authorities, who generally neither impose taxes nor have to justify to local 
populations how money is spent" (Rondinelli 1983 p.49).  
To summarise, the emphasis on local financial autonomy is based on the following 
propositions:  
(i) Independence. It is generally believed that genuinely independent decision making 
will not emerge at the local level unless local governments have a significant degree of 
financial autonomy. Otherwise local authorities will merely be the 'deconcentrated agents' 
of the center.  
(ii) Incentives. Local decision makers lack incentives to behave 'properly', and according 
to local needs, unless the resources being expended are those of the local constituency, to 
which the decision makers are accountable. In other words, financial autonomy makes 
local decision makers more sensitive to both costs and local priorities.  
On the other hand of course, equity considerations may well point in the opposite 
direction, in favour of central transfers. Once the national government accepts the role of 
ensuring at least a minimum degree of parity in the provision of public goods and 
services among localities, some form of fiscal equalisation grants would tend to follow. 
Given the substantial regional disparities which characterise many developing countries, 
this redistributive function is likely to be crucial. Grants are also a primary means for 
overcoming the problem of spillovers (externalities). Further, as to incentives and 
accountability, there exist other perhaps more effective means of ensuring that local 
decision makers are responsive to both costs and local priorities, such as local elections. 
The nature of the grant system is another crucial variable - strictly tied grants have more 
far reaching repercussions for financial autonomy than do lump sum transfers. These points are often forgotten by those commentators who lament the lack of financial 
autonomy.  
The available quantitative evidence as to the extent of local financial autonomy shows the 
following. For the small sample of countries for which data is presented in the IMF GFS, 
we can observe a range of degrees of local financial autonomy (table 1). Measured in 
terms of local own, as a percentage of total local revenue, Indonesia is the least (at 22%) 
and Kenya the most independent (98%). Local own revenue as a proportion of local 
expenditure shows a similar pattern. The average degree of local autonomy across the 
sample stands at around 64%.  
Table 1 
Local Financial Autonomy in Selected Developing Countries, 1988 
   
  Own revenue as a % total 
local revenue  
Own revenue as a % of 
local exp. 
Chile   
Colombia   
Indonesia   
India   
Kenya   
Malawi (1984)   
Malaysia   
South Africa   
Thailand   
Zimbabwe   
Brazil  
64   
87   
22   
56   
98   
95   
73.6   
88.7   
68   
51   
79  
61   
59   
22   
48.8   
98.9   
67.4   
64.8   
90   
73.6   
58   
75.9  
   
Experience has shown that financial dependence can increase local government 
vulnerability to central domination, in terms of formal controls (e.g. tied grants) and more 
covert modes of influence, as well as the economic fortunes of the national government.  
•  In Nigeria, the objectives of the local government system introduced in the 1970s 
- to make local administration more responsive to the local community - were 
found to be incompatible with its revenue base (Smith, 1982). Local governments 
are heavily dependent upon central grants, which can be withheld if local 
expenditure is judged "wasteful, unreasonable or in conflict with central policies" 
(Smith 1982). The author reports that "these controls have tended to be drawn into 
a punitive style of central supervision motivated by partisan interest as much as a 
concern for fiscal irregularity". It was also noted that 99.6% of grants for 
education and health were in arrears, causing severe cash flow problems (in 1969-
70). The heavy dependence of state and local governments on the monthly federal 
allocations had further repercussions. The national dependence on oil led to 
extreme instability, as both prices and production oscillated on a monthly basis, and made the planning of government expenditures, at all levels, virtually 
impossible. 
•  In Tanzania, the national government provides 100% grants for expenditures on 
education, water supplies and roads - and correspondingly insists on some 
significant controls over local policies and expenditure. But the most significant 
problem facing Tanzanian local authorities since 1982 has been the general 
decline in central transfers, itself a result of macro-economic constraints 
(particularly the rising burden imposed by debt servicing). At the same time, local 
dependence on central transfers has increased significantly, from 60% (1984/5) to 
77% in 1987/90. These trends have diminished the ability of local authorities to 
run key social and economic services, and to maintain local infrastructure 
(Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990). The author draws the negative lesson that it is "very 
unlikely that much decentralisation can be achieved in circumstances where 
central government accounts for much of local expenditure" (ibid p.30). 
•  In Bangladesh, actual grant allocations tend to be erratic. Bahl (1989) found that 
the average shortfall is just over 20% - which is a serious problem for local 
governments with very little own revenue. 
There are a number of instances where the central government has interfered in local 
government finances in an apparently arbitrary and disruptive manner. In Nigeria, for 
example, the abolition of the cattle tax in 1974 and the community rate in 1980-2 was 
done unilaterally, and without compensation. These items had constituted 50-90% of 
local internal revenue at the time (Orewa, 1987).  
Central grants  
In principle, central grants can have several objectives. These include the reduction of 
vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances; reduction in differences in fiscal capacity 
between local governments resulting from different resource endowments and economic 
structures; ensuring a similar pattern in the provision of services in each locality, at least 
to a minimum level; and internalising externalities - the use of grants in the latter case 
derives from Pigou (1947) and is usually referred to as "the compensation principle". 
According to Bird (1990, p.281), the "essence of the (intergovernmental) finance problem 
is how to adjust fiscal transfers to achieve tolerable results in the face of clearly non-
optimal assignment of functions and finances".  
Grants can be differentiated by the degree to which they are need-related (Bennet 1982). 
Grants can be allocated on the basis of measured geographical differences in needs, or in 
costs of servicing those needs. These arise mainly from differences in the number of 
client groups, and in the size and density of local jurisdiction. Usually expenditure need is 
measured on the basis of a national minimum standard. Alternatively, grants can seek 
resource equalisation in the revenue base of local governments, given the same tax effort. 
Revenue-equalising grants seek to overcome unequal tax bases by distributing grants 
preferentially to those local authorities which for a given tax effort have a small tax base 
as against those authorities with large tax base. Unitary grants combine features of each of the two approaches, with the advantage of simultaneously compensating for disparities 
in both tax bases and local spending needs.  
More generally, central grants can be either block or categorical in form. General purpose 
block grants (lump sum transfers) are more efficient in the sense that local governments 
can decide how best to spend the money. In practice however, spending may still be 
subject to central guidelines which effectively govern allocations. Categorical or project-
specific grants are intended to be used only for specific categories of expenditure - either 
broadly or narrowly defined. The allocation of categorical grants can be based on a 
formula (such as indicators of 'need' - e.g. number of primary school children) and/or a 
project-by-project review of specific proposals. These may have the advantage that the 
center could direct funds to areas of priority for human development (assuming, of 
course, that the center would, and that local government would not, have done so). Funds 
thereby directed to priority areas may be additional, or alternatively, this may simply 
substitute for what would have been spent in any case (since central grants, like overseas 
aid, is fungible). Grants can be adjusted by matching requirements, which aim to induce a 
degree of local involvement and accountability for the particular expenditure programme. 
Grants can also be distinguished on the basis of whether they are open or closed-ended, 
i.e. whether the central government will finance all eligible requirements or whether an 
upper limit is set.  
•  In Bangladesh, the most important grant revenue source of the zilla parishad 
(district) is the Upazila Development grant (which replaced the Rural Works 
Programme in 1984) (Bahl, in Schroeder, 1989). It is a block grant, insofar as 
there is considerable local discretion in project selection; however there are 
significant elements of central direction, through the establishment of guidelines 
and priorities. It does not have any matching provisions, nor any other incentive 
for local governments to increase their revenue effort. A second type of grant to 
rural local governments is known as a normal grant - which is in fact a collection 
of specific purpose grants, earmarked for various purposes. 
Where centralised planning is important, transfers are likely to be plan-related and 
consequently earmarked for development projects approved thereunder. It has been 
observed in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand that the heavy dependence of local 
authorities on central transfers and the lack of financial discretion in expenditures has 
weakened local government (Nooi, 1987). In Indonesia, budgets of the regional 
authorities require central Ministerial approval, while those of the lower levels are subject 
to action by the executive at the next highest level. In the Sudan after 1979 powers and 
functions were channelled down to the most basic local government unit, but this was not 
paralleled by a corresponding decentralisation of personnel or financial powers.  
In some cases (e.g. Nigeria) the formula for revenue sharing is provided for in the 
constitution. More often however, it has been observed that transfers tend to be regarded 
by the center as a residual in their own budgeting process (Bahl and Linn 1983). 
Obviously the extent to which this occurs depends upon the seriousness with which local institutions are regarded by higher authorities. It may also reflect, in part, the stabilisation 
objectives of the national government.  
In 1979, only about half of the grant entitlements of local governments in the Philippines 
were actually distributed.  
Grants should normally, as far as possible, exhibit the features of stability, certainty and 
objectivity, in order to promote efficiency and allow appraisal against social, economic 
and political goals (Bennet 1982). However the system of intergovernmental transfers in 
developing countries is often closed, complex, and subject to uncertainty and political 
manipulation. In Brazil, for example, 26% of federal transfers to the states and local 
agencies are governed by "convenios" - specific agreements negotiated on a discretionary 
basis, in the tradition of "clientismo".  
Practice  
In practice, the conditions for complete financial autonomy are rarely met. Virtually 
everywhere, expenditure exceeds revenue at the local level (see table 9 above), which 
portrays the practical significance of central transfers. It is interesting to note that vertical 
fiscal imbalance is not confined to developing countries; indeed a recent comparative 
study found that central transfers account for a greater share of state and local revenue in 
industrial countries than in developing countries (Wasylenko 1987).  
There is a wide range of experience - local own revenue as a proportion of local 
expenditure ranges from 100% in Mexico City (Bahl and Linn 1983), to about 15% for 
Zimbabwe's District Councils (Helmsing 1991). The sample of developing countries 
drawn from the 1990 IMF GFS shows that the degree of local financial autonomy 
typically fell within the 50-90% range, and averaged around 64% or more.  
An alternative approach is to observe that the average share of local taxes in total revenue 
rarely exceeds 20% (and is often much less in many African countries); whilst the share 
of local in total expenditures is often higher than 30% (Prud'homme 1988) - this implies 
that about one-third of local expenditure will be financed from central transfers.  
In a number of cases central transfers constitute a significant source of local revenue.  
•  In Malaysia the national government provides more than 85% of total local 
revenues, in Pakistan, 89%, and in Indonesia, the figure is about 75% (Rondinelli, 
1990). In Nigeria, local sources as a share of total revenue dropped from 75% in 
1962, to about 19% in 1983 (Olowu, 1987). In Zimbabwe, the contribution of 
local revenue to total district revenue increased more than three-fold between 
1980 and 1985, yet it still only averages about 15% (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). In 
Tanzania, the share of local revenue in total local government revenues declined 
from 40% in 1984/5 to 23% in 1987/8 (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990b). In the Sudan, 
the share of local revenue varied between provinces, from 29% to 10% (Norris, 
1983). The extent to which central transfers constrain local autonomy depends largely upon the 
terms of the allocation - whether block or conditional, whether there are any 
accompanying guidelines and so on. This has to be examined on a case-by-case basis. In 
Indonesia, for example, under the Inpres programme for schools, local discretion has 
been limited to location, and decisions as to how many, what capacity, design etc. are 
resolved by the center. Similarly in Zimbabwe, central grants are strictly tied to specific 
purposes.  
Total Public Resource Mobilisation  
In many developing countries, increasing public expenditures on human development 
requires more than restructuring existing budgets. There may also need to be an increase 
in the public revenue and expenditure ratios (HDR 1991). Tax revenue as a percentage of 
GNP stands, on average, at 15.5% for developing countries, compared to 23.2% for 
industrial countries (HDR 1991 table 44). Similarly developing countries, on average, 
have smaller public expenditure ratios than industrial countries - 20%, compared to 28% 
(WDR 1990 Table 11). It is also noted that public sectors in industrial countries tend to 
be substantially more decentralised than developing countries' (as reflected in the 
structure of public employment; see table 10). It is therefore of interest to explore the 
possibility that decentralisation, through the creation of effective lower levels of 
government, may be a means by which the need for increased total public resource 
mobilisation can be met.  
The following paragraphs examine the so-called visible benefits principle, which is 
generally the basis for optimistic predictions about the revenue raising potential of local 
government and the significance of voluntary contributions at the local level. (The reader 
should also bear in mind the discussion of local taxation and cost recovery above.) The 
impact of central transfers upon local tax effort is also relevant. Further it is possible that 
local borrowing constitutes a significant source of local resources. The mechanisms by 
which local resources can be mobilised raise several, often competing, considerations - 
including revenue raising ability, effects on economic efficiency, equity implications and 
administrative feasibility (Bahl 1984). Finally it is useful to seek some overall empirical 
indication of the impact of decentralisation upon total resource mobilisation.  
The Visible Benefits Principle and Voluntary Contributions  
The visible benefits principle of taxation predicts that decentralisation will elicit 
additional contributions, even among the poor, and from the poorer regions in developing 
countries. Decentralisation may lead to greater mobilisation of local resources through 
the willingness of consumers of public services to "share the burden" when they can 
actively participate in the design and operation of projects. This would seem to apply 
only where local residents believe that a significant proportion of taxes will be retained 
locally, and spent on projects and services which they value.  
•  Evidence to support the visible benefits principle is provided by a detailed survey 
of development resources and constraints in one of the better administered upazilas in Bangladesh. It found that among those people who indicated their 
readiness to contribute to local development activities (about half the 
respondents), the poorer groups were more willing to do so than the better off, 
provided that they did not have to carry a disproportionate share of the burden 
(Thomas 1989). 
•  According to a study of decentralisation in Mozambique, the decentralised health 
service encouraged people to express their preferences and correspondingly 
adapted to local needs - to a greater extent than other social services. And as a 
result, health benefited more than other sectors from an increased input of locally 
generated resources (Mackintosh and Whyt, 1988). 
The visible benefits principle can, of course, work both ways. As we have seen, tax 
evasion is a serious problem at the local level. Non-compliance may be attributed to 
perceived lack of benefit. According to Rondinelli (1990), the widespread image of 
inefficient municipal management explains the African city dwellers' reluctance to pay 
taxes. In Nigeria, the general public is said to be strongly resistant to property rate 
collection and other charges - a hostility due in part, it is said, to the fact that residents do 
not feel that they are getting the amount and quality of services for which they are paying 
(Rondinelli, 1990). An evaluation of the Monrovia City Council in Liberia stressed that 
people do not pay property taxes, nor fees for services, if services are poor, enforcement 
is weak and funds are wasted (Werlin 1990). In Zimbabwe the very low yield of the 
development levy is due, in part, to the perception that the funds will be "wasted" on 
local council administration (see case study). Indeed it has been observed that (former) 
Prime Minister Thatcher's approach to local government in the U.K. was based upon a 
belief in a visible costs principle - that people will actually not demand local public 
services once it is clear that they must directly contribute to their provision.  
The visible benefits principle must be viewed in the context of taxation - principles and 
practice - discussed above. The reader will recall that the revenue raised at the local level 
is often quite limited. Perhaps the practical significance of the visible benefits principles 
lies in the local mobilisation of voluntarism, which taps resources for public investment 
which might otherwise have remained untapped. The revenue raising potential for local 
development can be considerable, as evidenced by the Harambee movement in Kenya 
and the Tesito in the Gambia. It has been argued that successful decentralisation is a 
crucial complement to effective self help (Schaffer, 1982). The latter "requires marketing 
and credit facilities, water and infrastructure and so on, which are likely to depend on the 
decentralised institutions of government" (ibid. p.42.)  
•  The Orangi project in a Karachi slum area, which focused on women's health and 
education, and sanitation, mobilised self-help activities to co-finance and 
construct water, sanitation and other facilities, and was supported by outside 
technical assistance (from government, NGOs and volunteer social workers) 
(Rondinelli, 1990). 
•  In the Indian state of Karnataka, the gram sabha (meeting of all voters in the 
village) assists in the implementation of local development schemes through volunteer labour and the collection of local monetary contributions (Slater and 
Watson, 1989). 
•  In Kenya, the late President Kenyatta actively encouraged the harambee 
movement (Swahili, meaning 'let's pull together'). County councils played a vital 
role in the harambee movement through Community Development Assistants, 
whose task it was to help local groups organise themselves to run projects in areas 
such as agriculture, education and health. They were expected to play a role as 
links between the community and government (both local and central). 
By way of contrast, self-help is said to have been ineffective elsewhere, for a 
variety of reasons, due mainly to the political and bureaucratic context where 
official attitudes and policies discourage such activities.  
•  In Calcutta, because the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority "has little 
communication with the communities in the metropolis", self-help activities have 
not been effectively mobilised (Banjaree, 1989). 
•  Mobilising enthusiasm for local self-help projects has been largely unsuccessful 
in community government areas in the North Solomons Province of Papua New 
Guinea. Most local leaders are said to look to provincial grants in order to launch 
community development projects (Nyamekye, 1983). 
•  District Councils in Zimbabwe have reported increasing disillusion with respect to 
self help projects, largely because the central government promised contribution 
frequently fails to eventuate - e.g. locally constructed schools stand empty for 
want of teachers (Annual Plan Reviews, various). 
•  Some authoritarian governments effectively prohibited community self help 
organisations (e.g Argentina, 1976-1988). 
Factors identified as key to the successful mobilisation of voluntarism (Khan and 
Miller 1989), include such elements of the local context as culture, religion, the 
political climate, government policies, and the availability of wealth, labour and 
management skills, and time.  
•  Voluntarism has been explored in the Bangladeshi context (Khan and Miller, in 
Schroeder, 1989). It was observed that in Islamic and Hindu doctrine, there are 
established concepts relating to contributions towards some kinds of collective 
goods. In Islam, the concept of zakat (one of the five pillars of the religion) is 
translated as alms giving. There is strong evidence that local communities are able 
to mobilise funds on a regular basis to support local religious institutions. Chanda 
(Bengali, meaning dues paid to a specific cause) is frequently collected in cash or 
kind for religious purposes, and is also a financing source for secular projects 
such as road repair. It is collected from the direct beneficiaries of a particular 
project. Fieldwork has found that the significance of such contributions varies 
between districts. 
•  In some countries university students who receive government subsidies are 
required to "volunteer" to help implement and supervise small-scale rural 
development projects - Nepal, India and Indonesia provide examples of this. There are widely used terms for the donation of labour in countries as diverse as Sri 
Lanka (shramdan) and Peru (minga). The efficiency of "voluntary" contributions of 
labour and materials depends upon the opportunity costs therein. At certain times of the 
year (such as the non-harvest season), the opportunity cost of labour may be extremely 
low. Efficiency requires, however, that the society-wide benefits of the project at least 
equal the opportunity costs of the individuals who donate labour and materials. 
Moreover, in-kind services raise important questions of equity. Local leaders and 
traditions may ensure compliance with such contributions, but the burden may not be 
equitably distributed. It is also noted that the use of compulsory labour on local projects 
by colonial regimes left a negative legacy toward such a policy. Still local responsibility 
for the construction of buildings with local labour, to house services run with central 
government staff, is characteristic of many parts of francophone Africa (Bahl, et al 1984).  
Some are more sceptical about the scope for increased resource mobilisation via the 
voluntarist route. Bahl et al (1984) argued that voluntary contributions, both monetary 
and in-kind, rarely account for substantial amounts of revenue, and that their growth 
potential is limited. Moreover, 'self-help' associations may become a drain upon central 
government resources. They tend to focus more upon the construction of facilities, rather 
than the maintenance thereof - and as such the national government may be under 
pressure to meet recurrent costs (Hughes 1985 p.62).  
In Kenya, community groups depend heavily upon central government financial 
support for capital and especially recurrent expenditures. Communities may 
embark on the construction of health centres, for example, on the assumption that 
the government would subsequently supply drugs and equipment, and employ the 
required staff. The community development assistants, together with local 
politicians, have tended to urge communities to embark on more and more 
projects without consideration of longer-term factors, such as likely recurrent 
costs. Wallis (1990) reports that central government budgets thereby came under 
"excessive pressure" (p.440). This resulted in the assertion of greater control by 
the central government, and the reduction of local authority involvement. 
Inter-governmental Transfers - Impact on Resource Mobilisation  
"All assistance should be provided in ways and on terms that are positive-sum - that 
neither substitute for nor discourage people's contributions." - (Uphoff 1988).  
As discussed above, transfers from higher to lower levels of government are often a 
significant source of local finances. Local resource mobilisation may either expand or 
contract in response to the transfer. In the former case the transfer can be termed 
"stimulative", whilst in the latter local governments cut back on local revenue raising, 
and substitute the central transfer (Bahl et al 1984). The objective of central transfers 
should be to allow recipient local governments to fulfil their expenditure functions, while 
encouraging their own fiscal efforts as far as possible and ensuring an equitable 
distribution of public service provision throughout the country.  According to Bird (1990), an increase in total resource mobilisation is unlikely to follow 
central grants in practice. Similarly, the World Bank (1988) expressed the view that local 
governments come to view grants as substitutes for local taxes and user charges (pp. 165-
6).  
•  In Nigeria in the mid-1970s, grants from central and state governments to the 
local level were substantially increased. From 1976 to 1977?, central grants to 
local government increased roughly five and a half times. At the same time, the 
national revenue sharing formula lacked any incentive for raising taxes; as a result 
local governments were implicitly encouraged to drop such revenue sources as 
community taxes, property rates and user fees (Oluwu 1982). Both state and local 
revenue fell, in relative and absolute terms (Olowu 1990). In Ibadan City, for 
example, the number of property taxpayers dropped from 27 000 persons in 1975 
to 8 650 in 1979. Other cities experienced similar declines (WDR 1988). 
•  In Bangladesh, some components of the 'normal' (tied) grants programme are 
supposed to provide an incentive for local resource mobilisation. For example, 
central grants are used to pay a portion of the salary of local officials. But in 
practice this does not stimulate local revenue effort - the grants are not 
conditional, and the local salary share often goes unpaid (Bahl 1984). 
Matching requirements can be used to stimulate local resource mobilisation. Under these 
conditions, it is in the locality's best interest to continue raising revenues which, in 
addition, ensure that it has a more vested interest in the overall success of the project. The 
same arguments would apply to the use of distribution formulas for block grants which 
specifically include local tax effort.  
There are examples of specific attempts to provide incentives for local revenue raising. 
The state of West Bengal enacted legislation in 1983 which requires municipal 
governments to increase their own revenue collections as a condition of capital assistance 
grants (Banjaree, 1989). (Grant formulas in the UK, Japan and some state grant 
programmes in the US include a reward for local tax effort: the grant is calculated as the 
difference between a jurisdiction's current property tax collections, and the amount it 
would have collected had it applied its existing rate to an 'average' tax base: Dillinger in 
EDI 1989.  
Borrowing  
Borrowing is a means by which additional funds may be mobilised for local 
governments. National governments in developing countries have increasingly allowed 
municipalities to borrow to finance infrastructure, especially when fees can be levied to 
recover costs (Rondinelli 1990). At the outset however, it should be pointed out that this 
may be a problematic route - given the potentially adverse results which could follow, in 
the loss of national monetary control and the implications for the efficacy of national 
macroeconomic policy. Although municipal development financial institutions (MDFIs) 
are not new, according to Dillinger (1989), "the merits of this approach to local 
government finance remain unproven".  Borrowing - from central government or intermediaries - may be undertaken in order to 
finance major capital investments that cannot be paid for from today's recurrent revenues. 
This is generally done through the creation of a MDFI, which offers a diverse portfolio of 
financial issues, and has greater flexibility than local governments. These specialised 
institutions are said to have the advantage that the risk of local government default means 
that they are more likely to scrutinise creditworthiness more carefully, select better 
projects, and enforce repayment more rigorously. Municipal credit institutions have an 
established record in continental Europe and Japan (Dillinger, 1989).  
In developing countries, an MDFI usually begins with an initial injection of funds from a 
donor and a counterpart contribution, usually larger, from the central or state government. 
The World Bank has provided seed money to establish or stabilise a number of MDFIs. 
Where, as in Latin America, these financial institutions depend solely upon loans from 
central government to finance their lending operations, the resources mobilised would 
generally not enlarge the total public sector 'pie'.  
•  In Brazil, the state governments of Santa Catarina and Parana have set up funds 
from which creditworthy municipalities can borrow for capital investment, 
provided that they have a satisfactory investment plan and are willing to accept 
technical assistance to help increase local revenue raising capacity (Rondinelli, 
1990) 
•  In Senegal, local authorities can submit projects to the Comite National des Prets, 
for technical evaluation on the basis of established allocation criteria. The next 
stage is financial evaluation, and then financing by the Banque Nationale de 
l'Habitat (a central government financed institution originally created to 
administer low-income housing programmes). This credit system is reported to be 
yielding satisfactory results in terms of the number and size of operations 
undertaken, but an improved capability to assess the actual implementation of the 
projects and the use of funds is required (EDI 1989). 
•  Jordan's MDFI has been described as "notably successful" (WDR 1988). An 
autonomous Cities and Villages Development Bank, established by the 
government in 1979, provides investment finance and technical assistance to 
municipal and village councils. It has helped finance the expansion of physical 
and social infrastructure (such as roads, schools, clinics, water supply and 
electricity) to virtually all settlements, even the small and remote. It has also been 
"instrumental in maintaining and improving the quality of infrastructure 
investment through its standards, appraisal and monitoring", and become 
increasingly involved in financial and technical advice for local authorities 
(p.164). The Bank has introduced criteria which helps municipalities to better 
forecast their debt service capacity. 
Central governments tend to strictly regulate and limit the ability of municipalities to 
borrow. This is not only due to concerns about financial solvency. The monetary 
implications of unrestricted borrowing might have significant inflationary repercussions, 
and undermine macroeconomic stabilisation policy at the national level.  •  In Nigeria, fear of excessive borrowing meant that only the largest, most 
financially viable municipal governments were allowed to take loans. 
•  In Brazil, the federal government sets specific limits on both the amount of debt 
and debt service that municipalities can incur (Rondinelli, 1990). 
•  In Zimbabwe, urban councils raise about 80-90% of recurrent revenue from own-
sources - taxes, fees, licences, tariffs and rents. The capital budgets in the form of 
loans from the central government, or from the Local Authority Pension Fund. 
Only two councils, Harare and Bulawao, are allowed to borrow on the open 
market and can issue stocks and bonds (Moyo, in EDI 1989). 
Finally it should be noted that the effective rates of interest faced by local governments 
will tend to vary, depending upon the nature of the bondholders, e.g. whether borrowing 
from the central government, or overseas banks or local residents. In some cases there 
have been problems with repayment. MDFIs in Honduras, Kenya and Morocco, for 
example, are reported to have experienced (and tolerated) substantial arrears (WDR 
1988).  
Empirical evidence on total public resource mobilisation  
This is a crucial, but generally neglected dimension of decentralisation in developing 
countries. There are a number of empirically testable hypotheses concerning how the 
aggregate level of revenues generated might be influenced by the structure of 
government, in particular, when spending and taxation decisions are made on a 
decentralised basis. Yet there is very little in terms of rigorous quantitative evidence. 
Ideally, we would want some specific studies of developing countries - both time series 
(before-and-after comparisons), and cross-country data (between different countries with 
differing degrees of decentralisation).  
The most relevant strand of research to date has produced a lively debate (among some 
U.S. academics), over the relationship between decentralisation and government size. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) put forth the view, by analogy with the conventional 
theory of monopoly in the private sector, that a monolithic (i.e. centralised) government 
will systematically seek to maximise tax revenue. This led them to the proposition that 
the size of the public sector varies inversely with the extent of decentralisation. From the 
perspective of the above-mentioned authors, (which is obviously somewhat different than 
the present one), decentralisation is endorsed as a means of constraining total public 
resource mobilisation. Marlow (1989) explored the hypothesis that 'Total government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, cetirus paribus, the greater the extent to 
which taxes and expenditures are decentralised.'  
According to Marlow's analysis, the degree of fiscal decentralisation affects public 
finance through the following avenues:  
(i) Decentralisation increases competition in the public sector, leading to a relatively 
lower tax burden - i.e. given mobility of residents and capital in pursuit of fiscal gains, the greater the numbers of alternative tax jurisdictions, the less likely that 'excessive' 
taxes will be levied;  
(ii) Conversely, centralisation restricts the ability of states to compete (as in (i)) since a 
growing national share of total government money weakens the relative significance of 
local governments; and  
(iii) Centralisation may generate a greater reliance on inflationary finance given that only 
the national government is able to print money.  
Unfortunately (for our purposes) Marlow's empirical analysis of government spending 
was limited to the USA. It covered the period 1946-1985, and used expenditure as a 
measure of government size (rather than taxation). He found that decentralisation affects 
the growth of government negatively (p.266), and that the shifting of government 
responsibilities from the Federal to the state and local levels will contribute to a slowing, 
or falling, of public sector size in the USA.  
This conclusion is controversial. Oates (1985) argued that decentralisation would tend to 
increase total public resource mobilisation. In his empirical investigations, Oates had 
found in 1972, for 42 countries, regressing tax revenue (size of public sector) on a fiscal 
centralisation ratio (central revenue as a proportion of the total), a strong and statistically 
significant negative association. Controlling for income resulted in a still negative result, 
although it was not statistically different from zero at the usual confidence levels.  
In 1985, Oates explored the question again for 43 countries (18 industrial and 25 
developing). The results were that, for the entire sample, the rank correlation between the 
size of the public sector and the extent of centralisation is strongly and significantly 
negative (table 11). A relatively decentralised public sector is typically large. However 
this result is misleading since (as noted above), there is a dramatic difference between the 
average developing and industrial country. Developing countries have small, centralised 
public sectors, compared to industrial countries. Examination of the co-efficients for the 
two variables shows that there is no longer a significant relationship between them. 
Within each of the sub-samples, decentralisation has little relationship to the degree of 
decentralisation. Overall then, Oates' results lead to the null hypothesis that 
de/centralisation and the size of government have little to do with one another.  
Further mobilisation in developing countries over time is needed, before and after 
decentralisation, to gauge the impact thereof.  
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4. Participation  
Participation facilitates in the political realm the pre-eminence of human development and self-
determination, both committed to the ideals of freedom and equality.  
(Borter, quoted in Frenkel 1986).  
At the outset, the 1991 Human Development Report emphasises "Development by the 
people -through appropriate structures of decision making, people must participate fully 
in the planning and implementation of development strategies". Participation can be 
defined briefly, for present purposes, as 'taking part in the formulation, passage or 
implementation of public policies' (Parry 1972). It is necessary, however, to be more 
specific as to the nature of participation in a particular context, and identify who takes 
part in what, when and how, and with what results. This is the task of the present section.  
A distinction can be drawn between participation viewed in terms of active, broad-based 
local participation in political decision making, as an end in itself; and participation as a 
means to affect the appropriateness of decisions and enhance the impact of public 
expenditures upon efficiency, equity, private initiative and so on. These aspects can be 
referred to, respectively, as the developmental and instrumental values of participation 
(Parry 1972). Although this distinction is not always clear-cut, it does usefully reflect two 
approaches to thinking about participation. The former is clearly important, and much of 
the relevant literature is concerned with participation in the developmental sense. 
However our ultimate interest in the present survey lies in the instrumental aspect - the 
impact of local participation, be it broad based or not, upon decisions about the allocation 
of expenditures for human development. Even where local participation is characterised 
as being "subject to elite domination", it is still possible that there would be a positive 
impact upon decisions about human development. This ties into the discussion of 
comparative priorities below.  
These issues are addressed in turn, under a number of headings; the mode, the intensity 
and the quality of participation, and then the impact of decentralisation and participation 
upon the nature of decisions made. First, as to whether decentralisation improves the 
modes of participation - we see that decentralisation typically involves the creation of 
additional formal structures, ostensibly aiming to increase local participation. Second, the 
question as to who effectively makes decisions at the local level is addressed - it is found 
that national officials and/or local elites often tend to dominate the process. Finally, and 
most importantly from our present point of view, the impact of local participation upon 
decision making and priorities is explored. Even in the absence of broad based participation, the actual decision makers may be responsive to interests other than their 
own, so that the quality of decision making is enhanced.  
Developmental - Does Decentralisation Enhance Political Participation?  
"Like a well-established and well-loved music hall act, participation and local government are words 
often found in partnership"  
(Bulpitt 1972).  
Participation is an important theme of many writings on decentralisation. The emphasis 
tends to be upon its political dimension, exploring the extent to which decentralisation 
effectively involves people in decisions about, inter alia, local development. Managing 
one's own affairs is held to be an integral element of human development, the objective 
being to maximise the opportunities for individuals to participate in the decisions which 
affect their lives.  
Decentralization and participation are often positively linked. The underlying belief is 
that local decision making structures will facilitate the genuine involvement of all the 
people, in issues of direct concern to their needs and interests. This in turn assumes both 
the desire of individuals to take part in local government, and the existence of appropriate 
forums which allow and encourage the free expression of their interests. Local 
government is sometimes presented as a form of direct democracy, or at least as essential 
to the workings of the modern democratic state.  
Yet there is no necessary correlation between broad based local participation and 
decentralisation. The relationship depends basically upon the social, economic and 
political setting, and the type of decentralisation enacted. In some cases, 'true' devolution 
and increased participation were clearly not part of the national government's agenda; the 
objective was no more than a limited degree of deconcentration. A number of authors 
(e.g. Conyers, 1984; McGinn and Street, 1986; Collins 1989; Cassasus 1990; Samoff, 
1990) have emphasised that decentralisation should be seen basically in terms of 
rearrangements of power, and tend to conclude that such policies often result in 
deconcentration, and primarily strengthen central power. Ideally we would want to 
examine participation (or the lack thereof) on the basis of concrete evidence, such as the 
holding, fairness, and competitiveness of elections, voter turnout, lobbying of 
representatives, etc... In practice one must resort to more secondary sources of 
information.  
Modes of Participation  
The mode of taking part in local decision making will differ according to the 
opportunities - institutional and informal - available, the interests and political resources 
of the potential participants, and the attitudes prevalent in the society (Parry 1972). It is 
generally inaccurate to describe a political decision in terms of a once-and-for-all act; 
rather there are typically a number of stages, ranging from putting an item on the agenda, 
through technical advice, discussion of favoured proposals, to enforcement of the final 
decision. For example, local participants may be more effective in putting matters of local concern on the agenda, and much less involved in the technical aspects of decision 
making.  
The focus here is upon the institutional arrangements which have been created under the 
auspices of decentralisation. In several of the cases, there has been a negative relationship 
between 'decentralisation' and participation, and a tightening of central, often 
authoritarian, control. These examples typically, although not invariably, fall at the 
deconcentration end of the spectrum.  
•  Under a military dictatorship in Chile, the devolution of responsibilities for basic 
social services to the municipalities occurred simultaneously with closer central 
government control, with previously elected local officials, including mayors and 
community advisors, being subject to Presidential appointment (Winkler, 1989). 
•  Zambia's announced policy of "decentralisation in centralism" sought to create an 
"integrated local administration system". The center transferred power to the 
district level, but through Party officials and political appointees, both of whom 
are subject to tight central control. In a sense, this deconcentration broadened 
opportunities to participate in local decision making, but this was strictly 
channelled through, and constrained by, the (one) Party structure. It resulted in a 
single politico-administrative structure (District Council) in each locality, which 
effectively enhanced the "leading role" of the Party (Conyers, 1984; Chikulo, 
1985; Nooi, 1987). The reforms effectively strengthened central control over a 
wide range of affairs previously regarded as local (Olowu 1989). The functions of 
the Zambian state at the local level include "official socialisation, by which an 
official ideology and appropriate values and attitudes are diffused, and by which 
government action is represented as being in the common interest; (and) 
participation, in politics and planning, in order to maintain the legitimacy of the 
state" (Rakodi, 1988 p. 32). 
•  In the Sudan, the Local Government Act (1971) sought to achieve "maximum 
possible participation of citizens in the administration of their local affairs and 
thus reduce centralisation" (Olowu 1989). At the same time, the Act made 
Provincial Councils (which are presided over by a political appointee) responsible 
for, inter alia, "political enlightenment and people's mobilisation ... in accordance 
with the objectives of the May Socialist Revolution". The new system was said to 
have, above all, aimed at encouraging the widest possible participation in 
government. The evidence as to the reality of public participation is unclear. 
Opportunities for female participation were greatly increased by a 25% 
membership quota in the councils. There was, however, general confusion as to 
what level of participation was appropriate - given the existence of six councils at 
the lowest level, two at the intermediate, and the Provincial Council at the apex. 
Further, the Provincial Commissioner - concurrently a personal appointee of the 
President, provincial secretary of the Party (SSU), Treasurer of the Council and 
head of the public service in the province - was able to veto decisions with which 
he disagreed. In general, particularly in the south, the system failed to operate as 
(ostensibly) intended (Norris, 1983). •  Over the past two decades, the Kenyan government has frequently affirmed its 
belief in the concept of decentralisation, and the involvement of wananchi (the 
people) in identifying, designing, implementing and managing projects and 
programmes in the districts. However, critics have argued that during the same 
period, elected local government has been weakened, and that the 'nyayo' 
philosophy of the President requires a close linkage between local government 
and national policy, as the latter is determined by the central leadership (Wallis 
1990). 
An overview of country experience suggests that decentralisation is more likely to be 
thoroughgoing, in the sense that there is genuine devolution of authority and efforts to 
promote participation, under liberal democratic/ pluralist national regimes. Where the 
nation state is authoritarian/one-party, the mode of decentralisation tends to follow 
deconcentration, which effectively preserves central control. This applies equally to 
capitalist and socialist regimes, where small cliques have captured the power of the state. 
At the same time, however, the converse does not necessarily hold - democracy need not 
lead to decentralisation.  
The foregoing proposition is supported by the above-mentioned country cases, as well as 
the experience of particular countries over time.  
•  In Peru, in the period since 1949, there have been shifts in the attitude of national 
governments toward decentralisation. The authoritarian administrations of Odrria, 
Velasco, and Morales Bermudez have consistently rejected devolution and 
political delegation, preferring the greater control of deconcentration and 
bureaucratic delegation. The democratic governments of Prado, Belaunde and 
Garcia emphasised political devolution of decision making authority - the latter 
attempted to implement a sweeping programme of general devolution to the 
regional and local levels (Scmidt, 1989) 
•  In the Philippines, after the imposition of martial law in 1972, a marked 
intensification of centralisation was observed (Ruland and Sajo 1988). Local 
governments were seen primarily as a device to consolidate the regimes hold on 
power. Local elections were suspended until 1972. Urban barangays were created 
as the basic administrative units of the country. While the barangays were 
purportedly created as a means to broaden citizen participation, they were led by 
regime-loyal, hand-picked (until 1982) officers, and studies found that in low 
income areas they primarily exerted functions of political mobilisation and control 
for the regime (ibid p.27). 
•  In Liberia the militarisation of local administration followed the 1980 coup. Even 
after the promulgation of the new constitution and the ostensible return to civilian 
rule, the role of the military in local administration remained significant. In 1987, 
six of the thirteen county superintendents were military men in active service 
(Sawyer 1990). 
The Intensity and Quality of Participation : Who Makes Local Decisions  Who participates and with what frequency? The intensity of participation refers to the 
proportion of the population that takes part in political activity (Parry 1972). A related 
question lies in the quality of participation, or its effectiveness - whether the policy 
outcomes are those intended by the participants and the direct result of their actions. 
Voting, for example, is sometimes regarded as qualitatively inferior because it is distant 
from the legislative outcome, and the average voter takes no further part in the decision 
making process, abdicating her will to the electoral representative. In any case it is 
doubtful whether voting in an election where there is only one party amounts to 'real' 
participation. Even where an electoral system is formally open, the outcome may be as 
predictable as in one-party states because the opposition lacks the necessary resources 
(wealth, skill and organisation) for success. Alternatively the policies and platforms of 
the 'opposing' parties may be so similar that there is not, in reality, any real degree of 
choice exercised in the act of voting. On the other hand, going to the polls may be the 
most which can be expected of the average participant, in developing and industrial 
countries.  
It has been argued that decentralisation, by multiplying the available modes of 
participation and by establishing institutional arrangements by which votes will be more 
closely linked with political consequences, improves the effectiveness of participation. 
Local knowledge of, and a commitment to, the community is said promote a desire to 
participate in local government. However there are numerous examples of formal 
attempts at decentralisation which have failed to engage the effective participation of 
local people in decisions about local development. Sometimes this is apparently because 
the national government never actually intended such a result to follow (as in the 
examples above). In other cases it may be in spite of the creation of structures ostensibly 
designed to facilitate local participation, often because of the dominance of decision 
making by official bureaucrats. In the following paragraphs, some of these are recounted.  
National Officials  
This survey has emphasised the likelihood that local government will be regarded simply 
as a technical and administrative arrangement within the national government machinery, 
which relieves the central authorities of direct responsibility of providing certain public 
services. The civil servants who staff the various central field agencies at the local level 
play a number of roles, including the provision of technical advice, the administration 
and co-ordination of services, and regulatory functions. It has been observed that they 
may also dominate local decision making, for reasons ranging from superior expertise to 
ulterior motives on the part of central authorities.  
•  In Zimbabwe, channels for popular participation were created in the form of 
Village and Ward Development Committees, and District Councils. In practice 
however, it has been found that elected representatives were frequently overruled 
by the technically more competent central government officials, who have more 
direct control over the allocation of public expenditure (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). 
•  In Senegal, administrative decentralisation reforms in 1972 sought to encourage 
popular participation in the management of local affairs. Through the active role of local people in the making of development policy, the government hoped to 
counter the "rising tide of the malaise paysan" wherein the peasants were refusing 
to repay government loans or otherwise co-operate with government programmes 
in rural areas (Vengroff and Johnston, 1987). To ensure 'responsible participation', 
the affairs of each rural community (group of villages) were to be managed by a 
representative body, the rural council. Two-thirds of the councillors are elected 
(on a winner-take-all party basis), and one-third chosen by the general assembly 
of co-operatives in the rural community. The councillors (overwhelmingly male 
and poorly educated), often felt that their views were not taken into account in the 
initiation and execution of local development projects. The above-mentioned 
study concluded that the national administrative authorities were put in a position 
which allowed them to "exercise authority in a manner inconsistent with the spirit 
of the administrative reform." Moreover, the system adopted did "not represent a 
major departure from French administrative practice, in that the state and its 
agents retain full supervisory control over all aspects of local level actions". 
•  In Chinese cities, the Residents' Committees and Street Offices, the political 
organs which form the linkage between the people and the government, are 
supposed to provide opportunities for participation in the governmental process. 
However it has been argued that the Chinese government has a "top-down" 
approach toward community development which seeks to maximise popular 
support for national policy goals and Party officials (Leung, 1990). Seen in this 
light, the community structure serves as an instrument of the state to secure 
ideological unity. The cadres perform apparently conflicting roles - as 
representatives of the interests of the people, and government officials 
implementing government policies. The government, however, does not perceive 
this as a problem. 
Critics argue that the community structure of committees does not encourage the 
articulation of interests which diverge from the official mass line. And 
correspondingly, some surveys have found that half the people saw the resident 
committees as 'nasty and meddling', another quarter viewed them neutrally, and 
only a quarter of the sample regarded them as helpful (ibid p. 204). The 
importance of the structure as a mechanism of political control was allegedly 
demonstrated in the aftermath of Tiennamen Square in 1989. The street offices 
and residents' committees were immediately mobilised to support the government, 
through organising political study groups, putting up pro-government banners and 
assisting the police in tracking down dissidents (Leung, 1990).  
•  Another, perhaps extreme, example is the set of decentralisation proposals 
developed by the South African government, to accompany the amended 
constitution of 1983. The state's guidelines for black community authorities 
purported to envisage maximum devolution of power to the local level, and 
minimum administrative control. Contrary to the stated objectives however, 
decentralisation has been interpreted as a strategy for extending central control, by 
depoliticising the population, by controlling the actions of local government 
institutions and by using the local authorities as a "training ground for collaborative political leadership" (Samoff, 1990, pp.522-23). In the short term, it 
was also intended to deflect popular protests from the national to the local 
government, and thereby reinforce central authority (id.). 
In some cases, the impact of decentralisation upon the intensity and quality of local 
participation is controversial. Tanzania is one such case. The reforms embarked upon in 
1972 included the creation of deliberative assemblies at all levels, which involved both 
elected representatives and the relevant government functionaries. Maro (1990) 
concluded that this had thereby increased the level of popular participation in the drawing 
of village plans, through the village council and committees. Slater (1989) however, 
regards the country as an example where the "rationalisation and consolidation of 
centralised authority lay at the roots of the spatial restructuring of state power, so that 
decentralisation was more illusion or myth than hard institutional reality" (p. 514). That 
author argues that there was little real attempt to facilitate mass participation in the 
decision making structures, and little dialogue between government staff and the people 
to find out about actual problems, potentials and needs. Final decisions about regional 
and district plans and personnel all rested firmly with the center (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Planning and the Prime Minister's Office). The machinery for popular 
participation provided in each Ujaama village was under the general supervision of the 
centrally appointed village manager. According to Kasfir (1983) the degree of 
participation in the newly created institutions was actually less than that prior to the 
reforms. Similarly, Samoff (1989) concludes that in practice, Tanzania experienced 
deconcentration, which largely reinforced central authority and converted village councils 
into development advisory committees, dominated by administrators and technicians.  
Local Elites  
It is sometimes argued that community attachment and knowledge will lead to increased 
rates of participation in local affairs. But even where there is a substantial measure of 
devolution, participation on the part of those people previously excluded from decision 
making structures need not follow. Empirical studies have emphasised the importance of 
high social status (income, occupation and education), characteristics not necessarily 
confined to those with a high degree of community attachment, as indicators of high 
political participation rates in local government. The studies available suggest that power 
structures in small communities are often oligarchic in character, and that political 
activity is typically the preserve of the few and the more important the decisions are, the 
fewer the number of people involved (Bulpitt 1972). This contradicts the developmental 
objective of broad-based participation. Popular election does not always circumvent this 
problem. Given the distribution of assets (land), income, education, and client-patron 
relations, local elections tend to favour the rich and "well-born", especially in highly 
stratified societies.  
The phenomenon of elite domination is not unique to local governments, nor to 
developing countries. The role of elites is one of the basic problems for direct, as well as 
indirect (representative) democracy. According to the U.S. political scientist Ostrom, the 
existence of an elite is unavoidable for any political system, be it democratic or not. It might be added that the postulate of participation in the sense of an equal influence of 
everyone is unrealistic inasmuch as it presupposes everybody having such an interest, in 
the face of a multitude of 'private' endeavours which might be much more effective, at 
least from the individual's point of view (e.g. meeting basic consumption needs).  
Although we do not know how governmental structures affect political attitudes and 
behaviour, it seems reasonable to believe that the characteristics of local representative 
democracy will resemble, to a certain extent, democracy at the national level (Bulpitt 
1972). Local systems of organisation are power systems, quite as much as national power 
structures. It has been argued that new local organisations are quickly taken over by those 
holding control in the existing structures (Ralston et al 1983).  
•  A study of Iloilo City in the Philippines found that local politics was marked by a 
high degree of competitiveness, especially prior to martial law, when voter 
turnout averaged nearly 81% between 1947 and 1971. It had fallen markedly by 
1980 (to 74%) reflecting a one-sided contest under the auspices of 
authoritarianism. Yet political participation was not broad based, in the sense that 
the upper-middle and upper classes dominated decision making, and competed for 
elected positions. In one sample of local politicians, 30% were lawyers, 26% 
other professionals, 29% businessmen - there were no lower class representatives 
on the council. "Wealth, personal connections, family prestige and a wide 
clientele are still the major criteria for political success" (Ruland and Sajo 1988). 
•  Even within democratic political cultures in the North, the incidence of 
participation varies significantly, as does the kind of people who seek to 
participate. In the U.S. only 15% of those aged between 18-24 voted in the last 
Congressional election. The better educated and better off are far more likely to 
participate in politics and government than the uneducated poor. [In some 
industrial countries (eg Australia) local government elections are notorious for 
low intensity of participation (in terms of turnout at elections).] 
In many developing countries, women have been excluded from traditional and modern 
forums of decision making, at all levels of government. The extension of participation 
requires both the erosion of male privileges and prejudices, and the creation of adequate 
educational, training and other facilities (such as family planning). It appears that such 
comprehensive changes require, at the very least, positive governmental action at the 
national level.  
•  A field study in Nusa Tenggara Timor, Indonesia demonstrated the difficulties in 
eliciting the participation of women in development projects. Each village in 
Indonesia is headed by an elected village chief and his assistants. Whilst issues 
are discussed in a musyawarah (community meeting), decisions are effectively 
made by the chief. Women lead relatively isolated lives and rarely attend 
musyawarah. The main vehicle to stimulate the involvement of women is the 
Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga which, at the village level, is headed by the 
chief's wife (in accordance with cultural traditions). In the villages studied, this 
body was functioning poorly and the chief was actually making the decisions. •  Some argue that separate forums for women should be established, rather than 
included in mainstream organisations (Yudelman 1986). The reasons against 
integration are that women want to run their own organisations, and to earn and 
control their own income (in the case of income-generating projects). On the other 
hand, it is stressed that separate is not equal, because women tend to be politically 
and economically marginalised by such efforts. 
Quotas are one possible means by which the observed tendency for elite 
domination can be redressed. They can ensure a minimum representation of 
deprived and minority groups.  
•  In the Indian state of Karnakata, the composition of the mandal panchayat (group 
of villages) encourages participation by groups commonly excluded from local 
decision making - 25% of the seats are reserved for women, and a minimum of 
18% of seats are reserved for members of scheduled castes. Some cynical 
commentators attribute this to the Janata Party's desire to incorporate 
marginalised voters into its patronage network, in order to challenge "the 
Congress machine" (Slater and Watson, 1989). 
•  In Vietnam, adequate representation of poor peasants in the decision making 
bodies of production co-operatives was sought through reserving two-thirds of the 
seats on the relevant committees for low income groups (Majeres 1985). 
In the USA since the 1960s some federal social laws have provided that the programmes 
have to be administered with "maximum feasible participation" of the local poor. These 
national programmes were administered through a (centrally designed) ad hoc local 
forum which ignored the traditional local structure in favour of the underprivileged 
(African Americans, Latinos etc.). The reviews of this approach have been controversial. 
But there is agreement that the scheme influenced local community power structures to a 
much greater extent than had been anticipated by the national politicians who introduced 
the provision (Frenkel 1986).  
The Instrumental Value of Participation - The Impact of Decentralisation on Local 
Decision Making  
Instrumental theories portray participation as a means by which individuals can ensure 
that their interests are defended and promoted, and as a way to facilitate better 
information and communication, and therefore more effective government. Participation 
is also expected to induce enterprise, initiative and imagination which will benefit the 
whole community. Unfortunately the relationship between decentralisation and the 
degree of participation facilitated thereunder on the one hand, and the impact upon other 
objectives of human development on the other, is not clear-cut.  
There is mixed evidence as to the instrumental aspects of participation in a decentralised 
system. McGinn and Street (1986) conclude their discussion of (educational) 
decentralisation in the following terms: "non-democratic governments will not use 
decentralisation to broaden democratic participation (no matter what their rhetoric), and whatever benefits result from increased efficiency will be distributed inequitably in an 
inequitable society" (p.490, italics added). Yet we will see evidence which contradicts 
this thesis. Indonesia, under a manifestly authoritarian regime, has achieved through the 
substantial decentralisation of expenditures on basic social and economic infrastructure, 
impressive strides in human development over the corresponding period. Such advances 
were equitably distributed across the archipelago, especially so in favour of the 
impoverished eastern islands. And in Taiwan, measures of decentralisation adopted in a 
state which was far from democratic have contributed to relatively equitable patterns of 
growth and infrastructure development.  
It has already been observed that even where there is a thoroughgoing devolution of 
decision making power to local government, the poor may still be effectively excluded. 
Beyond simply labelling situations as being "subject to elite domination" however, it is 
necessary to pursue the issue further. Are local spokespersons, albeit members of the 
local elite, more appropriate and/or beneficial than the alternative of central control? Elite 
groups may act solely out of self interest, or be regarded as more capable representatives 
of local communities. Similarly, where civil servants and nominated individuals dominate 
local decision making they are not, automatically, less responsive to local demands. 
Local constituents may prefer to contact field agency officials rather than their locally 
elected representatives. Finally it is noted that the fact that most important decisions are 
made in the national capital does not automatically mean that local interests and demands 
will automatically be ignored or slighted.  
These are largely empirical questions. It is necessary to look at the priorities and 
behaviour of those who occupy local positions of power, and compare this to the revealed 
preferences of central authorities in the capital. In some cases, the outcomes will be 
better, in others worse, and sometimes perhaps no different than that which would have 
resulted under a centralised system.  
The available studies suggest that power structures in small communities are conservative 
in their policy attitudes (Bulpitt 1972). The notion of 'community' which often underlies 
discussions of local government has been criticised; community harmony may be the 
result of repression and community integration the result of conflict. It has been argued 
that the dominant value of small community life and local government is fraternity, 
which emphasises consensus and stability rather than conflict and change (Wood, cited in 
Bulpitt 1972), to the disadvantage of the poorer members of the community. The 
following paragraphs reflect instances where the decisions of local government have 
favoured the better-off groups in the community.  
•  In Nepal, where political parties were (until recently) banned, it was reported that the 
people which traditionally held social and economic power (such as wealthy farmers) 
have used the system instituted under the Decentralisation Act (1982) to benefit 
themselves (Bienen 1990).  
•  In Bangladesh, the chairmen and elected members of the union parishad (the local 
government unit in closest contact with the people) are drawn from the rural elite, 
because of the influence of traditional patronage relationships. It has been argued that an authority that formerly entailed some reciprocity has been invested with official sanction 
and partisan support, thereby facilitating the ability of the local elite to further its own 
interests at the expense of the community. Powers have been transferred to members of 
the local elite, and to centrally controlled and recruited civil servants (Khan 1987).  
•  As noted above, local government in Iloilo City in the Philippines has been dominated 
by the upper classes (Ruland and Sajo 1988). This was said to have major repercussions 
on urban development processes and priorities - "basic socio-economic issues 
confronting the poor figured lowly in the value system of the city's decision makers" 
(ibid. p. 273).. In a country where unemployment was approaching 20%, this problem 
was only ranked 8th among 17 major problems confronting the city, and social inequity 
ranked 12th.  
•  It has been observed in East Africa that the main beneficiaries of community 
development schemes have been relatively privileged social groups - those with the initial 
resources, skills or influence to help ensure that 'self-help' schemes reflect their own 
particular needs.  
Some argue that centrally-sponsored institutions are inherently likely to 'co-opt' popular 
action. This implies that local decision making will not alter the distribution of the 
benefits of public expenditure, insofar as official decision making structures operate so as 
to modify perceptions about local needs.  
•  In Israel, a highly centralised and politicised nation, Matnassim were established 
in order to provide an array of social services, and to facilitate citizen 
participation, through the majority representation of local residents on the 
Governing Boards. In practice however, local representatives tended to identify 
with a centralistic, homogenising view of society, more than with local interests. 
This was attributed partly to the fact that the political careers of local politicians 
are tied into national political parties. One study concluded that local Matnas have 
not been able to independently develop programmes of local interest - and that it 
was "not effective as a vehicle for community-specific development within the 
heterogeneous Israeli society" (Havassy and Yany 1990). 
One drawback of central field agency domination, from an instrumental point of view, is 
that national officials may tend to lack the time and resources to develop adequate 
contacts with the public. It has been said that these officials are likely to have an 
"enforced neutrality", avoiding contacts and initiatives wherever possible (Bulpitt 1972).  
Obviously the foregoing evidence about the impact of local decision making forums upon 
actual distribution of the benefits of public expenditures is rather scattered and anecdotal. 
More comprehensive evidence and analysis is presented below in Part IV, under the 
discussion of the comparative priorities of local and central government.  
5. The Impact Upon Economic Activity  
The expansion of income earning opportunities is a crucial dimension of human 
development. Yet the impact of governmental structure upon economic activity is difficult to pinpoint, especially given the multitude of associated variables such as macro 
economic policy, development strategies and ideology. Ideally we would like to be 
specific, and obtain evidence as to whether the decentralised provision of economic 
infrastructure has actually promoted local economic activity. Unfortunately there is little 
direct evidence either way.  
In principle, decentralisation may promote local economic activity through several 
means, including an increased infusion of capital and other resources, the more extensive 
provision of infrastructure, and a more effective 'enabling environment' than would have 
been the case under a centralised system. In this light it has been claimed that countries 
with effective local government systems have been much more dynamic and successful 
economically than those under centralised control. It is further argued that there exists a 
causal correlation between decentralisation and increased economic activity (Allen 1987). 
Indeed the general assumption in much of the literature on decentralisation appears to be 
that decentralisation promotes economic development (Olowu, 1987; Olowu and Wunsch 
1990). According to Tocqueville, in his criticisms of the nineteenth century European 
administrative system, the necessary creativity and popular enthusiasm to sustain the 
development process might be lacking in the absence of effective basic local government 
systems (Tocqueville, Democracy in America, cited in Oluwu, 1987).  
As suggested above, the potentially positive implications of decentralisation for private 
sector activity are various. First, where decentralisation is accompanied by increased 
public resource availability and capital inflows, this will have direct and secondary 
stimulative multiplier effects. For example, the construction and maintenance of local 
infrastructure, such as roads, water supply and electricity, is likely to involve local 
contractors and wage labour. Second, as we saw above (p.*) in the discussion of 
economic infrastructure, decentralisation is likely to lead to more appropriate selection of 
the type and location of facilities, and better long term maintenance. Thus 
decentralisation can contribute to improved physical conditions (transportation, energy 
sources, communications etc.) which reduces rural isolation and improves the 
profitability of local enterprises, and thereby stimulates local economic activity. Third, 
local governments may be more supportive of "endogenous entrepreneurial 
development". The latter is defined by the OECD (1986) as development built on local 
assets, expanding existing enterprises and creating new ones, which is initiated and 
managed locally. Governments at the local level may be better able to formulate policies 
which are appropriate to local conditions. Entrepreneurial energies may be unleashed 
from the burden of central bureaucratic regulation (assuming, of course, that these are not 
replaced by local red-tape). Thus it has been observed that "because they need support 
that is individualised to local conditions, entrepreneurial initiatives appear to survive and 
flourish best in settings that permit flexible and localised public management (OECD 
1986,p.33).  
Finally less immediate benefits might also be forecast, such as those flowing from a 
labour force whose skills better meet the needs of local employers. Devolution of 
decision making power to the local level may also benefit local entrepreneurship by 
helping to overcome structural constraints. The rural economic environment is characterised by large distances from the urban centres where both public and private 
decision making tends to be conducted and financial resources and management 
information concentrated. Dispersed rural enterprises have tended to be relatively isolated 
and have poorer knowledge of the economic activities in their immediate environment 
and beyond. Local governments may be well positioned to formulate and implement 
policies which are supportive of local business including such services as management 
assistance and market information. It is said that the physical and social distances which 
separate central officials from rural entrepreneurs, and that the indiscriminate character of 
regional policies have inhibited the development of fruitful policies by the national 
administration (OECD 1986).  
Caputo (1988) is enthusiastic about the potential for local governments in "enabling local 
economic growth". This is to follow from their ability to adopt a management approach 
"based on the active participation and promotion of many small businesses" (p.111). 
Access to public contracts - through local government calls for tender for the construction 
and equipment of decentralised public facilities - is presented as a significant factor in the 
dynamic growth of small businesses. The other "main lines of action" for local 
government lie in the establishment of systems to gather and analyse information on the 
dynamism and constraints of local small businesses, support for small business 
associations, and involvement in the creation of effective permanent channels for 
consultation and participation (p.115). The author argues that programmes for supporting 
small businesses are best promoted at the local level.  
At the same time the influence of national macroeconomic policies must be borne in 
mind - where central economic managers are seeking to stabilise or contract the 
economy, any local stimulatory measures may well be overwhelmed in the larger context. 
Moreover national development policies - industrial, agricultural, trade etc. - will 
generally have a substantial impact. A national system of direct communications, 
highways and railways is also important, especially for local 'export' industries.   
Practice  
There are a number of cases where decentralisation has stimulated local economic 
activity. Sometimes this has followed the construction of economic infrastructure; in 
other places it has been attributed to the capital injected through transfers to 
impoverished localities under a decentralised system.  
•  In Taiwan, the agricultural land reform programme had a significant effect on 
population distribution in the 1950s and 1960s. It created some 200 000 new 
owner-farmers and greatly increased job opportunities in rural areas. From the 
early 1970s the government began to focus on spatial development issues. The 
location of public utilities has been fairly well spread throughout much of the 
island. The road network is evenly developed over the western and eastern coastal 
plains of the island and there is a good rail system. This facilitates the dispersed 
distribution of industrial establishments. The perceptible growth of population and 
industry in the central and eastern regions, and the less rapid growth of the Kaohsiung and Taipei metropolises in recent years suggests that the 
decentralisation of infrastructural improvements across the island has helped to 
avoid over-concentration of population and economic activities in the 
metropolitan areas (Tsai 1990). 
•  In Indonesia, the major redistributive schemes and central transfers adopted under 
the auspices of "decentralisation" are said to have been a significant factor in 
explaining the healthy growth rates of relatively poor regions, especially in the 
Eastern islands (Hill 1991). 
•  Decentralization in Tanzania sought to promote small-scale industries in a self-
reliant fashion (Maro, 1990). The reforms increased the use of local resources, 
raw materials and skills. There was also evidence that these industries produced 
goods and services which could otherwise only have been obtained at the expense 
of high and foreign exchange costs. 
Positive economic consequences do not flow automatically however. There are 
instances where decentralised governmental structures have not provided a 
positive link promoting local economic activity. Sometimes this can be attributed 
to an allocation of government responsibilities between different levels of 
government in a manner which limits any positive local impact; in other cases, 
there are continuing inadequacies in infrastructure at the local level.  
•  Nigeria's 1976 reform created a three tier structure of government - federal, state 
and local - the third being based on local units which varied greatly in size and 
population. No distinction was made between urban and rural areas. The range of 
functions allocated to local government councils included primary education, 
health services and roads, but did not extend to water supply, small scale 
industries and co-operatives. Several negative consequences are seen to have 
resulted from these arrangements, such as lop-sided infrastructural landscape in 
favour of local government headquarters in urban centres and the absence of 
agricultural programmes in most areas (Apkan 1990). 
•  In the Philippines the development of urban hinterland centres was pursued in 
order to rectify the country's grave regional economic imbalances. The key 
strategy, known as the Regional Cities Development Project (RCDP), involved 
infrastructural development, strengthening management capabilities of the city 
government, and "the creation of conditions conducive to the expansion of an 
urban economy". Ruland and Sajo's (1988) study of the impact of the scheme in 
Iloilo City found that some of the infrastructural components - such as a modern 
port complex and a well-developed road system - improved the foundation upon 
which to build a sound manufacturing sector. Yet serious infrastructural 
limitations remained in the inadequate water system (whose supply had not 
increased in the past 20 years) and electricity which was expensive and 
insufficient to supply heavy industry. The study concluded that overall the RCDP 
had not yet induced economic growth in the city. On the contrary the prevailing 
economic crisis left the infrastructural improvements to fall into "an economic 
vacuum". There has been a considerable research and debate on the nature of industrial 
decentralisation, and the role of the government therein (see e.g. Bell 1987; 
Wellings 1988; World Bank Spatial Policies Programme). Decentralisation here 
refers to the relocation of industry from the metropolitan areas to the periphery. 
The dominant opinion is that it is primarily a result of government intervention in 
the provision of incentives and development of infrastructure. An alternative view 
is that industrial decentralisation is largely a spontaneous response to market 
forces.  
•  This issue has been discussed extensively in the South African context, where a 
"vast quantity of money has been paid towards incentives and the development of 
infrastructure in far-flung industrial decentralisation points (IDP)"(Wellings 
1988). The IDPs were able to offer infrastructure and services to industrialists. 
Surveys of local companies have shed some light on the factors bearing upon firm 
location decisions, revealing that the incentives were often the major attraction of 
the IDPs and that many firms would relocate if the subsidies were removed. On 
the other hand it has been argued that although incentives may have been decisive 
in some cases, the scale was substantially in excess of what was required, and that 
the process of relocation would have continued in any case (Bell 1988). The areas 
were also attractive to unskilled labour intensive industries, since labour was 
relatively cheap and unorganised. [As far as I can tell the controversy is 
unresolved.] 
•  World Bank research (published in Rogerson 1986) has suggested that Sao Paolo 
has been undergoing a 'polarisation reversal', so that national patterns of growth 
and development of increasing urban concentration have ceased and the processes 
of spatial decentralisation have begun. This "slow rearrangement of economic 
activities in space" is said to have occurred in response to market signals, and in 
the absence of strong policy interventions. Industrial surveys found that 
decentralised development depended primarily upon local initiatives and the 
emergence of new industries, rather than relocation or establishing new branches 
of existing plants. The underlying factors were diseconomies of scale (congestion, 
pollution, high labour and land costs); mandatory licensing for all new industrial 
investments in heavily polluted areas; and, most importantly, the improved 
availability and quality of industrial infrastructure in the regions. The study 
concluded that "instead of fostering often expensive large-scale industrial parks 
designed to lure metropolitan-based establishments, it appears more valid to 
channel efforts into stimulating local enterprise initiatives" (Rogerson 1986). 
In sum, it appears to be generlly agreed that the local development of infrastructure, on a 
comprehensive basis, is likely to have a positive impact upon local entrepreneurial 
activity employment and economic growth.  
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6. Equity  
Measured in terms of various indicia of human development, there are marked disparities 
between rural and urban areas, regions, and income groups in developing countries. This 
has been an important theme of the HDRs. Many examples can be cited (see HDR 1990 
pp 29-33; 1991 pp.26-7). Thus the distribution of central grants, public expenditures, and 
the burden of taxation under a decentralised system are all critical aspects of the present 
survey. In this section the theoretical arguments and any available empirical evidence are 
brought to bear upon these issues.  
It is important to recognise the multi-dimensional nature of equity. In the present context, 
one must distinguish between inter - district (between different parts of the country), and 
intra - district (the position of different socio-economic and gender groups within the 
locality vis- -vis each other) aspects of equity. Improvements or deterioration in these 
various elements of equity need not coincide. Indeed it appears that while 
decentralisation can promote equity among different groups within a region, through 
increased local public expenditure and the wider provision of public goods and services, 
there is a risk that disparities between districts may worsen due to, for example, different 
tax bases and inadequate fiscal equalisation. The former tendency points in the direction 
of greater decentralisation, whilst the latter suggests that the central government should at 
least retain a strong redistributive role.  
There are several critical factors which determine how de/centralisation influences 
equity. These include central grants, expenditure and taxation effects. It is clear that no 
uniform generalisations may be forthcoming about the impact of decentralisation on 
aggregate inequality, since the impact of the various factors may be working in different 
directions. On balance, the evidence uncovered by the present survey suggests that 
aggregate inequality is likely to be predominated by worsening inter-regional equity, 
largely because of the absence of effective central redistributive policies.  
Intra-district  If decentralisation leads to increased local public expenditure and expands the provision 
of public goods and services, a narrowing of intra-district disparities in access among 
different socio-economic groups would be expected to follow. Moreover, if 
decentralisation of decision making is accompanied by increased participation of 
representatives from a wider variety of political, ethnic and social groups, greater equity 
in the allocation of public resources is presumed to be more likely (Uphoff and Esman 
1974). Whether the latter is likely to eventuate was discussed in section 3 above. The 
reader will recall that many commentators are pessimistic as to the likelihood of active 
broad based participation in decision making under decentralisation. According to 
Hughes (1985), "too frequently the local beneficiaries are not the poor, as much as elite 
groups and political factions controlling the local authorities" (p.59). On the other hand 
the empirical evidence brought together on the topic of comparative priorities in the 
present survey suggests that local governments tend to spend a higher proportion if their 
budgets on social services, and on more basic levels of provision therein, than do central 
governments (see Part IV).  
From a theoretical perspective, inequalities within specific localities could worsen under 
decentralisation, because the redistributive functions of local government are thereby 
limited for two related reasons (Oates, 1985):  
(a) On the taxation side, "sorting out along Tiebout lines" will imply relatively little 
scope for redistribution from the wealthy to the poor within jurisdictions; and  
(b) Local redistributive expenditures will be constrained by the fear of attracting the 
mobile poor with relatively generous local support programmes.  
This suggests that the actual scope for assistance to the poor within the locality will be 
more circumscribed under a relatively decentralised fiscal system.  
Inter - district  
The impact of decentralisation upon spatial disparities in human development is 
potentially two-fold. Decentralisation, even in terms of its more limited mode 
(deconcentration), can reduce spatial inequalities in access to basic education and health 
care, clean water, decent income earning opportunities and so on, through the wider 
provision of public goods and services. On the other hand however, if decentralisation 
extends to the mobilisation of public resources (i.e. revenues as well as expenditures), 
existing disparities are likely to be exacerbated. This follows from the observation that 
the poorer regions of the country will have correspondingly lower fiscal potentials. In 
practice, there is evidence which reflects the operation of both scenarios.  
A number of studies support the proposition that inter-district disparities may be reduced 
through the wider provision of public goods and services. Rondinelli et al (1983) list 
among the positive results of decentralisation that "the access of people living in 
previously neglected rural regions and local communities to central government resources and institutions has increased, if only incrementally, in most developing countries that 
have decentralised" (p.50).  
•  In Morocco, the Local Authorities Development Fund (created as part of the 
decentralisation effort) distributed funds throughout the country on a far more 
equitable basis than its predecessor, the Communal Supply Fund, which had 
mainly been drawn upon by richer, urban communes (Cheema 1983). 
•  Maro (1990) found that in Tanzania, data on clean water, health facilities, primary 
education and roads showed that decentralisation had led to: 
(i) increased government expenditure on these services, which resulted in 
increased provision throughout the rural areas, and  
(ii) a drastic reduction in user-distance to basic social services, tending toward 
uniform access to services in all districts, and therefore a reduction in inter-district 
disparities. 
The Extent and Impact of Central Grants  
The center has a potentially powerful redistributive role, in collecting revenue on the 
basis of ability to pay, and allocating funds on the basis of need. The latter can be done 
either through a bias towards poorer areas (tackling inter-district inequality), or via 
specific grants which tend to benefit the less well off (e.g. for primary education), thereby 
enhancing intra-district equity. The available evidence relates mainly to the impact of 
grants upon inter-district equality.  
It has been widely argued by writers on fiscal federalism (e.g. Musgrave 1959; Oates 
1974) that the national government has the primary responsibility for initiating and co-
ordinating policies so as to achieve horizontal equity - i.e. that policies for redistribution 
are most appropriately set and implemented centrally. This is partly because there should 
be a single level of government which has the role of determining the extent of 
redistribution, lest different decisions made by various levels of government undo the 
redistributive actions of the other. Moreover, the marked spatial variations in resource 
availability point to the need for the center to adopt the predominant role in redistribution 
(as in, for example, Indonesia - see case study). There is also the 'Tiebout effect' of 
population mobility, which limits the feasible extent of variance between independent 
redistributive measures at the local level (Helm and Smith 1987), and suggests the need 
for a strong central role in promoting an equitable distribution of public resources. (It is 
noted that the need for redistributive grants conflicts, to some extent, with the presumed 
need for a substantial degree of financial autonomy, discussed in section 2 above.)  
The central government may undertake substantive schemes of redistribution through 
grants which favour local governments in poorer parts of the country. In practice 
however, it appears that the prevailing fiscal arrangements under decentralisation - by 
design or otherwise - generally fail to enhance inter-district equity.  •  In Chile, the system of central grants was altered from one which redistributed in 
favour of poorer regions to one which made allocations on a per capita basis. 
Inadequate central financing failed to cover the cost of service provision (as it was 
supposed to), so that poorer municipalities could only afford inferior services - 
thereby worsening existing inequalities between regions. 
•  Zimbabwe proceeded on similar lines to Chile, in that many recurrent central 
grants are allocated on a per capita basis with no consideration of community 
fiscal capacity (Winkler 1989). 
•  In India, it has been said that federal education grants are made primarily on 
political grounds and serve only to exacerbate spending disparities (Tilak, 1989). 
•  In Bangladesh, the fiscal system transfers resources from the urban to the rural 
sector (where 85% of the population lives). At the same time however, 
development fund grants are allocated on a per capita basis without regard to 
need, and the infrastructure grants appear to be distributed on an ad hoc basis 
(Bahl, in Schroeder, 1989). 
•  In Botswana, where the District Councils depend upon central transfers for over 
80% of total recurrent expenditure, the system of resource allocation is described 
as "haphazard", resulting in the "uneven provision of local government services in 
different parts of Botswana" (Tordoff 1988 p.197). 
By way of contrast there is some evidence which reflects attempts by national 
governments to alleviate the inter-district equity problem, through grants which 
offset differentials in local tax bases.  
•  In Uttar Pradesh, grants are distributed to the districts on a criterion of 
"backwardness" - taking total population, number of scheduled castes (who tend 
to be landless) and development of infrastructure (roads and electrification) in the 
district. Under this arrangement, which was introduced with decentralisation, the 
backward districts get more than in the past, and inter-district disparities have 
tended to be reduced (Sanwal, 1987). 
•  In Nigeria, constitutional changes over time have led to an equalising trend in 
federal transfers. Until 1978 transfers were made on the basis of derivation, as 
well as other criteria which focused more upon redistribution. In successive 
constitutional amendments, the latter gained in importance. The heavily populated 
and poorer northern states have been able to reduce the influence of the derivation 
principle in transfers and extend, first, the population criterion and, more recently, 
the "additional need" factor. Thus, new formulas have further increased the 
importance of the fiscal equalisation principle (Hinchcliffe 1989 p.445). 
•  In Brazil the 1967 tax reform led to the redistribution of public funds from richer 
to poorer regions (Graham 1987). The basic formula used by the federal 
government weighted the amount received according to the level of development. 
For every 100 cruzeiros collected by the federal government in taxes set aside by 
law for transfer to the states, the North received back 210 cruzeiros in 1976; the 
states of the South and Southeast regions receive less than 25 cruzeiros for each 
100 they collect. •  In the education sector, the World Bank found that the formula for distributing 
federal education moneys to the states in Brazil is highly redistributive. Similarly, 
Eastern Nigeria and Kenya have taken actions to redistribute government grants 
in favour of poorer community schools (Winkler, 1989). 
The Expenditure Effect  
Decentralisation may enhance equity through increased public expenditure on those areas 
of most benefit to the poor. Improved provision and utilisation of basic social and 
economic services can follow. This relates to the discussion of relative priorities in Part 
IV below. In the following sections, the expenditure effect of decentralisation is 
appraised from the perspective of equity, both intra and inter-district, in the specific 
contexts of health and education. Different characteristics and concerns tend to be 
relevant to the each sector.  
In practice it is found that decentralisation does tend to expand the provision of basic 
social and economic infrastructure. Yet inequalities persist, and are sometimes 
exacerbated. This may be due to disparities in resource allocation or in utilisation 
patterns, or in the ability to respond to incentives under a decentralised system. It is a 
moot point as to whether this leads to a more or less equitable situation overall than that 
which might have existed under a centralised system.  
Health care  
Equity is an important consideration in the health context, where access to services (and 
indicators) varies markedly across different regions, income groups and sexes (HDR table 
9). By increasing access throughout the country, decentralisation may help to reduce 
these disparities. However the limited evidence available on this point tends to suggest 
that the expansion of health resources under a decentralised regime does not tend to be 
equitably distributed, even within regions.  
•  The most positive example of an equitable expansion of services across regions 
under a deconcentrated system is provided by Tanzania. Maro (1990) found that 
there was a clear bias in favour of regions that had fewer facilities prior to 
decentralisation, such as Dodoma, Coast and Mwanza. The result was a dramatic 
increase in the provision of health facilities. In 1972, only one in eight people 
lived within five kilometres of a hospital; in 1980, 60% of the villages either had a 
health facility or were within five kilometres of one. 
•  In Indonesia, between 1969 and 1983, in tandem with increasing decentralisation 
of public expenditures, there was a rapid expansion of health services. More 
recently the Posyandu (community-based integrated health post, mostly 
concerned with child survival) has been extended to all parts of the country. 
Currently, the Kecamatan (sub-district) health center provides the administrative 
framework within which most basic health care activities take place. Yet despite this substantial deconcentration of health operations, there exist large 
disparities in utilisation patterns among different groups in Indonesian society 
which impact adversely upon intra-district equity. It has been found that, on 
average, the insured population (civil servants and their families) used the health 
services four times more frequently than the rest of the population. In one 
provincial study, the top income decile made up one-third of all hospital 
inpatients, one-half of hospital outpatients, and one-quarter of all health center 
visitors (Gish et al 1988).  
•  A recent critique of the decentralisation of health services in Mexico provides an 
interesting counterfactual-type study (Gonzalez-Block, 1989). It also introduced 
the important variable of macro-economic conditions. The study covered two 
states in the poorer parts of the country, one of which decentralised to a 
significant extent (Guerrero), whilst the other did not (Oaxaca). It found that inter-
municipal disparities worsened in decentralised Guerro. The statistics used to 
indicate health need satisfaction were: the number of general consultations; 
extension of service coverage (measured by first time consultation); protection 
against pertussis, tetanus and diptheria (measured by third dose of DPT 
vaccination); and first time antenatal care consultations. Variables were collected 
for three years (1985-7). (Although not explicitly defined in the study, it appears 
that the population were grouped into five strata, based on 
residence/municipality.) 
Prior to decentralisation, the pattern of distribution of health service indicators between 
different strata of the non-insured population in both states tended to be equitable. The 
most needy received significantly more general and first-time consultations per capita. 
Oaxaca continued to distribute services on a similar basis, although with a significant 
decrease in volume across all indicators - due to the economic crisis (table 12). "The 
negative effects of the economic crisis along the five strata were thus assimilated with 
equality in the state that remained centralised." By way of contrast, there was a 
significant shift in the pattern of distribution of services between strata in Guerrero after 
decentralisation. In spite of the economic crisis, the state as a whole received more 
services; yet all of the increments benefited the top two strata living in the most important 
cities and tourist areas of the state. The middle strata experienced little change either way. 
The two poorest strata, however, suffered a significant drop in services - especially in the 
interruption of DPT vaccination. These people were mainly Indians and peasants living in 
small dispersed settlements.  
The study attributes this regressive shift to the planning and resource allocation policies 
followed under decentralisation. The tourist resorts of Guerrero received additional 
resources from the center, by-passing state level negotiations. The middle strata 
municipalities negotiated on a bilateral basis with state authorities, which seemed to have 
provided some protection against the economic crisis. The municipalities in the poorest 
strata signed no decentralisation agreements. Thus the incentives offered by the center to 
decentralise were better assimilated by the richer and economically more strategic 
municipalities, in contrast to the net negative effect suffered in the poorest rural areas. The study concludes that decentralisation in Guerrero increased health differentials 
between rural and urban areas, and between those sectors engaged in production for local 
markets and those generating foreign exchange.  
Inter-district inequities in health care were found to have worsened in Ondo State, 
Nigeria after decentralisation in 1976 (Iyun,1988). This study compared the distribution 
of both hospitals and health facilities over time. During the period (1976-85) there were 
substantial increases in the state's total resources (hospital beds and staff) for health. 
However some local government areas had an excess share of facilities relative to their 
population, whilst others had less than their 'fair' share. The favoured districts were 
described as the 'most viable economically', and included those with large urban centres. 
The disparities were exacerbated by losses of medical staff from government institutions 
(because the state could not afford to pay them), and the establishment of increasing 
numbers of private clinics which tended to be concentrated in the districts already most 
favoured in terms of public health facilities. Thus the imbalances were regressive in 
nature, and increased over time.  
Education  
Given the serious disparities which affect the educational opportunities of rural, poor and 
female children in developing countries (HDR 1991 tables 9-10), the enhancement of 
equity is a foremost concern. There is a vital need for increased resource provision 
directed towards those districts and for those students who are currently disadvantaged. 
This argues for strong redistributive measures in educational policy - which can only be 
fully undertaken by the national government. In favour of decentralisation is the 
possibility that the demand for education by traditionally excluded groups may be 
promoted. Yet there is considerable evidence that decentralisation of responsibility for 
education tends to exacerbate, or at least not reduce, existing inequalities especially 
between regions. It is a difficult counterfactual question as to whether the expansion of 
educational opportunities under a decentralised regime, albeit on an uneven basis, is 
better from the perspective of aggregate inequality, than the situation which would 
pertain under centralisation. The following paragraphs present the available evidence on 
these points.  
•  There is strong evidence that the Harambee schools, which proliferated during the 
1970s and represented 73% of all secondary schools by 1987, exacerbate inter-
district inequalities in Kenyan education (Mwira 1990). This occurs in several 
ways. Harambee schools are more important in poorer, less economically 
advanced parts of the country, yet charge higher fees than government schools. 
The unequal distribution of school places by province and school type is shown in 
table 13. 
•  There has also been a polarisation of the school system in terms of quality. Using 
the public examinations as a gauge, government schools and Harambee are on 
either of the extreme ends of the scale, the former achieving far better results. The 
consequences of this are reflected in post-secondary enrolment by school type - 
i.e. the fact that Harambee students are far less likely to proceed onto university (table 14). The factors underlying poor examination performance are inadequate 
teaching and physical facilities. Few Harambee schools teach the natural and 
physical sciences, for example, because they cannot afford the equipment. These 
disparities also have a intra-district gender dimension (see table 12) - because the 
government built more boys' than girls schools, girls are forced to seek 
alternatives and are more likely than boys to enrol in Harambee schools. 
•  In 1983, some aspects of the recurrent costs of primary education in Zambia were 
transferred from Lusaka to the district level and to parents. Central education 
expenditures were basically confined to teachers salaries. Silanda and Tuijnman 
(1989) found that increased local financing was a major cause of inter-district 
disparities in total recurrent expenditure per pupil (see table 15). There was a 
"striking degree of inequality between regions in terms of the funds available for 
the financing of non-salary components of the recurrent budget. Parental 
expenditures per pupil on the purchase of learning materials was more than twice 
as high in three regions (Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central), as in the remaining six 
- which largely reflected "general rural-urban, socio-economic disparities" (p.13). 
The authors concluded that the "decentralisation of responsibility for the 
financing of primary education may run counter to policies emphasising the 
provision of equal access to a uniformly good primary level education throughout 
the country" (p.16). 
•  Samoff (1990) argues that when local autonomy in education is enhanced, efforts 
to reduce regional inequalities are undermined. He illustrates this with the case of 
the 'bush schools' in Kilimanjaro, a better off region in Tanzania. These private 
secondary schools proliferated in the mid-1970s as government schools were 
increasingly unable to meet the demand for secondary schooling. They were 
typically established by a local coalition which included church personnel, 
government officials, party leaders and other community representatives (often 
village headmen). Financial assistance comes from the church and local 
contributions. Once opened, the schools are 'quasi-public' - being subject to 
Ministerial regulations and funded by a local school tax (collected by village 
governments). Whilst these schools expanded educational opportunities in 
Tanzania the initiatives "generally served to thwart national redistributive and 
equalisation policies" (p.11). The author reports that the representatives of 
relatively disadvantaged regions preferred greater centralisation, whilst 
Kilimanjaro leaders seeking to limit redistribution advocated local autonomy. 
This case may be contrasted to the Kenyan situation (see above), where local 
school initiatives were of poorer quality than the public system. 
•  In India, the distribution of education expenditure between the center and the 
states is determined by the planning commission (re development expenditure) 
and the finance commission (for non-plan, statutory and maintenance 
expenditure). The formulae used by the federal agencies contain a mixture of 
criteria - 'neutral' (population), progressive (per capita income), and regressive 
(state of derivation) (Hinchcliffe 1989). However the actual pattern of plan 
resources does not indicate any strong rationale behind interstate allocation - 
neither state domestic product per capita, nor education development (enrolments 
etc.) are explanatory factors. Regarding non-plan expenditures from finance commissions, educationally advanced states receive larger allocations. Whilst this 
may be because of the larger education systems to be maintained by these states, 
some have blamed arbitrary discriminatory policies. Tilak (1989) concluded that 
"on the whole, neither the planning commission nor the finance commission has 
been able to introduce progressivity into transfers of resources to the states for the 
education sector. The whole mechanism of federal fiscal transfers has tended to 
work to the detriment of the weaker states", and that interstate inequalities 
(measured by the coefficient of variation in the expenditure on education) have 
correspondingly increased (p.476). Other studies have similarly suggested that 
federal transfers have not reduced interstate inequalities in India (Hinchcliffe 
1989). 
The reason for this, according to Tilak (1989 p.476), is that "essentially all basic policy 
decisions in education are political in character. Resource allocation is not exempt". More 
vocal states, and states having a ruling political party in power identical with, or 
supportive of, the ruling party at the center are favoured in the process. "In short, the 
model that best explains allocation of resources by the center to the states for education 
may be a political model" (id.).  
•  A recent study of decentralisation in education noted that in Eastern Nigeria, 
wealthier communities were found to respond most strongly to government 
incentives to build new schools (Winkler, 1989). 
•  U.S. evidence suggests that substantial disparities can arise in a decentralised 
system. The New York State Constitution requires the state legislature to "provide 
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all 
the children of this state may be educated". At the same time however, local taxes 
constitute about 45% of the total school finances. In Long Island, recurrent 
expenditure per pupil is $5178 in the poorer districts, compared to $10 529 in the 
wealthy districts of Great Neck, a wealthier district (NYT, 16/5/91). This is 
despite the fact that state aid policy is, at least partly, redistributive. Great Neck 
receives only $360 per pupil, compared to Roosevelt's $2576. Even if the 
wealthier districts received no state subsidies at all, their capacity to generate 
revenue still vastly exceeds that of the poorer schools. Thus decentralisation 
appears to result in large inequities in school funding. Would a centralised system 
enhance equity? This would partly depend upon the ability of the state to raise the 
same resources which are currently being collected. There is clearly ability to pay 
in the wealthier districts. There must also be willingness to contribute to the 
education of pupils outside the local community. 
•  The centralised educational policies of various Latin American countries allowed 
a massive expansion of education. The combined primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates have increased from 68% in 1970, to 84% in 1987 (HDR 1991 
table 24). Despite this formidable achievement there is said to be a general 
dissatisfaction with the model pursued, partly due to the expected (but unfulfilled) 
democratic and equity effects of education policies (Cassusus, 1990, p.12). Wide 
socio-economic disparities and the exclusion of marginal sectors together with 
scarcity of materials and teachers are reflected in the highly uneven distribution of achievements across schools. Statistics show that school failure, expressed in 
terms of repetition, drop-out and over-age, are mainly concentrated in rural and 
urban marginal sectors (id.). 
Hinchcliffe (1989) concluded from a review of financing education in six federal 
countries (three developing - Brazil, India and Nigeria), that spatial equalisation efforts 
succeed where the emphasis is on block or general revenue grants, rather than sector or 
project specific allocations.  
Redistributive financing is an important, but not the sole, means to enhance educational 
equity. Other aspects of schooling may significantly impact upon the enrolment and 
attendance of children from poor families. These may be most appropriately set at the 
local level.  
•  In Bangladesh, flexible scheduling is one of the key strategies used to increase the 
school participation of girls and children from poor families. BRAC has 
established a system of schooling for 8-10 year olds which is open only to the 
children of landless, illiterate parents. 63% of the pupils are girls - the target is 
70%. BRAC is currently planning to establish another system of schools, only for 
girls, between 13-15 years of age. 
The Taxation Effect  
The system of taxation can have a significant impact on aggregate inequality, through 
differing tax burdens among income groups in the economy. It has been said that fairness 
in taxation is especially important where the level of (average) income is low and its 
distribution is highly skewed (Musgrave 1983). Taxes do take a relatively large share of 
even very low incomes in most developing countries (Bird and Miller 1990). National 
and local taxes may well vary in their impact upon intra- and inter-district inequality, 
given the different bases and tax rates which are utilised.  
Unfortunately there is little evidence as to whether local systems of taxation are relatively 
more or less progressive than those at the national level. This is not very suprising, given 
the considerable difficulties involved in estimating the incidence of the tax burden in 
developing countries. Basic data is required as to the distribution of income by types of 
earning, expenditure patterns by income levels and sectors, and the distribution of 
property and assets. Any analysis will be based on assumptions about the incidence of 
specific taxes. Nor can equity be evaluated without reference to relative tax compliance - 
especially where the rich enjoy greater opportunities to evade payment.  
Despite the empirical problems, it has been said that national taxation policies in 
developing countries are generally found to be "not very regressive" (Bird and Miller 
1990). Typically, the main sources of national revenue are levied on (in descending 
order): foreign trade, income (corporate and personal), sales and resource extraction. As 
in industrial countries, the weight of opinion as to the incidence of corporations tax in 
developing countries is inconclusive (Lent 1990). The basic unknown is whether the tax is shifted in the long run, either back to labour (in the form of lower real wages), or 
forward to consumers.  
The incidence of indirect sales taxes - on tobacco, alcohol and oil - appears to vary 
sharply from country to country, depending on the specifics of local consumption and tax 
structures (Bird and Miller 1990). Whilst some have concluded that "in most cases the 
existing structure of indirect taxation is markedly regressive" (Chenery 1974), others 
argue for detailed quantitative study rather than "sweeping generalisation" (Bird and 
Miller 1990). Clearly distinctions must be drawn amongst different socio-economic 
groups - poor rural, largely subsistence households are likely to have different 
expenditure patterns than the urban poor.  
The nature of local taxes tends to suggest that the burden is not very regressive. The main 
progressive revenue sources available to local governments in developing countries are 
automobile use and ownership, and real property. Taxes on motoring - vehicles and 
gasoline - may be progressive insofar as the demand tends to be highly income elastic 
(Cnossen 1990). Bahl and Linn (forthcoming) found that of 19 studies in thirteen 
developing countries, most found the property tax to be generally or very progressive - 
although the actual distributive impact of such taxes obviously depends largely upon its 
details (Bird and Miller 1989) - for example the treatment of rental versus owner-
occupied, of land versus improvements, and so on.  
On the negative side, the multitude of local revenue sources, levied on entertainment, 
sumptuary items, small businesses and so on, may be regressive in net impact.  
•  In Indonesia, the equity effects of existing local taxes have been seen as follows 
(Devas 1988). Motor vehicle taxes are relatively equitable, since car ownership is 
limited to upper income groups. Taxes on entertainment are reasonably equitable, 
because the tariffs vary according to type of entertainment, with traditional 
performances having the lowest rates. Taxes on restaurants and hotels are 
progressive, since the rich are likely to spend proportionately more on these items, 
and small establishments and itinerant vendors are exempt. The effects of the 
registration taxes levied on businesses are uncertain, depending on who the final 
consumers are and what proportion of the tax is passed on. Finally, the tax on 
non-motorised vehicles can be regarded as regressive, since users of bicycles and 
becaks are likely to be among the poorer members of the community. 
7. Obstacles  
The actual process of implementation and the obstacles confronted thereunder raises 
issues which do not always directly impact upon human development, yet nonetheless 
underlie the whole discussion of decentralisation. This survey would be incomplete 
without an appraisal of the operation and significance of these obstacles. Indeed this is 
regarded by many commentators as the most important issue to address (e.g. Rondinelli, 
1984). It will have emerged from the foregoing that decentralised systems of government 
should be appraised in terms of actual operation, rather than ostensible aims and designs. This is especially relevant in deeming particular decentralisation efforts as representing 
either deconcentration or devolution.  
Significant practical problems can inhibit the implementation of government efforts to 
decentralise. They range from the political - central decision makers are likely to resist 
any diminution of their powers - to the practical, especially shortages of resources and the 
difficulties arising due to weak local administrative capacity. Ministers of finance in the 
national government may oppose the transfer of revenue sources to decentralised units, 
whilst reliance on central funding can mean chronic delays, revenue shortfalls and 
reduced local autonomy. For example, it has been reported that the bureaucratic obstacles 
to decentralisation in Nepal were so serious that local officials were frequently required 
to travel to Kathmandu in order to expedite the release of central grants (Bienen et al 
1990).  
Political constraints  
"Where decentralisation is proposed seriously, it is likely to be a focus for political 
confrontation, precisely because it has to do with specifying who may participate 
legitimately in decision making and whose interests will have highest priority" (Samoff 
1990, p.524).  
It is predictable that change will be resisted by those who perceive their vested interests 
threatened by a new structure of governmental arrangements. This, coupled with 
bureaucratic inertia, can constitute formidable obstacles to the implementation of 
decentralisation reforms. Political will at the highest level may not, per se, be sufficient to 
overcome such obstacles.  
A number of authors criticise the assumption that national governments are "unitary, 
neutral actors". McGinn and Street (1986) argue that policy makers evaluate 
organisational reforms in terms of the impact upon their own power and control over the 
use of public resources - so that different actors react differently to the same policy.  
•  Since 1983 the Rawlings government in Ghana has been pursuing a 
decentralisation proposal that would transfer virtually all ministerial activities 
through the regions to the localities. In 1988, District Assemblies were elected 
which were supposed to take command of district-level administrations onto 
which the resources and expertise of central ministries were to be devolved. 
Olowu (1990) reported that progress has been very slow because of powerful 
forces within the administration against the plan; the distrust of elected 
councillors by military and civil servants alike; and the widespread feeling that 
decentralisation was a diversion from national economic policies. In the 
meantime, the old structures have continued through selected management 
committees presiding over deconcentrated administration at regional, district and 
local levels. 
•  An IRD project in Peru in the early 1980s which sought to combine regional 
spatial planning with decentralised administration was "ultimately undermined by political obstacles and central government controls" (Rondinelli and Wilson 1987 
p. 348). The most serious constraints stemmed from continuing central controls 
on local planning and resource allocation. This "not only inhibited the local 
development corporations from responding to local needs and conditions, but 
subjected them to manipulation by the dominant national political party" (ibid 
p.353). The highly centralised control meant a vacuum of information about local 
conditions which "in turn generated apathy toward regional problems and this, 
combined with the lack of power or resources at the local level, created pervasive 
inertia against acting promptly on regional plans or local development proposals. 
In rare cases expeditious action occurred when local political groups bypassed 
departmental channels and went directly to the central ministries or influential 
congressmen in Lima. The study concluded that the potential for decentralisation 
depended crucially upon increasing political commitment to decentralised 
planning and decision making (ibid. p. 356). 
Bureaucratic obstacles  
Beyond the political tensions involved in decentralisation attempts, there often arise 
significant problems related to the nature of the bureaucracy - its structure, technical 
competence and resource base. The creation of new systems of local government requires 
considerable administrative skill and resources. There may be basic problems with 
respect to personnel needs, attitudes (held both locally and centrally), and training in 
local government.  
In a number of cases, the central government has retained effective control over local 
personnel through recruitment, promotion, payment and so on. Although this may help to 
alleviate skill and resource shortages at the local level, it leads to accountability and 
loyalties which lead upward to the capital, rather than to local constituents. This may 
undermine local autonomy, and create an obstacle to the implementation of decentralising 
reforms.  
•  In Indonesia, it has been observed that the structure and regulations governing the 
civil service severely handicap efforts to develop a local civil service adequate to 
meet the demands of decentralisation (King, 1988). Substantial deconcentration of 
development activity through INPRES programmes was found to have been 
undermined by centralising civil service reforms (as well as financing 
arrangements, see ** above). In 1985 over three-quarters of employees working 
in regional governments were seconded central employees. Local staff available 
for decentralised management was subject to cumbersome and centralised control. 
Further, the structure of incentives encouraged a "brain drain" from the regions to 
Jakarta. 
•  In Bangladesh, although the services of civil servants has been formally 
transferred to the upazilas, their appointment, training, transfer, promotion and 
discipline all remain subject to national government control (Khan, 1987, op cit). 
•  In Botswana the recruitment, posting, training, promotion and discipline of local 
authority staff is generally the responsibility of the centrally directed Unified Local Government Service (ULGS). The ULGS staff at headquarters has been 
strongly criticised by the District Councils for not being sufficiently aware of, and 
responsive to, local problems and needs (Tordoff 1988 p.198). 
Staff shortages at the local level appear to be a crucial constraint in many developing 
countries. An IMF survey conducted in 1982 showed that 57% of all government 
employment in industrial countries is at the 'local' (as opposed to the central) level, 
compared to only 15% for developing countries - Africa averaging only 6%, Latin 
America 21% and Asia 37% (World Bank 1983). This can be seen to reflect personnel 
shortages as well as the fact that local governments account for a greater share of public 
expenditure in industrial, relative to developing, countries.  
•  In Nigeria, there is reportedly a wide gap between the staff required by local 
governments and the actual number employed by them. Local governments have 
not been able to attract and retain qualified staff and attempts by state and federal 
governments to train local government staff have not overcome this problem 
(Nwankwo 1984). 
Rondinelli et al (1983) emphasise the "crucial effects of shortages of trained staff 
on the success of decentralisation" (p.69). There are many examples of local 
governments with limited capacity. In the Chilean context of a relatively 
thoroughgoing decentralisation, the limited capacity of local officials has confined 
their work to mainly administering central directives: local initiatives have been 
rare (Racynski 1987). In Kenya the vast majority of skilled technicians and 
managers have been concentrated in Nairobi. The Sudan has suffered severe skill 
shortages, even within central ministries, which impeded decentralisation and 
limited the ability of provincial administrators to provide even basic services. In 
Pakistan, the technical officers available to the markaz councils were quite limited 
- in that the project managers are often either agricultural technicians or generalist 
administrators with little experience of district planning and development (Khan 
1982).  
•  The Moroccan government recognised the importance of personnel at the local 
level in creating a new special corps of posts in the local civil service, consisting 
of centrally trained and paid chief civil servants called 'secretary-generals'. 
Training centres for local civil servants were greatly expanded (Nellis 1983). 
•  In Zambia, administrative capacity to plan and implement substantial 
development programmes was lacking at the "provincial, let alone district level - 
(and) even in Lusaka". The shortage of qualified staff, the absence of suitable 
training programmes for district development officers, the unattractiveness of 
local government employment all contributed to this problem (Rakodi 1988). 
•  In Kenya there are several management problems at the local level. Many officers 
tend to be underqualified for their jobs; in some cases appointment is on the basis 
of political criteria rather than merit. There are frequently severe gaps in staffing. 
Some councils have six or seven vacancies at senior levels (clerk, treasurer, 
surveyor etc.) - so that one officer might be expected to fulfil all of these tasks over an extended period. In this light it is noted that in the 1984-88 National Plan 
period, even the more successful councils only managed to carry out about half 
the projects they had proposed (Wallis 1990). 
•  In Botswana the separation of the 'Tribal Administration' from the Village 
Development Committees is said to have stifled the effectiveness of the latter. 
Although the traditional institution has been stripped of its statutory powers it 
remains influential, as "the bulk of the rural people still look to the Chief and ... 
the traditional hierarchy for advice and guidance on a wide range of issues" 
(Tordoff 1988). 
•  Another example of institutional weaknesses undermining the efficacy of local 
government comes from Liberia. In the period 1974-1980, a World Bank-funded 
urban development project in the Liberian capital concentrated on infrastructural 
improvements. The Monrovia City Council had very limited spending and 
administrative authority. Local revenue covered only 7% of local expenditure, 
accounting systems were very weak, and mismanagement occurred frequently. 
The responsibilities of the MCC were poorly defined and qualified staff were 
lacking. 
The World Bank worked outside of this structure through its "Project Team"; by the end 
of 1985 the planned civil works were largely completed, which benefited an estimated 
130 000 people. However little had been accomplished in the way of institutional reform. 
The MCC became increasingly dependent upon central funds, as the government was 
becoming less reliable. One evaluation (by Price Waterhouse) identified the following 
weaknesses: (i) shortages of professional skills; (ii) responsiveness of the appointed 
mayor and council to their superiors, rather than local residents; (iii) inadequate revenue 
and weak fiscal discipline; (iv) uncoordinated development programmes; and (v) failure 
to enforce local regulations.  
The role of NGOs and traditional structures  
It can be argued that human development is such a complex issue that a wide variety of 
institutions - market, central government and field administration, local government and 
non governmental organisations - are required. Hyden, for example, writes in the African 
context that genuine local governments must build upon the wide variety of traditional 
and modern local associations, because otherwise people will perceive local governments 
to be an extension of the State. Similarly, Uphoff argues that there should be "multiple 
channels of action". Since any one channel can become monopolised or blocked, it is said 
to be better that there be a degree of competition as well as complementarity between 
various institutions - whether bureaucratic, local government, co-operative, private 
enterprise, NGO, religious or other. More recently Wunsch and Olowu (1990) have 
argued along the same lines.  
The attention accorded to NGOs follows their apparent comparative advantage in areas of 
priority for human development, given their flexibility and small size, as well as highly 
motivated personnel (Paul, in Lewis 1988). However rather than attempt to assess the 
relative performance of NGO vis- -vis that of the various levels of government, the ambit of discussion is more limited. It investigates the proposition that local, rather than 
national, governments are better able to create an environment within which the work of 
NGOs is facilitated.  
Turning then to evidence of collaborative relationship between government and 
grassroots organisations, the following points emerge. There is already considerable 
operational collaboration in both planning and delivery of public goods for human 
development - e.g. Amul Dairy in India and the Grameen Bank (Paul, op cit).  
In Indonesia, the national government provides the funds, supplies and technical 
expertise needed for family planning programmes, whilst community volunteers and 
village organisations mobilise demand and assist in the distribution of contraceptive 
supplies.  
An important related issue is the role of traditional institutions. This has been explored in 
some detail in the African context. Traditional institutions have generally not been 
invested with measures of self-governance. In East Africa - Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Tanzania - and elsewhere governments have not treated them as critical agents in 
ensuring the appropriateness and sustainability of development initiatives (Harbeson 
1990). Sometimes this has been due to their association with the former colonial regime, 
or with conservative obstacles to reform in the country.  
A number of writers have emphasised that national governments have neglected and even 
deliberately undermined traditional self-governing bodies; and that this, in turn, has 
inhibited the effectiveness of local government.  
"Rather than build and improve on these institutions, they replaced them with expanded 
state structures, often with disastrous results. Furthermore, historical and anthropological 
studies indicate that local self-governing structures are more compatible with several 
traditional African political systems than the nominally `decentralised' structures created 
by African states. These traditional self-governing structures (ethnic, town and 
community unions) have continued to co-exist with the newly created structures in 
several African countries with very little interaction between them" (Olowu 1990).  
In Africa traditional institutions were the mechanisms by which the people regulated their 
social and economic affairs, and exercised and controlled political power. Traditional 
authority encompassed chiefs and councils of elders and the complex bodies of law 
which guided their actions; for example, the village councils promulgated and enforced 
access rules that regulated the balance between livestock, water and forage, and 
minimised overgrazing, and complex rules of access and use assured (young men across) 
most of Africa access to land.  
Since independence, the tendency has been to abolish any legal authority which remained 
in traditional institutions. Traditional leaders have, as in the colonial era, frequently been 
'co-opted', through recruitment into the civil service or pensions. In some cases resistance 
to such policies has led to bloody violence - as in Southern Sudan, Uganda and Ghana. In the result, the absence of effective local institutions is said to inter alia threaten common 
resources and community endeavours. Deforestation and decertification processes in the 
Sahel have been traced directly to the absence of local institutions able to regulate tree 
use and livestock foraging. In Botswana, the abolition of local traditional authorities 
made it far more difficult to solve such problems (Wunsch 1990). Also, as noted above, 
traditional leaders appear to have been far more effective than government officials in 
collecting local taxation dues.  
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6. Equity  
Measured in terms of various indicia of human development, there are marked disparities 
between rural and urban areas, regions, and income groups in developing countries. This 
has been an important theme of the HDRs. Many examples can be cited (see HDR 1990 
pp 29-33; 1991 pp.26-7). Thus the distribution of central grants, public expenditures, and 
the burden of taxation under a decentralised system are all critical aspects of the present 
survey. In this section the theoretical arguments and any available empirical evidence are 
brought to bear upon these issues.  
It is important to recognise the multi-dimensional nature of equity. In the present context, 
one must distinguish between inter - district (between different parts of the country), and 
intra - district (the position of different socio-economic and gender groups within the 
locality vis- -vis each other) aspects of equity. Improvements or deterioration in these 
various elements of equity need not coincide. Indeed it appears that while 
decentralisation can promote equity among different groups within a region, through 
increased local public expenditure and the wider provision of public goods and services, 
there is a risk that disparities between districts may worsen due to, for example, different 
tax bases and inadequate fiscal equalisation. The former tendency points in the direction of greater decentralisation, whilst the latter suggests that the central government should at 
least retain a strong redistributive role.  
There are several critical factors which determine how de/centralisation influences 
equity. These include central grants, expenditure and taxation effects. It is clear that no 
uniform generalisations may be forthcoming about the impact of decentralisation on 
aggregate inequality, since the impact of the various factors may be working in different 
directions. On balance, the evidence uncovered by the present survey suggests that 
aggregate inequality is likely to be predominated by worsening inter-regional equity, 
largely because of the absence of effective central redistributive policies.  
Intra-district  
If decentralisation leads to increased local public expenditure and expands the provision 
of public goods and services, a narrowing of intra-district disparities in access among 
different socio-economic groups would be expected to follow. Moreover, if 
decentralisation of decision making is accompanied by increased participation of 
representatives from a wider variety of political, ethnic and social groups, greater equity 
in the allocation of public resources is presumed to be more likely (Uphoff and Esman 
1974). Whether the latter is likely to eventuate was discussed in section 3 above. The 
reader will recall that many commentators are pessimistic as to the likelihood of active 
broad based participation in decision making under decentralisation. According to 
Hughes (1985), "too frequently the local beneficiaries are not the poor, as much as elite 
groups and political factions controlling the local authorities" (p.59). On the other hand 
the empirical evidence brought together on the topic of comparative priorities in the 
present survey suggests that local governments tend to spend a higher proportion if their 
budgets on social services, and on more basic levels of provision therein, than do central 
governments (see Part IV).  
From a theoretical perspective, inequalities within specific localities could worsen under 
decentralisation, because the redistributive functions of local government are thereby 
limited for two related reasons (Oates, 1985):  
(a) On the taxation side, "sorting out along Tiebout lines" will imply relatively little 
scope for redistribution from the wealthy to the poor within jurisdictions; and  
(b) Local redistributive expenditures will be constrained by the fear of attracting the 
mobile poor with relatively generous local support programmes.  
This suggests that the actual scope for assistance to the poor within the locality will be 
more circumscribed under a relatively decentralised fiscal system.  
Inter - district  
The impact of decentralisation upon spatial disparities in human development is 
potentially two-fold. Decentralisation, even in terms of its more limited mode (deconcentration), can reduce spatial inequalities in access to basic education and health 
care, clean water, decent income earning opportunities and so on, through the wider 
provision of public goods and services. On the other hand however, if decentralisation 
extends to the mobilisation of public resources (i.e. revenues as well as expenditures), 
existing disparities are likely to be exacerbated. This follows from the observation that 
the poorer regions of the country will have correspondingly lower fiscal potentials. In 
practice, there is evidence which reflects the operation of both scenarios.  
A number of studies support the proposition that inter-district disparities may be reduced 
through the wider provision of public goods and services. Rondinelli et al (1983) list 
among the positive results of decentralisation that "the access of people living in 
previously neglected rural regions and local communities to central government resources 
and institutions has increased, if only incrementally, in most developing countries that 
have decentralised" (p.50).  
•  In Morocco, the Local Authorities Development Fund (created as part of the 
decentralisation effort) distributed funds throughout the country on a far more 
equitable basis than its predecessor, the Communal Supply Fund, which had 
mainly been drawn upon by richer, urban communes (Cheema 1983). 
•  Maro (1990) found that in Tanzania, data on clean water, health facilities, primary 
education and roads showed that decentralisation had led to: 
(i) increased government expenditure on these services, which resulted in 
increased provision throughout the rural areas, and  
(ii) a drastic reduction in user-distance to basic social services, tending toward 
uniform access to services in all districts, and therefore a reduction in inter-district 
disparities. 
The Extent and Impact of Central Grants  
The center has a potentially powerful redistributive role, in collecting revenue on the 
basis of ability to pay, and allocating funds on the basis of need. The latter can be done 
either through a bias towards poorer areas (tackling inter-district inequality), or via 
specific grants which tend to benefit the less well off (e.g. for primary education), thereby 
enhancing intra-district equity. The available evidence relates mainly to the impact of 
grants upon inter-district equality.  
It has been widely argued by writers on fiscal federalism (e.g. Musgrave 1959; Oates 
1974) that the national government has the primary responsibility for initiating and co-
ordinating policies so as to achieve horizontal equity - i.e. that policies for redistribution 
are most appropriately set and implemented centrally. This is partly because there should 
be a single level of government which has the role of determining the extent of 
redistribution, lest different decisions made by various levels of government undo the 
redistributive actions of the other. Moreover, the marked spatial variations in resource 
availability point to the need for the center to adopt the predominant role in redistribution (as in, for example, Indonesia - see case study). There is also the 'Tiebout effect' of 
population mobility, which limits the feasible extent of variance between independent 
redistributive measures at the local level (Helm and Smith 1987), and suggests the need 
for a strong central role in promoting an equitable distribution of public resources. (It is 
noted that the need for redistributive grants conflicts, to some extent, with the presumed 
need for a substantial degree of financial autonomy, discussed in section 2 above.)  
The central government may undertake substantive schemes of redistribution through 
grants which favour local governments in poorer parts of the country. In practice 
however, it appears that the prevailing fiscal arrangements under decentralisation - by 
design or otherwise - generally fail to enhance inter-district equity.  
•  In Chile, the system of central grants was altered from one which redistributed in 
favour of poorer regions to one which made allocations on a per capita basis. 
Inadequate central financing failed to cover the cost of service provision (as it was 
supposed to), so that poorer municipalities could only afford inferior services - 
thereby worsening existing inequalities between regions. 
•  Zimbabwe proceeded on similar lines to Chile, in that many recurrent central 
grants are allocated on a per capita basis with no consideration of community 
fiscal capacity (Winkler 1989). 
•  In India, it has been said that federal education grants are made primarily on 
political grounds and serve only to exacerbate spending disparities (Tilak, 1989). 
•  In Bangladesh, the fiscal system transfers resources from the urban to the rural 
sector (where 85% of the population lives). At the same time however, 
development fund grants are allocated on a per capita basis without regard to 
need, and the infrastructure grants appear to be distributed on an ad hoc basis 
(Bahl, in Schroeder, 1989). 
•  In Botswana, where the District Councils depend upon central transfers for over 
80% of total recurrent expenditure, the system of resource allocation is described 
as "haphazard", resulting in the "uneven provision of local government services in 
different parts of Botswana" (Tordoff 1988 p.197). 
By way of contrast there is some evidence which reflects attempts by national 
governments to alleviate the inter-district equity problem, through grants which 
offset differentials in local tax bases.  
•  In Uttar Pradesh, grants are distributed to the districts on a criterion of 
"backwardness" - taking total population, number of scheduled castes (who tend 
to be landless) and development of infrastructure (roads and electrification) in the 
district. Under this arrangement, which was introduced with decentralisation, the 
backward districts get more than in the past, and inter-district disparities have 
tended to be reduced (Sanwal, 1987). 
•  In Nigeria, constitutional changes over time have led to an equalising trend in 
federal transfers. Until 1978 transfers were made on the basis of derivation, as 
well as other criteria which focused more upon redistribution. In successive 
constitutional amendments, the latter gained in importance. The heavily populated and poorer northern states have been able to reduce the influence of the derivation 
principle in transfers and extend, first, the population criterion and, more recently, 
the "additional need" factor. Thus, new formulas have further increased the 
importance of the fiscal equalisation principle (Hinchcliffe 1989 p.445). 
•  In Brazil the 1967 tax reform led to the redistribution of public funds from richer 
to poorer regions (Graham 1987). The basic formula used by the federal 
government weighted the amount received according to the level of development. 
For every 100 cruzeiros collected by the federal government in taxes set aside by 
law for transfer to the states, the North received back 210 cruzeiros in 1976; the 
states of the South and Southeast regions receive less than 25 cruzeiros for each 
100 they collect. 
•  In the education sector, the World Bank found that the formula for distributing 
federal education moneys to the states in Brazil is highly redistributive. Similarly, 
Eastern Nigeria and Kenya have taken actions to redistribute government grants 
in favour of poorer community schools (Winkler, 1989). 
The Expenditure Effect  
Decentralisation may enhance equity through increased public expenditure on those areas 
of most benefit to the poor. Improved provision and utilisation of basic social and 
economic services can follow. This relates to the discussion of relative priorities in Part 
IV below. In the following sections, the expenditure effect of decentralisation is 
appraised from the perspective of equity, both intra and inter-district, in the specific 
contexts of health and education. Different characteristics and concerns tend to be 
relevant to the each sector.  
In practice it is found that decentralisation does tend to expand the provision of basic 
social and economic infrastructure. Yet inequalities persist, and are sometimes 
exacerbated. This may be due to disparities in resource allocation or in utilisation 
patterns, or in the ability to respond to incentives under a decentralised system. It is a 
moot point as to whether this leads to a more or less equitable situation overall than that 
which might have existed under a centralised system.  
Health care  
Equity is an important consideration in the health context, where access to services (and 
indicators) varies markedly across different regions, income groups and sexes (HDR table 
9). By increasing access throughout the country, decentralisation may help to reduce 
these disparities. However the limited evidence available on this point tends to suggest 
that the expansion of health resources under a decentralised regime does not tend to be 
equitably distributed, even within regions.  
•  The most positive example of an equitable expansion of services across regions 
under a deconcentrated system is provided by Tanzania. Maro (1990) found that 
there was a clear bias in favour of regions that had fewer facilities prior to 
decentralisation, such as Dodoma, Coast and Mwanza. The result was a dramatic increase in the provision of health facilities. In 1972, only one in eight people 
lived within five kilometres of a hospital; in 1980, 60% of the villages either had a 
health facility or were within five kilometres of one. 
•  In Indonesia, between 1969 and 1983, in tandem with increasing decentralisation 
of public expenditures, there was a rapid expansion of health services. More 
recently the Posyandu (community-based integrated health post, mostly 
concerned with child survival) has been extended to all parts of the country. 
Currently, the Kecamatan (sub-district) health center provides the administrative 
framework within which most basic health care activities take place. 
Yet despite this substantial deconcentration of health operations, there exist large 
disparities in utilisation patterns among different groups in Indonesian society 
which impact adversely upon intra-district equity. It has been found that, on 
average, the insured population (civil servants and their families) used the health 
services four times more frequently than the rest of the population. In one 
provincial study, the top income decile made up one-third of all hospital 
inpatients, one-half of hospital outpatients, and one-quarter of all health center 
visitors (Gish et al 1988).  
•  A recent critique of the decentralisation of health services in Mexico provides an 
interesting counterfactual-type study (Gonzalez-Block, 1989). It also introduced 
the important variable of macro-economic conditions. The study covered two 
states in the poorer parts of the country, one of which decentralised to a 
significant extent (Guerrero), whilst the other did not (Oaxaca). It found that inter-
municipal disparities worsened in decentralised Guerro. The statistics used to 
indicate health need satisfaction were: the number of general consultations; 
extension of service coverage (measured by first time consultation); protection 
against pertussis, tetanus and diptheria (measured by third dose of DPT 
vaccination); and first time antenatal care consultations. Variables were collected 
for three years (1985-7). (Although not explicitly defined in the study, it appears 
that the population were grouped into five strata, based on 
residence/municipality.) 
Prior to decentralisation, the pattern of distribution of health service indicators between 
different strata of the non-insured population in both states tended to be equitable. The 
most needy received significantly more general and first-time consultations per capita. 
Oaxaca continued to distribute services on a similar basis, although with a significant 
decrease in volume across all indicators - due to the economic crisis (table 12). "The 
negative effects of the economic crisis along the five strata were thus assimilated with 
equality in the state that remained centralised." By way of contrast, there was a 
significant shift in the pattern of distribution of services between strata in Guerrero after 
decentralisation. In spite of the economic crisis, the state as a whole received more 
services; yet all of the increments benefited the top two strata living in the most important 
cities and tourist areas of the state. The middle strata experienced little change either way. 
The two poorest strata, however, suffered a significant drop in services - especially in the interruption of DPT vaccination. These people were mainly Indians and peasants living in 
small dispersed settlements.  
The study attributes this regressive shift to the planning and resource allocation policies 
followed under decentralisation. The tourist resorts of Guerrero received additional 
resources from the center, by-passing state level negotiations. The middle strata 
municipalities negotiated on a bilateral basis with state authorities, which seemed to have 
provided some protection against the economic crisis. The municipalities in the poorest 
strata signed no decentralisation agreements. Thus the incentives offered by the center to 
decentralise were better assimilated by the richer and economically more strategic 
municipalities, in contrast to the net negative effect suffered in the poorest rural areas. 
The study concludes that decentralisation in Guerrero increased health differentials 
between rural and urban areas, and between those sectors engaged in production for local 
markets and those generating foreign exchange.  
Inter-district inequities in health care were found to have worsened in Ondo State, 
Nigeria after decentralisation in 1976 (Iyun,1988). This study compared the distribution 
of both hospitals and health facilities over time. During the period (1976-85) there were 
substantial increases in the state's total resources (hospital beds and staff) for health. 
However some local government areas had an excess share of facilities relative to their 
population, whilst others had less than their 'fair' share. The favoured districts were 
described as the 'most viable economically', and included those with large urban centres. 
The disparities were exacerbated by losses of medical staff from government institutions 
(because the state could not afford to pay them), and the establishment of increasing 
numbers of private clinics which tended to be concentrated in the districts already most 
favoured in terms of public health facilities. Thus the imbalances were regressive in 
nature, and increased over time.  
Education  
Given the serious disparities which affect the educational opportunities of rural, poor and 
female children in developing countries (HDR 1991 tables 9-10), the enhancement of 
equity is a foremost concern. There is a vital need for increased resource provision 
directed towards those districts and for those students who are currently disadvantaged. 
This argues for strong redistributive measures in educational policy - which can only be 
fully undertaken by the national government. In favour of decentralisation is the 
possibility that the demand for education by traditionally excluded groups may be 
promoted. Yet there is considerable evidence that decentralisation of responsibility for 
education tends to exacerbate, or at least not reduce, existing inequalities especially 
between regions. It is a difficult counterfactual question as to whether the expansion of 
educational opportunities under a decentralised regime, albeit on an uneven basis, is 
better from the perspective of aggregate inequality, than the situation which would 
pertain under centralisation. The following paragraphs present the available evidence on 
these points.  •  There is strong evidence that the Harambee schools, which proliferated during the 
1970s and represented 73% of all secondary schools by 1987, exacerbate inter-
district inequalities in Kenyan education (Mwira 1990). This occurs in several 
ways. Harambee schools are more important in poorer, less economically 
advanced parts of the country, yet charge higher fees than government schools. 
The unequal distribution of school places by province and school type is shown in 
table 13. 
•  There has also been a polarisation of the school system in terms of quality. Using 
the public examinations as a gauge, government schools and Harambee are on 
either of the extreme ends of the scale, the former achieving far better results. The 
consequences of this are reflected in post-secondary enrolment by school type - 
i.e. the fact that Harambee students are far less likely to proceed onto university 
(table 14). The factors underlying poor examination performance are inadequate 
teaching and physical facilities. Few Harambee schools teach the natural and 
physical sciences, for example, because they cannot afford the equipment. These 
disparities also have a intra-district gender dimension (see table 12) - because the 
government built more boys' than girls schools, girls are forced to seek 
alternatives and are more likely than boys to enrol in Harambee schools. 
•  In 1983, some aspects of the recurrent costs of primary education in Zambia were 
transferred from Lusaka to the district level and to parents. Central education 
expenditures were basically confined to teachers salaries. Silanda and Tuijnman 
(1989) found that increased local financing was a major cause of inter-district 
disparities in total recurrent expenditure per pupil (see table 15). There was a 
"striking degree of inequality between regions in terms of the funds available for 
the financing of non-salary components of the recurrent budget. Parental 
expenditures per pupil on the purchase of learning materials was more than twice 
as high in three regions (Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central), as in the remaining six 
- which largely reflected "general rural-urban, socio-economic disparities" (p.13). 
The authors concluded that the "decentralisation of responsibility for the 
financing of primary education may run counter to policies emphasising the 
provision of equal access to a uniformly good primary level education throughout 
the country" (p.16). 
•  Samoff (1990) argues that when local autonomy in education is enhanced, efforts 
to reduce regional inequalities are undermined. He illustrates this with the case of 
the 'bush schools' in Kilimanjaro, a better off region in Tanzania. These private 
secondary schools proliferated in the mid-1970s as government schools were 
increasingly unable to meet the demand for secondary schooling. They were 
typically established by a local coalition which included church personnel, 
government officials, party leaders and other community representatives (often 
village headmen). Financial assistance comes from the church and local 
contributions. Once opened, the schools are 'quasi-public' - being subject to 
Ministerial regulations and funded by a local school tax (collected by village 
governments). Whilst these schools expanded educational opportunities in 
Tanzania the initiatives "generally served to thwart national redistributive and 
equalisation policies" (p.11). The author reports that the representatives of 
relatively disadvantaged regions preferred greater centralisation, whilst Kilimanjaro leaders seeking to limit redistribution advocated local autonomy. 
This case may be contrasted to the Kenyan situation (see above), where local 
school initiatives were of poorer quality than the public system. 
•  In India, the distribution of education expenditure between the center and the 
states is determined by the planning commission (re development expenditure) 
and the finance commission (for non-plan, statutory and maintenance 
expenditure). The formulae used by the federal agencies contain a mixture of 
criteria - 'neutral' (population), progressive (per capita income), and regressive 
(state of derivation) (Hinchcliffe 1989). However the actual pattern of plan 
resources does not indicate any strong rationale behind interstate allocation - 
neither state domestic product per capita, nor education development (enrolments 
etc.) are explanatory factors. Regarding non-plan expenditures from finance 
commissions, educationally advanced states receive larger allocations. Whilst this 
may be because of the larger education systems to be maintained by these states, 
some have blamed arbitrary discriminatory policies. Tilak (1989) concluded that 
"on the whole, neither the planning commission nor the finance commission has 
been able to introduce progressivity into transfers of resources to the states for the 
education sector. The whole mechanism of federal fiscal transfers has tended to 
work to the detriment of the weaker states", and that interstate inequalities 
(measured by the coefficient of variation in the expenditure on education) have 
correspondingly increased (p.476). Other studies have similarly suggested that 
federal transfers have not reduced interstate inequalities in India (Hinchcliffe 
1989). 
The reason for this, according to Tilak (1989 p.476), is that "essentially all basic policy 
decisions in education are political in character. Resource allocation is not exempt". More 
vocal states, and states having a ruling political party in power identical with, or 
supportive of, the ruling party at the center are favoured in the process. "In short, the 
model that best explains allocation of resources by the center to the states for education 
may be a political model" (id.).  
•  A recent study of decentralisation in education noted that in Eastern Nigeria, 
wealthier communities were found to respond most strongly to government 
incentives to build new schools (Winkler, 1989). 
•  U.S. evidence suggests that substantial disparities can arise in a decentralised 
system. The New York State Constitution requires the state legislature to "provide 
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all 
the children of this state may be educated". At the same time however, local taxes 
constitute about 45% of the total school finances. In Long Island, recurrent 
expenditure per pupil is $5178 in the poorer districts, compared to $10 529 in the 
wealthy districts of Great Neck, a wealthier district (NYT, 16/5/91). This is 
despite the fact that state aid policy is, at least partly, redistributive. Great Neck 
receives only $360 per pupil, compared to Roosevelt's $2576. Even if the 
wealthier districts received no state subsidies at all, their capacity to generate 
revenue still vastly exceeds that of the poorer schools. Thus decentralisation 
appears to result in large inequities in school funding. Would a centralised system enhance equity? This would partly depend upon the ability of the state to raise the 
same resources which are currently being collected. There is clearly ability to pay 
in the wealthier districts. There must also be willingness to contribute to the 
education of pupils outside the local community. 
•  The centralised educational policies of various Latin American countries allowed 
a massive expansion of education. The combined primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates have increased from 68% in 1970, to 84% in 1987 (HDR 1991 
table 24). Despite this formidable achievement there is said to be a general 
dissatisfaction with the model pursued, partly due to the expected (but unfulfilled) 
democratic and equity effects of education policies (Cassusus, 1990, p.12). Wide 
socio-economic disparities and the exclusion of marginal sectors together with 
scarcity of materials and teachers are reflected in the highly uneven distribution of 
achievements across schools. Statistics show that school failure, expressed in 
terms of repetition, drop-out and over-age, are mainly concentrated in rural and 
urban marginal sectors (id.). 
Hinchcliffe (1989) concluded from a review of financing education in six federal 
countries (three developing - Brazil, India and Nigeria), that spatial equalisation efforts 
succeed where the emphasis is on block or general revenue grants, rather than sector or 
project specific allocations.  
Redistributive financing is an important, but not the sole, means to enhance educational 
equity. Other aspects of schooling may significantly impact upon the enrolment and 
attendance of children from poor families. These may be most appropriately set at the 
local level.  
•  In Bangladesh, flexible scheduling is one of the key strategies used to increase the 
school participation of girls and children from poor families. BRAC has 
established a system of schooling for 8-10 year olds which is open only to the 
children of landless, illiterate parents. 63% of the pupils are girls - the target is 
70%. BRAC is currently planning to establish another system of schools, only for 
girls, between 13-15 years of age. 
The Taxation Effect  
The system of taxation can have a significant impact on aggregate inequality, through 
differing tax burdens among income groups in the economy. It has been said that fairness 
in taxation is especially important where the level of (average) income is low and its 
distribution is highly skewed (Musgrave 1983). Taxes do take a relatively large share of 
even very low incomes in most developing countries (Bird and Miller 1990). National 
and local taxes may well vary in their impact upon intra- and inter-district inequality, 
given the different bases and tax rates which are utilised.  
Unfortunately there is little evidence as to whether local systems of taxation are relatively 
more or less progressive than those at the national level. This is not very suprising, given 
the considerable difficulties involved in estimating the incidence of the tax burden in developing countries. Basic data is required as to the distribution of income by types of 
earning, expenditure patterns by income levels and sectors, and the distribution of 
property and assets. Any analysis will be based on assumptions about the incidence of 
specific taxes. Nor can equity be evaluated without reference to relative tax compliance - 
especially where the rich enjoy greater opportunities to evade payment.  
Despite the empirical problems, it has been said that national taxation policies in 
developing countries are generally found to be "not very regressive" (Bird and Miller 
1990). Typically, the main sources of national revenue are levied on (in descending 
order): foreign trade, income (corporate and personal), sales and resource extraction. As 
in industrial countries, the weight of opinion as to the incidence of corporations tax in 
developing countries is inconclusive (Lent 1990). The basic unknown is whether the tax 
is shifted in the long run, either back to labour (in the form of lower real wages), or 
forward to consumers.  
The incidence of indirect sales taxes - on tobacco, alcohol and oil - appears to vary 
sharply from country to country, depending on the specifics of local consumption and tax 
structures (Bird and Miller 1990). Whilst some have concluded that "in most cases the 
existing structure of indirect taxation is markedly regressive" (Chenery 1974), others 
argue for detailed quantitative study rather than "sweeping generalisation" (Bird and 
Miller 1990). Clearly distinctions must be drawn amongst different socio-economic 
groups - poor rural, largely subsistence households are likely to have different 
expenditure patterns than the urban poor.  
The nature of local taxes tends to suggest that the burden is not very regressive. The main 
progressive revenue sources available to local governments in developing countries are 
automobile use and ownership, and real property. Taxes on motoring - vehicles and 
gasoline - may be progressive insofar as the demand tends to be highly income elastic 
(Cnossen 1990). Bahl and Linn (forthcoming) found that of 19 studies in thirteen 
developing countries, most found the property tax to be generally or very progressive - 
although the actual distributive impact of such taxes obviously depends largely upon its 
details (Bird and Miller 1989) - for example the treatment of rental versus owner-
occupied, of land versus improvements, and so on.  
On the negative side, the multitude of local revenue sources, levied on entertainment, 
sumptuary items, small businesses and so on, may be regressive in net impact.  
•  In Indonesia, the equity effects of existing local taxes have been seen as follows 
(Devas 1988). Motor vehicle taxes are relatively equitable, since car ownership is 
limited to upper income groups. Taxes on entertainment are reasonably equitable, 
because the tariffs vary according to type of entertainment, with traditional 
performances having the lowest rates. Taxes on restaurants and hotels are 
progressive, since the rich are likely to spend proportionately more on these items, 
and small establishments and itinerant vendors are exempt. The effects of the 
registration taxes levied on businesses are uncertain, depending on who the final 
consumers are and what proportion of the tax is passed on. Finally, the tax on non-motorised vehicles can be regarded as regressive, since users of bicycles and 
becaks are likely to be among the poorer members of the community. 
7. Obstacles  
The actual process of implementation and the obstacles confronted thereunder raises 
issues which do not always directly impact upon human development, yet nonetheless 
underlie the whole discussion of decentralisation. This survey would be incomplete 
without an appraisal of the operation and significance of these obstacles. Indeed this is 
regarded by many commentators as the most important issue to address (e.g. Rondinelli, 
1984). It will have emerged from the foregoing that decentralised systems of government 
should be appraised in terms of actual operation, rather than ostensible aims and designs. 
This is especially relevant in deeming particular decentralisation efforts as representing 
either deconcentration or devolution.  
Significant practical problems can inhibit the implementation of government efforts to 
decentralise. They range from the political - central decision makers are likely to resist 
any diminution of their powers - to the practical, especially shortages of resources and the 
difficulties arising due to weak local administrative capacity. Ministers of finance in the 
national government may oppose the transfer of revenue sources to decentralised units, 
whilst reliance on central funding can mean chronic delays, revenue shortfalls and 
reduced local autonomy. For example, it has been reported that the bureaucratic obstacles 
to decentralisation in Nepal were so serious that local officials were frequently required 
to travel to Kathmandu in order to expedite the release of central grants (Bienen et al 
1990).  
Political constraints  
"Where decentralisation is proposed seriously, it is likely to be a focus for political 
confrontation, precisely because it has to do with specifying who may participate 
legitimately in decision making and whose interests will have highest priority" (Samoff 
1990, p.524).  
It is predictable that change will be resisted by those who perceive their vested interests 
threatened by a new structure of governmental arrangements. This, coupled with 
bureaucratic inertia, can constitute formidable obstacles to the implementation of 
decentralisation reforms. Political will at the highest level may not, per se, be sufficient to 
overcome such obstacles.  
A number of authors criticise the assumption that national governments are "unitary, 
neutral actors". McGinn and Street (1986) argue that policy makers evaluate 
organisational reforms in terms of the impact upon their own power and control over the 
use of public resources - so that different actors react differently to the same policy.  
•  Since 1983 the Rawlings government in Ghana has been pursuing a 
decentralisation proposal that would transfer virtually all ministerial activities through the regions to the localities. In 1988, District Assemblies were elected 
which were supposed to take command of district-level administrations onto 
which the resources and expertise of central ministries were to be devolved. 
Olowu (1990) reported that progress has been very slow because of powerful 
forces within the administration against the plan; the distrust of elected 
councillors by military and civil servants alike; and the widespread feeling that 
decentralisation was a diversion from national economic policies. In the 
meantime, the old structures have continued through selected management 
committees presiding over deconcentrated administration at regional, district and 
local levels. 
•  An IRD project in Peru in the early 1980s which sought to combine regional 
spatial planning with decentralised administration was "ultimately undermined by 
political obstacles and central government controls" (Rondinelli and Wilson 1987 
p. 348). The most serious constraints stemmed from continuing central controls 
on local planning and resource allocation. This "not only inhibited the local 
development corporations from responding to local needs and conditions, but 
subjected them to manipulation by the dominant national political party" (ibid 
p.353). The highly centralised control meant a vacuum of information about local 
conditions which "in turn generated apathy toward regional problems and this, 
combined with the lack of power or resources at the local level, created pervasive 
inertia against acting promptly on regional plans or local development proposals. 
In rare cases expeditious action occurred when local political groups bypassed 
departmental channels and went directly to the central ministries or influential 
congressmen in Lima. The study concluded that the potential for decentralisation 
depended crucially upon increasing political commitment to decentralised 
planning and decision making (ibid. p. 356). 
Bureaucratic obstacles  
Beyond the political tensions involved in decentralisation attempts, there often arise 
significant problems related to the nature of the bureaucracy - its structure, technical 
competence and resource base. The creation of new systems of local government requires 
considerable administrative skill and resources. There may be basic problems with 
respect to personnel needs, attitudes (held both locally and centrally), and training in 
local government.  
In a number of cases, the central government has retained effective control over local 
personnel through recruitment, promotion, payment and so on. Although this may help to 
alleviate skill and resource shortages at the local level, it leads to accountability and 
loyalties which lead upward to the capital, rather than to local constituents. This may 
undermine local autonomy, and create an obstacle to the implementation of decentralising 
reforms.  
•  In Indonesia, it has been observed that the structure and regulations governing the 
civil service severely handicap efforts to develop a local civil service adequate to 
meet the demands of decentralisation (King, 1988). Substantial deconcentration of development activity through INPRES programmes was found to have been 
undermined by centralising civil service reforms (as well as financing 
arrangements, see ** above). In 1985 over three-quarters of employees working 
in regional governments were seconded central employees. Local staff available 
for decentralised management was subject to cumbersome and centralised control. 
Further, the structure of incentives encouraged a "brain drain" from the regions to 
Jakarta. 
•  In Bangladesh, although the services of civil servants has been formally 
transferred to the upazilas, their appointment, training, transfer, promotion and 
discipline all remain subject to national government control (Khan, 1987, op cit). 
•  In Botswana the recruitment, posting, training, promotion and discipline of local 
authority staff is generally the responsibility of the centrally directed Unified 
Local Government Service (ULGS). The ULGS staff at headquarters has been 
strongly criticised by the District Councils for not being sufficiently aware of, and 
responsive to, local problems and needs (Tordoff 1988 p.198). 
Staff shortages at the local level appear to be a crucial constraint in many developing 
countries. An IMF survey conducted in 1982 showed that 57% of all government 
employment in industrial countries is at the 'local' (as opposed to the central) level, 
compared to only 15% for developing countries - Africa averaging only 6%, Latin 
America 21% and Asia 37% (World Bank 1983). This can be seen to reflect personnel 
shortages as well as the fact that local governments account for a greater share of public 
expenditure in industrial, relative to developing, countries.  
•  In Nigeria, there is reportedly a wide gap between the staff required by local 
governments and the actual number employed by them. Local governments have 
not been able to attract and retain qualified staff and attempts by state and federal 
governments to train local government staff have not overcome this problem 
(Nwankwo 1984). 
Rondinelli et al (1983) emphasise the "crucial effects of shortages of trained staff 
on the success of decentralisation" (p.69). There are many examples of local 
governments with limited capacity. In the Chilean context of a relatively 
thoroughgoing decentralisation, the limited capacity of local officials has confined 
their work to mainly administering central directives: local initiatives have been 
rare (Racynski 1987). In Kenya the vast majority of skilled technicians and 
managers have been concentrated in Nairobi. The Sudan has suffered severe skill 
shortages, even within central ministries, which impeded decentralisation and 
limited the ability of provincial administrators to provide even basic services. In 
Pakistan, the technical officers available to the markaz councils were quite limited 
- in that the project managers are often either agricultural technicians or generalist 
administrators with little experience of district planning and development (Khan 
1982).  
•  The Moroccan government recognised the importance of personnel at the local 
level in creating a new special corps of posts in the local civil service, consisting of centrally trained and paid chief civil servants called 'secretary-generals'. 
Training centres for local civil servants were greatly expanded (Nellis 1983). 
•  In Zambia, administrative capacity to plan and implement substantial 
development programmes was lacking at the "provincial, let alone district level - 
(and) even in Lusaka". The shortage of qualified staff, the absence of suitable 
training programmes for district development officers, the unattractiveness of 
local government employment all contributed to this problem (Rakodi 1988). 
•  In Kenya there are several management problems at the local level. Many officers 
tend to be underqualified for their jobs; in some cases appointment is on the basis 
of political criteria rather than merit. There are frequently severe gaps in staffing. 
Some councils have six or seven vacancies at senior levels (clerk, treasurer, 
surveyor etc.) - so that one officer might be expected to fulfil all of these tasks 
over an extended period. In this light it is noted that in the 1984-88 National Plan 
period, even the more successful councils only managed to carry out about half 
the projects they had proposed (Wallis 1990). 
•  In Botswana the separation of the 'Tribal Administration' from the Village 
Development Committees is said to have stifled the effectiveness of the latter. 
Although the traditional institution has been stripped of its statutory powers it 
remains influential, as "the bulk of the rural people still look to the Chief and ... 
the traditional hierarchy for advice and guidance on a wide range of issues" 
(Tordoff 1988). 
•  Another example of institutional weaknesses undermining the efficacy of local 
government comes from Liberia. In the period 1974-1980, a World Bank-funded 
urban development project in the Liberian capital concentrated on infrastructural 
improvements. The Monrovia City Council had very limited spending and 
administrative authority. Local revenue covered only 7% of local expenditure, 
accounting systems were very weak, and mismanagement occurred frequently. 
The responsibilities of the MCC were poorly defined and qualified staff were 
lacking. 
The World Bank worked outside of this structure through its "Project Team"; by the end 
of 1985 the planned civil works were largely completed, which benefited an estimated 
130 000 people. However little had been accomplished in the way of institutional reform. 
The MCC became increasingly dependent upon central funds, as the government was 
becoming less reliable. One evaluation (by Price Waterhouse) identified the following 
weaknesses: (i) shortages of professional skills; (ii) responsiveness of the appointed 
mayor and council to their superiors, rather than local residents; (iii) inadequate revenue 
and weak fiscal discipline; (iv) uncoordinated development programmes; and (v) failure 
to enforce local regulations.  
The role of NGOs and traditional structures  
It can be argued that human development is such a complex issue that a wide variety of 
institutions - market, central government and field administration, local government and 
non governmental organisations - are required. Hyden, for example, writes in the African 
context that genuine local governments must build upon the wide variety of traditional and modern local associations, because otherwise people will perceive local governments 
to be an extension of the State. Similarly, Uphoff argues that there should be "multiple 
channels of action". Since any one channel can become monopolised or blocked, it is said 
to be better that there be a degree of competition as well as complementarity between 
various institutions - whether bureaucratic, local government, co-operative, private 
enterprise, NGO, religious or other. More recently Wunsch and Olowu (1990) have 
argued along the same lines.  
The attention accorded to NGOs follows their apparent comparative advantage in areas of 
priority for human development, given their flexibility and small size, as well as highly 
motivated personnel (Paul, in Lewis 1988). However rather than attempt to assess the 
relative performance of NGO vis- -vis that of the various levels of government, the ambit 
of discussion is more limited. It investigates the proposition that local, rather than 
national, governments are better able to create an environment within which the work of 
NGOs is facilitated.  
Turning then to evidence of collaborative relationship between government and 
grassroots organisations, the following points emerge. There is already considerable 
operational collaboration in both planning and delivery of public goods for human 
development - e.g. Amul Dairy in India and the Grameen Bank (Paul, op cit).  
In Indonesia, the national government provides the funds, supplies and technical 
expertise needed for family planning programmes, whilst community volunteers and 
village organisations mobilise demand and assist in the distribution of contraceptive 
supplies.  
An important related issue is the role of traditional institutions. This has been explored in 
some detail in the African context. Traditional institutions have generally not been 
invested with measures of self-governance. In East Africa - Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Tanzania - and elsewhere governments have not treated them as critical agents in 
ensuring the appropriateness and sustainability of development initiatives (Harbeson 
1990). Sometimes this has been due to their association with the former colonial regime, 
or with conservative obstacles to reform in the country.  
A number of writers have emphasised that national governments have neglected and even 
deliberately undermined traditional self-governing bodies; and that this, in turn, has 
inhibited the effectiveness of local government.  
"Rather than build and improve on these institutions, they replaced them with expanded 
state structures, often with disastrous results. Furthermore, historical and anthropological 
studies indicate that local self-governing structures are more compatible with several 
traditional African political systems than the nominally `decentralised' structures created 
by African states. These traditional self-governing structures (ethnic, town and 
community unions) have continued to co-exist with the newly created structures in 
several African countries with very little interaction between them" (Olowu 1990).  In Africa traditional institutions were the mechanisms by which the people regulated their 
social and economic affairs, and exercised and controlled political power. Traditional 
authority encompassed chiefs and councils of elders and the complex bodies of law 
which guided their actions; for example, the village councils promulgated and enforced 
access rules that regulated the balance between livestock, water and forage, and 
minimised overgrazing, and complex rules of access and use assured (young men across) 
most of Africa access to land.  
Since independence, the tendency has been to abolish any legal authority which remained 
in traditional institutions. Traditional leaders have, as in the colonial era, frequently been 
'co-opted', through recruitment into the civil service or pensions. In some cases resistance 
to such policies has led to bloody violence - as in Southern Sudan, Uganda and Ghana. In 
the result, the absence of effective local institutions is said to inter alia threaten common 
resources and community endeavours. Deforestation and decertification processes in the 
Sahel have been traced directly to the absence of local institutions able to regulate tree 
use and livestock foraging. In Botswana, the abolition of local traditional authorities 
made it far more difficult to solve such problems (Wunsch 1990). Also, as noted above, 
traditional leaders appear to have been far more effective than government officials in 
collecting local taxation dues.  
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PART III - SECTORAL SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS  
The previous part explored such aspects of decentralisation as efficiency, equity and 
participation, supported by evidence drawn from the sectors most relevant to human 
development. This part seeks to portray a better sense of how decentralisation has tended 
to proceed in each sector, highlighting the most important characteristics. Thus, for 
example, the specific issues raised by decentralisation in education include the nature of 
decision making structures and interested constituencies, political ramifications and 
financing; whereas in the health context, decentralisation is very much associated with 
the concept of primary health care.   1. Education  
According to Winkler (1989), a highly centralised education system is perceived to be 
relatively expensive and inefficient, poor in quality, and unresponsive to the interests and 
needs of parents and local employers. Much of the evidence pertaining to the education 
sector was discussed above, under the general headings of Efficiency, Equity, Obstacles, 
and so on. The discussion in this section is confined to those aspects of decentralisation 
which are specifically relevant to education, in particular the nature of the decision 
making structures and issues of financing.  
1.1 The degree and type of decentralisation  
In practice, there is great diversity in the extent and type of decentralisation of 
educational functions. Decisions about education are typically made at several levels - 
national, state, regional, local, school, household and individual. At the same time, the 
system of education in any country consists of a number of components - ranging across 
curriculum and supervision, teacher recruitment and remuneration, and school 
construction. The degree of decentralisation is likely to vary according to each 
component. The organisation of schooling - minimum requirements and the structure of 
primary-secondary schooling - is often highly centralised. The chief administrator of a 
school district may be centrally appointed or subject to the local community; s/he may 
have substantial decision making authority, or be relatively powerless.  
Overall then, in order to assess whether a country's education system is decentralised, it is 
necessary to look at the distribution of decision making authority with respect to various 
educational functions. Most significant among these are: (i) The chief administrative 
officer -who selects the officer, and her/his decision making powers; (ii) Teachers - 
recruitment, posting, payment, etc; and (iii) Local financial autonomy - the degree to 
which local authorities are able to finance their own education systems.  
•  During the Cultural Revolution, the entire education system in China was 
decentralised, in the sense that national curricula and teaching materials were 
abandoned, as was the national examination system. Length of schooling, for 
example, was determined at the lower levels. It is said that the decollectivisation 
of agriculture and the decline of the communes and brigades since the late 1970s 
have deprived education of its major support structure. In the mid 1980s it was 
argued that the Chinese government's education policy was bifurcated - involving 
a small, centrally financed elite sector based on the "keypoint" concept, which 
trained first class scientists and engineers; alongside a mass sector providing basic 
education to the majority, which relied upon local government, collective and 
individual funding. The result is said to have been a serious neglect of basic 
education (Rosen, 1985). 
•  UNICEF (1990) reports that parents and village leaders have been actively 
involved in establishing and running BRAC schools. The village is responsible for 
providing the actual classroom (for which BRAC pays a small rent), and for 
deciding upon school hours. The monthly parents' meetings are well-attended. The teaching staff, drawn mainly from the better educated women in the village, 
take part in an intensive 12-day training course and receive continuing guidance, 
support and refresher training. They are only paid a small monthly stipend. 
•  In Nicaragua after 1979, each school had an Advisory Council - involving 
students, parents and teachers - which were reported to be "committed to discuss 
educational policies in order to diversify curriculum, programme content and 
methodologies" (Cassusus 1990 p.10). There was, however, a tension between 
people deciding their own goals and course of action, as against the role of 'the 
vanguard', who were supposed to guide the process. Often the mass organisations, 
which were supposed to be mobilising the population around the tasks of the 
revolution - like the mass literacy crusade - were seen as little more than political 
forums for transmitting the political line being propounded by the FSLN 
(Arngrove and Drewes 1991 p. 102). 
1.2 Financing  
The national government may both finance and directly provide all inputs into the school 
system, or the local community may fulfil part or all of this role. The system of financing 
recurrent local expenditure may be mixed - as in India, where the midday meal 
programme is provided by the local community but partly financed by central grants. The 
degree of local financing of education varies widely. In Brazil, for example, one fourth of 
all primary school funding is provided by the municipal governments, which is much 
higher than either Nigeria, where the local authorities run schools but provide little of the 
finance, or India where the central and state governments provide the vast majority of 
funds for education, and the zilla parishads relatively little (table 16) (Hinchcliffe 1989).  
In practice, school construction and financing tends to be among the most decentralised 
aspects of the education system, especially in Africa and Asia (Winkler 1989). In many 
countries the national government offers a matching grant, whereby the school 
constructed by the local community is staffed through central funds (as in Eastern 
Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and India).  
•  The central government finances 64% of total education costs in China, while 
local governments, brigades, enterprises and so forth contribute 28% and "the 
masses" 8%. Over 90% of central funding goes to recurrent costs. At the basic 
levels education in China is not compulsory, nor is it free. In the countryside, 
primary schools and teaching staff are largely financed by the local population. In 
the mid-1980s, 80% of the funds used to build and repair middle and primary 
schools in rural areas were raised locally. Teachers are expected to raise funds 
through commercial activities (Rosen, 1985). 
•  The Indian government has played an increasingly active role in education, 
through (i) its own regional colleges, national scholarships, University Grants 
Commission etc; (ii) the centrally sponsored sector, where the states may 
undertake responsibility for implementation (e.g. promotion of Hindi in non-
Hindi speaking states); and (iii) the centrally assisted sector, where central interest 
is embodied in state plans, and its financial contribution ranges between 25-100% of total cost. Direct federal education expenditures are limited however - there is a 
reliance upon intermediaries such as state governments and the UGS. In 1976, the 
reality was constitutionally formalised when education was put onto the 
concurrent list (it had previously been a state function). Still education represents 
a much larger proportion of state expenditure (about 20%) compared to the central 
budget - where education has declined from 2.3% (1976-7), to 1.5% (1985-6) 
total expenditure. Table * shows the centre-state shares in educational finances, 
by level of education (Tilak p.466). There have been calls to reform 
intergovernmental relations in education - Tilak (1989) recommends less physical 
concurrency (intervention in policy formulation, planning and administration), 
and more financial concurrency (devolution of larger resources to the states, or 
the centre helping the states to widen their own revenue bases). 
In some cases central grants are tied to specific educational purposes. In Nigeria, for 
example, it was estimated that 70% of federal and state grants to local governments 
support the national Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme (Smith, 1982). In 
Zimbabwe, central grants for tuition must be used only for that purpose, as narrowly 
defined by the centre, and not for, e.g., school administrative expenses.  
1.3 Political Aspects  
Decentralisation in education can be viewed in terms of the political implications and 
obstacles, especially vis-à-vis different groups within the bureaucracy, and national 
teacher unions and the State. In the Latin American context, for example, McGinn and 
Street (1986) stress that decentralisation is primarily a question of the distribution of 
power among various groups in the society.  
•  Decentralisation in Mexico has been seen as a battle between the bureaucrats and 
the technocrats, both of whom had been incorporated into the ruling PRI. The 
latter were described as 'intellectuals with links with the private sector' - this 
faction was given a new Vice Ministry of Educational Planning in the Secretariat 
of Public Education, and the position of Education Minister under the Portillo 
government (1976-82), and sought to replace patronage in appointments with 
technical criteria. Part of the technocrats' campaign was said to lie in the 
decentralisation of decision making to delegates of the Minister, with authority to 
act in his name; followed by the creation of formal offices that transferred 
responsibility for all levels of education (except tertiary) to delegates, 
undermining the power of the bureaucrats in Mexico City. The National Director 
General of Education lost a major source of power when administrative control 
over teaching positions was transferred. The reforms were also intended to 
weaken the national teachers' union (an ally of the bureaucrats), by forcing it to 
negotiate separately with the 31 states. Ultimately however a dissident teachers' 
group which became a mass movement opposed to the union's central authority 
and antagonistic to both factions, eventually pushed the technocrats 'back into the 
arms of the bureaucrats', at least temporarily. This led to renegotiation of the 
decentralisation plan. The authors conclude from this and other case studies that centralisation-decentralisation are chosen not only on their technical merits, but 
also as part of a strategy where political effectiveness is an important 
consideration (McGinn and Street 1986). 
•  Cassusus (1990) also emphasises the 'tensional power relationships' generated by 
the process of decentralisation in reference to Bolivian education. The teachers' 
union regarded decentralisation initiatives as an attempt to break their own 
hegemony, which prevented implementation of the project, at least during the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) government. 
•  In Thailand, non-formal education (NFE) has been deconcentrated following the 
recognition that the NFE curriculum ought not be urban-oriented in a largely 
(80%) rural country, and that there was a need for research and curriculum 
development outside the centre in order to overcome excessive standardisation. 
Regional centres of the Adult Education Division (AED) were established to 
conduct research into the educational needs, and produce NFE curricula and 
learning materials relevant to the ethnic and occupational structure of the region. 
The changes only affected the control of research and development activities - 
since operations had always been a provincial responsibility. Armstrong (1984) 
found that implementation of these reforms was facilitated by the following 
factors: (i) Senior officials in Bangkok did not view NFE as a high priority 
activity (compared to, say, secondary education) and therefore did not interfere in 
the process. (ii) National policy had endorsed decentralisation as a (rhetorical) 
goal, whilst the relevant policy documents and guidelines were extremely vague, 
which facilitated a flexible approach at the local level. (iii) Decentralisation policy 
was formulated within AED, and key officials were enthusiastic about the project. 
In several cases regional directors were able to mobilise local resources and 
recruit highly qualified staff. 
The study identified the most significant constraints to decentralisation as: (i) the highly 
centralised Thai budgetary system. Bangkok staff took an active role in the formulation 
of provincial budgets, thereby imposing their own programme decisions, whilst many 
provincial directors did not become seriously involved in the budget preparation process. 
A more significant inhibition was the cumbersome disbursement procedure; delays of up 
to four months into the fiscal year were common (not only for AED but throughout the 
system). (ii) The emphasis of the Thai bureaucracy on quantitative expansion. Since 
enrolment increases were most easily achieved in the existing urban-oriented 
programmes, it was difficult to move into the rural areas. This also resulted in a 
preoccupation with constructing and staffing new offices, rather than with evaluation or 
training.  
2. Health  
A number of international organisations and academic writings have endorsed the 
decentralisation of health services. Centralisation is associated with an emphasis on high 
cost curative medicine, highly trained medical personnel and technologically advanced 
facilities largely confined to urban centres and the better off. Decentralisation is seen as a 
means of achieving greater responsiveness to local needs through the delegation of authority and resources to the local community and to intermediate levels (WHO 1980). 
It has been praised as a means promoting local participation in health care (Mills et al. 
1987). Community participation, in turn, has been "almost universally accepted as the 
cornerstone of primary health care in developing countries" (Asthana 1989).  
Access to basic health services is available to fewer than three in ten people living in the 
rural areas in a number of developing countries. The argument for decentralisation rests 
partly on the need to increase access to health care, particularly in rural areas. Evidence 
suggests, for example, that the spatial deconcentration of maternity care could 
significantly improve the serious rates of maternity mortality presently suffered in many 
developing countries.  
•  One longitudinal study from Cote d'Ivoire found that the presence of an 
obstetrician in the district greatly reduced the incidence of complications (which 
had formerly necessitated transfers to hospital). The maternal mortality rate for 
rural women was 2013 per 100 000, compared to 33 per 100 00 in the town where 
the medical facilities were located. 
Others are more wary of attempts to promote decentralisation in the health sector, 
suspecting an association with the "contemporary international pressures on 
developing countries (which) militate strongly against a positive central 
government role in health", and seeing it as "a discrete way of the state 
abandoning its functions" (Collins 1989 p.169). There is a concern that "over-
decentralisation" could break up the consistency and coherence of national health 
policy and constitute a major obstacle to improved equity (ibid p.170).  
•  In what has been described as "the most radical decentralisation policy to date" 
(Winkler 1989), responsibility for the provision of basic social services in Chile 
was transferred from the State to local entities. The health care reforms mirrored 
the approach adopted throughout the social sectors, as: (i) responsibility for 
primary health care, infrastructure and personnel, was transferred to the 
municipalities; (ii) the role of the central Ministry of Health was limited to policy-
making and supervision; and (iii) providers of health service, both public and 
private, were paid directly on a fee-for-service basis. 
The impact of these reforms is controversial. In particular the redistributive implications 
(see Equity, above) and the increased central control (see Participation, above).  
•  It is also interesting to note that in Europe, where it is "correct to say that the 
provision of health care has been decentralised, through the development of 
primary health care services ... there is still a large gap between the health-for-all 
strategy and what goes on in PHC services" (Godhino 1990). For instance, 
communication and collaboration between communities and hospitals, health 
centres and local PHC programmes "remains weak" (ibid p.47). 
2.1 Implementation  A survey of the literature on health policy suggests that the district is increasingly 
regarded as "the backbone" of primary health care since, under the guise of various 
names, it is "the most peripheral fully organised unit of government" (Tarimo and 
Fowkes 1989). Certain advantages have been put forth: that it is administratively capable 
of supporting a specialised technical and managerial staff and exercising substantial 
decision making power, yet geographically and demographically compact enough to 
facilitate efficient management. Integration is put forward as an important principle to be 
pursued at the district level - e.g. collaboration and sharing of facilities between 
programmes for maternal and child health and immunisation. Also inter-sectoral concerns 
can be encompassed - e.g. the improvement of local water supplies. Yet while 
considerable decentralisation of authority is called for, it is often stressed that "overall 
national guidance and monitoring have to be provided by the government" (ibid p.79).  
•  Some of the problems which can arise in the course of attempts to decentralise the 
control of health services were evidenced in Papua New Guinea in the early 1980s 
(Thomason 1984). The central Department of Health decentralised the 
management of health services concurrently with the commencement of a major 
rural health development project in several provinces. The main components of 
the project (e.g. constructing and equipping new primary health facilities) 
included the activities whose control had ostensibly been decentralised to the 
provinces. A special central government unit was responsible for overall 
management of project implementation, including day-to-day operations. 
Throughout the planning and development of the project, there was only limited 
involvement of the provincial divisions of health, and even less of the respective 
provincial governments. This was despite the fact that the project was affecting 
purely provincial functions towards which the provincial governments would be 
required to provide a substantial financial contribution. These arrangements lead 
to frequent misunderstandings and conflict between the relevant institutions, 
which was reflected in long delays in implementation. 
•  A more recent study of Papua New Guinea, concluded that the provinces are now 
effectively responsible for the day-to-day operations of primary health care 
facilities and programmes. Provincial governments are provided with central 
grants, to be spent at their own discretion to organise and administer health 
programmes. Many provinces have decentralised even further by creating district 
offices designed to co-ordinate the local activities of the specialised agencies. In 
some cases district health officers are appointed, who are responsible for the 
supervision of health workers, submission of the district health budget, and 
making such policy decisions as where to locate new facilities. Generally, 
however, the district structures did not significantly further decentralisation - 
budgets were determined by the province and the district input was basically 
advisory. The study concluded that the provincial level was the most appropriate 
for responsibility for health care, combining support and supervision with local 
flexibility. 
•  In Mozambique, there was a shift in emphasis from hospital- based curative care 
to preventive medicine, combined with a broader infrastructure of basic curative 
care administered by intermediate health workers. The government reduced the list of essential imported drugs to 300, purchased on a competitive tender basis - 
so that the proportion of the health budget spent on drugs was maintained within a 
range of 10-20% (compared to 30-40% for most developing countries). These 
shifts met considerable opposition from health workers on the grounds of quality. 
Attempts to introduce courses on public health in the universities met with equally 
strong opposition from medical doctors and students alike. There was also local 
demand for basic curative care (see above). 
Further pressures were encountered by the new health policy in Mozambique. Real health 
expenditures fell in the face of escalating war costs and economic crisis. Donors 
increasingly by-passed the state drugs importer and failed to respect the national drug 
code. There were also organisational problems as aid agencies tended to favour selective 
health programmes (e.g. for immunisation and diarrhoea disease control) each with their 
own separate funding, wherein key decisions were typically taken by a small group of 
foreign experts. This approach was said to have left little room for consultation with, or 
the involvement of, the local people in villages. Mackintosh and Whyt (1988) argue that 
in Mozambique, health policies had been made nationally, but with genuine pressure 
from below as a result of decentralisation to local communities, but that donor practice 
effectively undermined this system (pp.158-9).  
•  A USAID-assisted project in Indonesia was partially effective in promoting 
decentralisation of health management, planning and implementation (Bossert et 
al. 1991). The capability of lower units was enhanced vis-à-vis the highly 
centralised Ministry of Health, particularly in the collection and analysis of better 
data (in terms of quality and quantity) than was available at the national level. 
Provincial and local health officials could convince central officials that national 
policies should be modified in order to take account of provincial realities. They 
were able to challenge national targets (especially those for specific diseases), 
initiate specific drug proposals that were accepted by the centre, and implement 
changes in national policies that were innovative or more appropriate to local 
needs (such as a TB programme in a Kabupaten in West Sumatra). Lower level 
units were able to persuade Jakarta officials that their decisions about priorities 
and interventions were more appropriate for the province than those set 
nationally. Another dimension of the project lay in innovative training of nurses, 
which encouraged greater community involvement and longer periods in the field. 
The result was not, however, thoroughgoing devolution of decision-making in the 
health sector. Often local initiatives were modified by the centre, rendering them 
'less effective'. Local responsiveness to the decentralisation project was not 
always positive - many local and provincial officials were not willing to support 
additional health efforts, and those who were seldom committed significant 
resources to support project initiatives. The study concludes that control of 
information is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for effective 
decentralisation of decision making. 
3. Water and sanitation  Here, perhaps more than any other sector, in schemes for the provision of water and 
sanitation, the literature emphasises the importance of community involvement. This 
involvement should encompass all stages, from project initiation and design to 
construction, operation and maintenance.  
3.1 Decision making processes  
It is generally held that centrally directed engineers, with little reference to local needs, 
are unlikely to realise the full potential of schemes for the provision of water and 
sanitation. The lessons which have emerged from experience emphasise the deficiencies 
of a top-down strategies. Local people should take a leading role in planning, 
constructing, financing and managing rural water supply and sanitation projects (IBRD 
1987, 1988; Narayan-Parker 1988; Douglas 1990; U Tin U 1988).  
•  It is reported from Adayaw in Burma that the network of basic health services 
staff and volunteers plays a vital role in encouraging community participation in 
development projects. Under the supervision and guidance of the local party and 
council, the town launched a major water supply effort, resulting in 97% of the 
population having access to safe water (U Tin U 1988). 
Nonetheless, government - local or central - has an important supporting role in 
this context.  
•  The Malawi Self Help Water Scheme, which is rightly regarded as the 
outstanding water project in rural Africa' (IBRD 1988), reflects the success of 
community collaboration with the national government. (The scheme was 
described on p.16 above.) Community participation has been successfully 
"institutionalised" in water committees (Cox and Annis 1982). The committee can 
seek technical assistance, channel requests for water, organise and take 
responsibility for the mobilisation of local resources, draw up work schedules, 
and promote community awareness about health education and hygiene. 
It is especially important to obtain the participation of women, who bear the burden of 
water collection, yet are often excluded from community decisions. In most villages, 
women and children are also the primary victims of water-related disease (Cox and Annis 
1982). When systematic attempts are made to include women in project development and 
maintenance, the results have been "encouraging" (IBRD 1988). Opportunities can be 
provided to enable women to improve their technical skills to perform these tasks. 
Examples from Zambia, Bangladesh, India and Paraguay reflect the training and 
involvement of women in maintenance. Yet in Malawi, where women provide most of 
the self help construction labour - they constitute only 10% of the important planning 
committees. At the same time it is important that such projects do not increase the already 
heavy workload of poor women, especially when their participation is voluntary rather 
than paid (Yudelman 1986).  
4. Housing  A general lack of data on housing availability, quality, tenure and so on makes any 
assessment of housing conditions in developing countries difficult, if not 'conjectural' 
(UN 1989). Nonetheless it is clear that the housing available to most households in 
developing countries - especially to the poor - is grossly inadequate (Struyk 1988). This 
problem is especially acute in rapidly growing urban areas - squatter settlements, shanty 
towns, and low-income neighbourhoods (Annis 1987). Publicly supported contractor-
built units, hitherto the norm, have not been able to meet this deficit - especially in cities 
growing at an annual rate of 3-5%. Since the mid 1970s(?), there has been a shift in 
public policy. The role of the state in housing policy is increasingly seen as that of an 
enabler, rather than as a provider. The focus has shifted to sites and services, slum 
upgrading, security of tenure and the provision of basic infrastructure.  
The issue here revolves around the extent to which decentralisation can help alleviate the 
problem of providing decent housing, especially for the poor. There is a considerable 
body of literature which appraises the role of community groups and self-help here. We 
also need to compare the role of local, to that of the national government, especially in 
the sense of its activities as an enabling institution.  
4.1 Role of the government  
The activities of governments, national and local, have a bearing upon the housing sector 
in the following senses. Various public policies may facilitate or deter informal housing 
investments, such as credit policies, building regulations, the nature and security of land 
tenure, and the regulations which affect the use of residential plots for income generating 
activities. The provision of basic infrastructure - water, sewerage, roads, electricity - also 
affects private housing decisions and the quality of housing.  
Some activities are likely to fall largely into the central domain - including real property 
legislation, credit policies and the provision of, say, electricity. In the remaining areas, 
there may be important steps open to local authorities to contribute to an 'enabling 
environment' to facilitate housing development. Local government is arguably in a good 
position to pursue such strategies. It can engage in consultations with local people, better 
appraise local conditions and needs, and frame policies and regulations appropriately in 
that light.  
There are however cases where municipalities have acted in ways which have not 
enhanced the availability of decent housing for the poor. Throughout Latin America, 
there have been numerous land invasions, with groups of low income families occupying 
undeveloped plots of private or public land and erecting makeshift shelters. Ironically in 
Colombia, much of that land was purchased by municipalities for use as sites as low-
income housing, which had yet to be built (Sorock 1984). In some instances the 
municipal regulations that were designed to protect homebuyers by requiring private 
developers to build adequate infrastructures have aggravated housing shortages (e.g. in 
Colombia).  •  In Iloilo City in the Philippines, the city government is said to have failed to 
respond to housing needs, which is one of the most serious problems facing the 
city. This was partly due to a lack of funds, and also to a "generally negative 
attitude towards squatters on the part of decision makers" (Ruland and Sajo 1988). 
When asked about the most effective strategy to approach the squatter problem, 
almost half the councillors opted for 'resettlement to prepared lots in periphery 
areas', although many of them were well aware of the adverse effects of 
resettlement on the living conditions of the families (ibid p.273). 
•  In Colombia, self-help housing movements (groups) receive technical assistance 
from SENA (the national institute for vocational training), and municipal 
planning authorities assist groups in designing site and infrastructure plans. 
Municipal officials also provide technical assistance to help upgrade local homes 
and communities. Municipal public utilities assist the groups by drawing up plans 
and budgets for the water, sewerage, and electricity systems and by supervising 
the community workers on the site (Solock 1984). 
•  Self help housing groups in Argentina joined together to pool expertise in 
architectural, financial and social services, and also to increase overall bargaining 
power. In the 1983 election campaign, the confederation urged the legalisation of 
land ownership where necessary, and support to self-help housing programmes 
through government credit subsidies, better technical assistance and less red tape 
(e.g. simpler building codes). They called on the state to provide basic 
infrastructure and public services. Nonetheless it was accepted that the national 
economic situation prohibited the construction of large public housing projects or 
increased housing subsidies, and that improvements must be sought primarily 
through legal and policy changes to facilitate self-help programmes (Page 1984). 
The self-help movement does not lack critics however. It has been noted that property-
owners and landlords rather than tenants, and older rather than more recent residents, 
tend to dominate residents' committees in redevelopment and upgrading projects (Stren, 
in EDI 1989).  
5. Economic infrastructure  
An array of economic infrastructure - including roads, irrigation, agricultural extension 
services, basic communications and electricity - facilitate local economic and 
employment growth. There is a growing body of opinion which regards the efforts of the 
central government in this regard as manifestly deficient (see Wunsch 1990). Attention 
has thus focused upon the role of the community and local government in the creation 
and maintenance of economic infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. At the same time 
it is recognised that national macro-economic policies, regarding fiscal and monetary 
matters, pricing and sectoral policies etc., will generally have a crucial impact upon 
economic activity throughout the country.  
•  One detailed micro-level study of a cluster of villages in West Bengal focusing on 
ways to promote employment expansion, emphasised the role of the 'panchayats' - 
the local unit of self government. The sectors covered included agriculture, animal husbandry, food processing, cottage industries, transport, and the building 
and maintenance of rural infrastructure. It was noted that "these works will 
involve a considerable amount of micro-level design, planning and organisation 
of human-power and materials, which cannot be achieved by the traditional 
bureaucratic methods of administration". The author concludes that local popular 
institutions of self-government, with appropriate leadership, can be expected to be 
much more useful in promoting employment expansion (Maitra 1982). 
•  Sanwal (1987) reports from Uttar Pradesh, India that decentralisation increased 
the commitment of local officials to promoting local development. Block 
Development Officers took bank managers out with them to the villages, the 
banks fixed dates for groups of villages in order to expedite loan procedures, and 
villagers were taken in groups to markets to select the best stock, carts and 
implements. 
5.1 Decision making procedures  
The responsibility for making decisions about the provision of economic infrastructure 
can be decentralised in a variety of ways. The following paragraphs present some country 
experiences in point.  
•  In the Indian state of Karnataka, legislative reforms in 1987 brought the planning 
and management of a number of important development activities within the 
jurisdiction of the zilla parishad (district). The zilla parishad is responsible for 
extension and training, the operation of commercial and seed farms, the 
development of irrigation, and the promotion of small scale industry through the 
establishment of training, production centres and marketing facilities. The most 
novel aspect of these arrangements lies in the legislative intention to give the zilla 
parishad effective control over the line departments. In the past, local authorities 
had exercised only limited control over the spending departments within their 
jurisdiction. According to Slater and Watson (1989) however, it seems likely that 
what public investment is planned will remain subject to national or state level 
policy decisions translated into targets, whilst how much investment is planned 
depends upon financial allocation procedures - decisions which are generally 
made in the state capital. The authors concluded that the main scope for 
manoeuvre lies in where investment is planned - which arguably had always been 
subject to local control. 
•  The operations of local government in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands in economic 
infrastructure are very restricted in scope - district councils spend very little on 
capital investment, as much of the investment on infrastructure (roads, water etc.) 
is made by the central government through the District Development Fund 
(Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). 
Occasional Paper 13 - DECENTRALISATION: A SURVEY OF LITERATURE FROM A HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE  
  
   
PART IV - EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION - COMPARATIVE PRIORITIES  
   
   
   
1.  Introduction and summary 
2.  Local community priorities 
3.  Local government priorities 
4.  Some Empirical Evidence 
Bibliography 
   
 
PART IV EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION - COMPARATIVE PRIORITIES   
1. Introduction and summary  
One task of the present study is to identify the overall relationship between 
decentralisation and expenditure allocation by sector - that is, whether or not local 
governments are associated with relatively higher expenditures on areas of priority for 
human development. Following the Human Development Reports of 1990 and 1991 (as 
well as a substantial body of academic work and numerous international declarations), 
"human priority" is defined to encompass those expenditures which contribute most to 
human development. Basic education, primary health care and family planning, water and 
sanitation for the poor and decent housing all fall within this ambit in the social sectors. 
A number of categories of economic expenditure, on rural roads, irrigation etc. are clearly 
also important, although excluded for the purpose of the present exercise.  
First this Part sums up the general arguments about expenditure allocations and decision 
making under decentralisation - in terms of the priorities of the local community and 
local governments. This is illustrated by a number of case studies. It is suggested that 
decentralisation has demonstrated potential to lead to a greater emphasis upon areas of 
priority for human development, but that this need not follow. Second, available evidence 
as to the relative priorities in specific sectors is presented. Finally, but certainly not lastly, 
an attempt is made to quantify the ratios of local and central governments. The limited 
evidence available reveals such a diversity of country experience that it is difficult to 
arrive at any firm general conclusions. Nonetheless it can be said that the sample revealed 
that proportionately higher shares of local expenditure are typically directed to the social 
sectors.  At the outset, the difficulties facing the present exercise should be noted. Any attempt to 
assess relative priorities is problematic where local government cannot be regarded as 
'autonomous'. The vertical fiscal imbalances and lack of financial autonomy which 
characterises local government in many countries may well entail a lack of local 
competence to determine local expenditure allocations. Central grants may be directly 
tied, or subject to guidelines. Further it is possible that decentralisation may impact upon 
central expenditure allocations, leading to higher, or lesser, shares directed towards 
human priorities.  
Note should be made of the obvious point that local priorities are virtually inherently 
more likely to accord to the basic priorities of human development, in the following 
senses. First because local governments are not generally concerned with such matters as 
defence, general administration and overseas debt repayment which may consume a large 
proportion of national budgets. Second, within the social sectors the focus is likely to be 
upon the lower (cheaper) levels of provision with their primarily local effects - for 
example, local clinics and dispensaries rather than large sophisticated hospitals, and basic 
schooling rather than universities.  
When examining decision making under decentralisation there are at least two related 
dimensions - the priorities of the local government and those of the local community. The 
main focus here is upon the former given that the task of the survey is to examine 
decentralisation of government. The latter is, however, clearly relevant - indeed in 
systems characterised by a significant degree of participation in local government, the 
priorities would be expected to converge.   
2. Local community priorities  
It is difficult to generalise about the priorities of local communities, which will inevitably 
vary across inter alia urban, rural and remote, better off and poorer, industrial and 
agricultural areas. Nonetheless the following observations can be made.  
The priorities of the local community may well differ from those considered to be 
important by the national government or donors. One major study argued that there is 
good evidence that neither rural nor urban residents volunteer for communal projects 
aimed at increasing productivity (e.g. irrigation); rather the projects in which they are 
prepared to participate showed that their priorities lie in the construction of schools, 
health clinics, water supplies and roads (Ralston et al 1983).  
It has been observed that the self-help activities are mainly concentrated upon the 
provision of priority social services such as schools, water supply and clinics (Hughes 
1985 p.60). Insofar as self-help schemes originate within local communities, they may 
provide a forum for expressing local needs and priorities. (This is not, however, the case 
when they are dominated by influential but narrow interest groups; when the poor lack 
the skills, confidence or influence necessary to advance a case; or when the availability of 
matching funds distorts local demands.)  •  In Tanzania, rural communities involved in the self-help movement co-operated 
in building schools, dispensaries and water supplies, but did not participate in 
agricultural projects unless compelled to do so by the government (Hyden, 1968 
cited in Ralston ibid.). The same pattern has been found in Zambia (projects of the 
Ward and Village Development committees), rural communities in Papua New 
Guinea and in the highlands of Peru (Ralston, ibid.). 
•  It has been found that women's groups in most developing countries tend to be 
focused on health and education, rather than physical infrastructure, such as roads 
(Miller, 1982, p.6-9). 
•  In 1985, in response to demands from village parents, the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) started experimental schools aimed at 
providing basic literacy, numeric and social awareness to the children of landless 
families. BRAB has developed a new model of basic primary education, which 
has proved to be accessible to the children of the poor and relevant to their needs. 
By late 1989 the programme had expanded to 2500 schools, with a further 2000 to 
open by this year. 
•  Nigerian rural communities are reported to regard improved water supplies as of 
the highest priority, but because this is expensive are more likely to begin with 
simpler, cheaper facilities such as roads (Okpala, 1980 cited in Ralston ibid.). 
The health priorities of local residents may differ from those considered of prime 
importance by the HDR. More specifically, the demand for curative care may be 
significant, so that primary health services may not meet local community preferences. 
Moreover, the poor may (understandably) be more concerned with basic consumption 
needs, prior to primary health care.  
•  An evaluation of an NGO-assisted programme to train village health workers in 
El Salvador reveals some of the difficulties which may be encountered (Capps 
and Crane, 1989). A survey conducted among the health promoters, who were all 
volunteers with limited education, found that much more time was being spent on 
treating illnesses than on community health education. This arose from the public 
demand for curative care, especially medications. In some cases this was due to a 
single promoter serving a large isolated community where no other resources 
existed. It was also noted that advertising has lead people to expect modern 
medicines to provide quick cures for almost all illnesses. 
•  In Mozambique, many of the village health workers met real difficulties as they 
could not satisfy the local demand for basic curative care. This sometimes 
resulted in the people losing confidence in the health workers, which had negative 
implications for the effectiveness of preventive measures, and also for the 
decentralisation of financing health care. Subsequently, the Ministry of Health 
decided to adjust its services to local aspirations, through providing greater 
curative skills in the training of health workers (MacIntosh and Whyt 1988). 
•  Tumwine (1989) provides a number of examples from the Chmanimani district of 
Zimbabwe where the priorities of local people differed from those of donors, and 
of local health workers. He cites the case of an externally assisted clinic, which 
had only involved the community in the construction of the building. It is the least utilised health facility in the district, mainly because the local community 
comprises va-postori (apostolic) religious groups which do not believe in the use 
of Western health services. Another example is the case of a village meeting 
called by a local nurse in response to a high incidence of bilharzia cases. The local 
health team decided that the people should be motivated to build and use 
improved latrines. But at the meeting it was revealed that the problem regarded as 
most serious by the community was 'sadza' (the staple food) and 'pellagra' (a 
nutritional problem). The meeting ended up discussing drought relief, nutrition, 
and communal food production plots. 
Thus the poor may be more preoccupied with satisfying immediate consumption needs 
than with the provision of services such as education and health. Gilbert and Ward (1985) 
found in their study of several Latin American communities that the level of participation 
varied according to the needs perceived by the local community. The lack of water and 
electricity attracted a higher degree of participation than the paucity of health centres and 
schools. In Zimbabwe, local participation in village community meetings varies 
according to the agenda to be discussed, the season, weather, etc. Land resettlement 
proposals, for example, arouse a lot of interest (see case study).  
Generally it has been noted that local NGOs tend to engage in areas of prime significance 
for human development - income-generating (e.g. credit), communal (such as 
afforestation), and social (e.g. primary health care) (World Development 1987). An 
evident priority of many local NGOs appears to lie in the task of educating and 
mobilising the poor to participate in, or demand services when they are illiterate, 
unorganised and/or live in remote areas.   
3. Local government priorities  
It would appear unwise to make sweeping statements about the extent to which local 
governments focus upon areas of significance for human development. Many complex 
factors will affect the orientation of local governments - including the socio-economic 
environment; the extent to which local public authorities represent the interests of their 
constituents; the political climate, which facilitates or restricts the free expression of 
popular feeling; and the functional responsibilities and financial resources available, or 
the extent to which local representatives are able to make decisions relating to the 
planning and implementation of human development projects and programmes. 
Nonetheless this sections attempts to draw a general picture of local government 
priorities.  
Local governments often have significant expenditure responsibilities in the areas of 
basic social services. Generally their concerns will tend to vary between localities, 
particularly between rural and urban areas. Matters such as refuse collection, sanitation, 
street cleaning and zoning - residential and industrial - are naturally more likely to be 
addressed by urban councils.  One study of alternative forms of popular participation in the context of basic needs 
concluded that local representative institutions may be well placed to articulate local 
perceptions and priorities but "in practice, lack of information, sectional interests, lack of 
resources and/or restricted powers may prevent them from fully appreciating the needs of 
deprived groups or acting to remedy them" (Hughes 1985).  
It has been argued that political and administrative decision-makers, particularly in 
democratic systems, prefer short term projects with immediate returns (Bahl et al 1984). 
This problem is not peculiar to developing countries. There is said to be a bias of local 
government in favour of highly visible projects such as new municipal buildings, rather 
than infrastructure development and recurrent expenditures such as road repair and 
school maintenance.  
•  It is reported that 80% of block grants to the upazilas in Bangladesh are spent on 
high profile and prestigious physical infrastructure, whilst allocations for critical 
social programmes are under-spent. Thomas (1989) concluded that, "without a 
further change in local level priorities, any further decentralisation of 
responsibility for primary education, health, water supply and other basic services 
to the local level cannot be contemplated" (p15). 
•  By way of contrast it was found in Agra district, Uttar Pradesh decentralisation 
promoted human development priorities: " The allocations for sectors like 
agriculture, social welfare and education...increased substantially ... Officers did 
more touring, and so came into direct contact with the poor, rather than dealing 
only through intermediaries. Programmes that benefited the poor and neglected 
areas were given priority" (Sanwal, 1987). 
•  Olowu (1989) reports that the experiments in self-governance across Africa in the 
early 1950s reflect high expenditures on areas of priority for human development, 
and that they had "remarkable success at building basic infrastructure" - roads, 
schools, clinics, bridges, markets, etc. - some of which still exist today (see table 
18). 
In the following sub-sections, examples of comparative priorities are drawn for specific 
sectors - education, health, water and sanitation, and economic infrastructure. (The extent 
of treatment of each reflects the availability of evidence, rather than the relative 
significance of the sector.)  
3.1 Education  
In principle, it would appear likely that local governments would focus more upon 
primary and lower secondary levels of schooling, rather than tertiary education - given 
the largely localised effects and lower costs involved. However whether education, per 
se, is an important priority of local governments is another matter. This would depend, to 
some extent, upon the allocation of functional responsibilities among different levels of 
government.  There is little empirical evidence as to whether decentralisation will help to promote 
spending on basic education, in terms of comparative expenditure ratios for local and 
central government. At the same time however there are numerous cases of local 
initiatives resulting in the expansion of provision of basic schooling - BRAB and 
Harambee are notable examples which have been referred to elsewhere.  
•  It has been reported from Uttar Pradesh, India, that decentralisation resulted in 
vastly increased provision of primary schools. There was increased emphasis on 
primary education, for example - in 1982, 98 schools were opened in Agra 
district, while the previous average had been seven new schools per year (Sanwal, 
1987). 
•  The Chinese government under Deng endorsed increased spending on education 
in order to promote economic development. The centre expected lower level 
governments to use the increased revenue available under economic 
decentralisation to support basic and vocational education. Problems have arisen 
however (Rosen, 1984). The localities, who are supposed to bear the burden of 
financing of mass education, reportedly prefer to invest in heavy industry 
projects, which are more prestigious and compensate for the irrational and 
inefficient supply of national industrial projects. According to Rosen (1985), local 
officials perceive education as a form of consumption which is essentially a 
"bottomless pit". Since 1979, intergovernmental transfers from the centre have 
been made on a lump sum basis with broad guidelines, whereas previously 
education funds had been earmarked for very specific purposes. In the result, the 
mass rural sector is locally (under-) financed, compared to the wholly urban elite 
sector which is disproportionately and centrally financed (Sautman, 1991). (The 
foregoing may represent a good example of a standard type of principal-agent 
problem in the decentralisation context). 
3.2 Health  
It is likely that local health expenditures are directed towards more basic levels of 
provision. In most cases, large, sophisticated hospitals would not fall within the fiscal 
possibilities faced by local government. This points to a higher share of priority health 
expenditures in local budgets. And at least in operational terms, it appears that certain 
areas of health care crucial to human development require a significant degree of 
decentralisation. Family planning, for example, may require medical personnel to go out 
to the people, and meetings with village leaders. The inherent limitation of population 
policies implemented through central agencies is expressly recognised in Bangladesh's 
current Fourth Five Year Plan (the national contraceptive prevalence rate is 35%).  
It has been argued that a shift in spending patterns alone will not be sufficient to promote 
preventive and basic curative health care - that there "also has to be a sharp change in the 
organisation of the social production of the new care" (Mackintosh and Whyt, 1988). An 
important difference between preventive health care and curative medicine is that the 
former requires the mobilisation of whole communities to be effective, while the latter 
normally treats individuals. In other words preventive care has to be eminently social in character (hence, the term 'public health') (ibid, p.169). It follows that health policy, in 
order to be effective, requires a significant degree of devolution, and must draw on and 
interact with community organisations.  
•  In 1972, the responsibility for health care in Tanzania was shifted to regional and 
district development directorates in a restructured central government field 
administration (Maro, 1990). The objective was to promote equity in the 
allocation of resources to health facilities. The establishment of rural health 
centres was funded partly through national government and partly through rural 
self-hElp, in the form of local materials and labour. Allocations for health 
increased greatly between 1972 and 1978, especially in recurrent expenditures, 
most of which went to rural clinics and dispensaries. This was accompanied by 
mass education campaigns aimed at improving nutrition, maternal and child 
health programmes. Maro (1990) found that most clinics and dispensaries were 
adequately maintained in terms of staff and essential drugs, and were generally 
regarded as adequate by users. 
•  In Mozambique, especially in the early years, local debate and as well as the 
decentralisation of resources were effectively promoted in the health sphere 
(Mackintosh and Whyts, 1988). The process of decentralisation in health planning 
and financing led to a shift in relative, and sometimes absolute terms, from city 
hospitals to rural clinics; from complex medical intervention to simpler 
procedures; from doctors to para-medicals; and from curative to preventive care 
(Macintosh and Wuyts,1988). There was an emphasis on training para-medical 
personnel and health posts. Health workers, chosen by local residents and sent on 
a six-month training course, were to concentrate on preventive care and health 
education, and be financially supported by the villages. Many villages put 
considerable local resources into providing health facilities and financing the 
health worker; some collected contributions in cash or kind from each household. 
There were, however, many problems with this system. The communal villages 
themselves were sometimes badly sited and unviable. This meant that health 
workers could not be financially supported, a fact which they naturally resented, 
given that teachers and agricultural workers were paid by the state. Also it was 
often difficult to maintain adequate basic supplies (Mackintosh and Whyts, 1988). 
•  The statutory responsibilities of the District Councils in Botswana include 
primary health care; the Councils are said to have played a major part in enabling 
the country to achieve one of the best health records in Africa (Tordoff 1988). 
•  Health services were not a high priority of local government in Ioilo City in the 
Philippines, where less than 6% of total local expenditures are directed toward 
health care. Health facilities suffer from inadequate premises, poorly qualified 
personnel, and shortages of medical and other supplies. 
3.3 Water and Sanitation  
Extensive appraisals conducted in the course of the International Drinking Water Decade 
by UNDP, the World Bank, and others have endorsed, inter alia, the following 
propositions: (i) Safe, accessible water supplies are an important priority of people living in rural areas in developing countries, as reflected in their willingness to pay for 
improved services and the extent of community involvement in a number of countries. 
(ii) Investments in sanitation services do not appear to be of high priority to most rural 
dwellers.  
•  In Senegal, it was found that spending decisions under decentralisation generally 
responded to the priorities expressed by the local councillors - the largest share of 
rural community budgets are directed toward the development of water supplies, 
particularly wells. Data from the Kaolick and Fatick regions indicate that 
expenditure on water by rural communities averages between 30-40% of the 
annual budget, compared to health (7%) and education (14%) (Vengroff and 
Johnston, 1987). 
That clean water is a high priority for local communities is evidenced by the many 
examples of their successful involvement in the planning, implementation and 
management of water supply systems, including Burma (U Tin U 1988), China, 
Colombia and Malawi (Briscoe and Ferranti 1988).  
•  In China the local community plays a leadership role in initiating water projects, 
selecting the source, technologies, and service levels, and financing the recurrent 
costs (local governments and entities are expected to pay capital costs) (ibid. 
p.19). Rural access to water stands at 66%, compared to a developing country 
average of 50% (HDR table 9). 
4. Some Empirical Evidence  
Significant difficulties face any attempt to measure priority public expenditures in 
developing countries (for a brief, understated description, see HDR 1991 Technical Note 
7). The prospect of quantifying local government priorities, and proceeding to conduct a 
comparative analysis, is even more daunting, given: (i) Severe data limitations - only 8 of 
the 85 developing countries which appear in the IMF GFS 1990 contain any data as to 
"Expenditure By Function" at local levels of government. Even here, we are limited to 
broad sectoral categories, without any further breakdown. Simply "education", for 
example, without any clue as to such sub-sectors as primary and secondary. (ii) Lack of 
financial autonomy - which may render any picture of "local expenditure allocations" 
illusory insofar as the local governments may not exercise any effective discretion in this 
sense. Even if central grants are not specifically tied, there may be guidelines which 
restrict the use of funds.  
Nonetheless, it is an important and useful exercise to undertake, at least in order to 
illustrate the general pattern of priority expenditures which exists. Table 19 shows the 
available evidence as to relative expenditures in the areas of education, health, and 
community amenities. The latter comprises public expenditures on the support of housing 
activities, community development, water and sanitation services, and social security and 
welfare services for the unemployed, the aged, and disabled people.  This data reflects an interesting picture of expenditure allocations. First as to education, 
in five of the eight countries, local spending is proportionately much higher than at the 
central level. Again in health, in five countries (although a different group from that for 
education), local spending is relatively higher. In six countries, local spending on 
community amenities was relatively more significant at the local level.  
It is also important to bear in mind the sub-sectoral breakdowns of expenditure. As the 
1991 HDR emphasised, the need for restructuring within each of the social sectors is as 
urgent as the need to reallocate expenditures between sectors. In many developing 
countries more then 80%, and in some cases over 90% of central health expenditures are 
directed towards hospital care. Thus even where the central government spending on 
health is proportionately greater than that at the local level, the impact upon human 
development may be less. In Chile, 6% of central expenditure is directed towards health, 
compared to only 3.4% at the local level; but almost 96% of the central allocation goes to 
hospitals. Unfortunately, as noted above, sub-sectoral breakdowns are not available for 
local government spending. It might be surmised that local government spending would 
tend to be directed towards clinics and community health workers, rather than large 
expensive hospitals. [Arguably, however, such a bias ought not to be taken for granted, 
insofar as this would purport to answer an important aspect of the present investigation 
simply by assumption; if no general propositions can be put, and the matter would have 
to be approached on a case-by-case basis.]  
TABLE 19 
Comparative priorities of local and central government: selected countries 
  
   
  Local government   Central government  


















Note: LE refers to local public expenditure as a % of GNP - i.e. district, not provincial level of 
government 
CE central government expenditure as a % of GNP 
CA refers to Community Amenities (including social welfare) 
n/a Not available 
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